WEKO3
アイテム
不二一元論派の非存在認識論
https://doi.org/10.15027/0002040421
https://doi.org/10.15027/0002040421d238e13b-b3c8-4284-85ba-930b93354f46
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
---|---|---|
![]() |
|
Item type | デフォルト(1) | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2025-04-25 | |||||||||
タイトル | ||||||||||
タイトル | 不二一元論派の非存在認識論 | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
タイトル | ||||||||||
タイトル | Non-Perception Theory in Advaita Vedānta | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
作成者 |
加藤, 隆宏
× 加藤, 隆宏
|
|||||||||
アクセス権 | ||||||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
内容記述 | ||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
内容記述 | Pramāṇa became a systematized topic within the Advaita Vedānta school later in its history. One of the earliest comprehensive studies on this subject in a non-Indian language is D.M. Datta’s The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical Study of Vedānta Theory of Knowledge. According to Datta, before the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, pramāṇa was not treated as an independent topic in Advaita Vedānta. While Śaṇkara’s works occasionally discuss pramāṇas like direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), they do not present a systematic epistemology. The absence of pramāṇa discussions in earlier key texts, like the Brahmasūtra and Śaṅkara’s commentary on it, might be due to their focus on Vedāntic hermeneutics. Since Upaniṣadic texts do not explicitly discuss pramāṇas, it was perhaps unnecessary for the Brahmasūtra to elaborate on them. Post- Śaṅkara, works like the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa attributed to Sarvajñātman (circa 10th century) discuss pramāṇas more explicitly. This text recognizes six pramāṇas, including non-existence (abhāva), which aligns with later discussions in the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā is organized into an introduction and nine chapters, covering six pramāṇas: perception, inference, analogy (upamāna), scripture (āgama), postulation (arthāpatti), and non-perception (anupalabdhi). This structure reflects the Vivaraṇa tradition’s influence and indicates the systematic nature of pramāṇa theory in Advaita Vedānta. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā aligns with the Bhāṭṭa views, asserting that non-perception is a unique means of knowledge, distinct from other pramāṇas like inference and analogy. It is defined as the direct apprehension of an absence in a suitable locus. Dharmarāja, author of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, addresses potential objections by refining the concept of “appropriateness (yogyatā)” for non-perception. The discussion on “appropriateness” in non-perception reveals interpretative challenges. In the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, the definition of non-perception involves the notion that “if a pot exists, it should be perceived,” but since it is not perceived, its non-existence is cognized. This is termed “appropriate non-perception (yogyānupalabdhi),” a concept shared among traditional scholars. The Mānameyodaya, a compendium of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, describes appropriateness as the presence of all conditions necessary for perception. Both schools use the structure “if a pot exists, it would be perceived.” In the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, the concept of non-perception (as a means of knowledge) is discussed, including potential objections and responses. A key issue addressed is the problem of direct knowledge. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā posits non-perception as an independent means of knowledge, but questions arise as to whether non-existence can be directly perceived. For example, “there is no pot on the ground” implies direct perception of the ground, recognized by both Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools. Dharmarāja’s explanation relies on the distinction between different kinds of mental modifications (vrtti), arguing that non-perception as a means of knowledge is separate from direct perception. This distinction is novel and not explicitly detailed in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā or its commentaries, leaving some aspects of the process unclear. The Vedāntaparibhāṣā outlines the four types of non-existence (prāgabhāva, pradhvaṃsābhāva, atyantābhāva, and anyo’nyābhāva) as acknowledged in the Nyāya school. While Advaita Vedānta shares basic classifications with Nyāya, it requires alignment with its own non-dualistic doctrine. The Nyāya school defines pradhvaṃsābhāva as “having a beginning but no end,” while Dharmarāja argues that pradhvaṃsābhāva itself must also cease. They posit that if the substratum has a beginning (sādi), non-existence is also finite, but if the substratum is beginningless (anādi), mutual non-existence is likewise beginningless. However, Advaita Vedānta denies any eternal substratum other than brahman. Everything apart from brahman is ultimately rejected as unreal or illusory, as its ultimate reality is negated within this philosophical framework. Dharmarāja also critiques Nyaya’s view that atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence) is permanent, arguing instead that it ceases during cosmic dissolution, aligning with the belief that only brahman is permanent. This stance extends to discussions on anyo’nyābhāva (reciprocal non-existence), where distinctions like “A is not B” are dependent on the substrate’s temporality. Differences are seen as results of ignorance (avidyā), which dissolve upon its cessation, maintaining the non-duality of brahman. Dharmarāja suggests that non-existence recognized in the empirical world does not conflict with the non-dualistic brahman, as the empirical world is seen as a superimposition on brahman. Ultimately, in Advaita Vedānta, the empirical distinctions vanish at the level of absolute reality, adhering to the doctrine that only brahman is truly existent. This conclusion reflects the inherent limitations within Advaita Vedānta’s doctrinal framework. |
|||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
内容記述 | ||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
内容記述 | 広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター研究成果報告書(2024年度) | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
内容記述 | ||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
内容記述 | The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic (2024) | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
出版者 | ||||||||||
出版者 | 広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
出版者 | ||||||||||
出版者 | Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic,Hiroshima University | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
言語 | ||||||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||
出版タイプ | ||||||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
ID登録 | ||||||||||
ID登録 | 10.15027/0002040421 | |||||||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||||
助成情報 | ||||||||||
助成機関識別子タイプ | Crossref Funder | |||||||||
助成機関識別子タイプURI | https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691 | |||||||||
助成機関名 | 日本学術振興会 | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
助成機関名 | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
研究課題番号URI | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20420/ | |||||||||
研究課題番号 | 21H00472 | |||||||||
研究課題名 | インド哲学における「無」の思想 | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
研究課題名 | The concept of absence and negation in Indian philosophy | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
助成情報 | ||||||||||
助成機関識別子タイプ | Crossref Funder | |||||||||
助成機関識別子タイプURI | https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691 | |||||||||
助成機関名 | 日本学術振興会 | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
助成機関名 | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
研究課題番号URI | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20420/ | |||||||||
研究課題番号 | 23K20420 | |||||||||
研究課題名 | インド哲学における「無」の思想 | |||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
研究課題名 | The concept of absence and negation in Indian philosophy | |||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||
収録物識別子 | ||||||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||
収録物識別子 | 1880-6376 | |||||||||
書誌情報 |
ja : 比較論理学研究 en : The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic 号 23(特別号), p. 117-134, ページ数 18, 発行日 2025-03-25 |
|||||||||
備考 | ||||||||||
言語 | ja | |||||||||
値 | 内容記述欄: システム上表示できない記号を一部省略。本文ファイルをご確認ください。 |