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ジャヤンタの非存在認識論の諸相とその後の展開 : ニヤーヤ学派とクマーリラ派との論争史を探る
https://doi.org/10.15027/0002040418
https://doi.org/10.15027/0002040418edac3147-d9b2-4711-91b1-b41ab7f18698
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Ann-ResProjCent-CompStudLogic_23_31.pdf (605 KB)
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| Item type | デフォルト(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2025-04-25 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | ジャヤンタの非存在認識論の諸相とその後の展開 : ニヤーヤ学派とクマーリラ派との論争史を探る | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Analysis of the Epistemology of Absence (abhāva) in the Nyāyamañjarī from Historical Perspective of the Development of Controversy between the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 作成者 |
丸井, 浩
× 丸井, 浩
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| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | The aim of this paper is to analyse the epistemology of absence (abhāva) in the Nyāyamañjarī (=NM) and to shed light on the historical development of controversy between Naiyāyikas (=N) and Bhāaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (=MKum) from Jayanta up to Udayana (partly to Gaṅgeśa) over the epistemology of past absence in particular. The sections 1-4 provide introductory accounts. The section 1 mentions the aim of this paper and the section 2 gives a brief survey of a pre-history of Nyāya’s discussion on abhāva. The section 3 shows a structural content of the relevant part of NM (NM I, 130.8–167.8) which is concerned with the epistemology of absence. It contains two different controversies. The first controversy is made between MKum and N (130.8–145.4) and the second is between the Buddhist philosophers and (145.7–163.11) and N. The second controversy is followed by Nyāya’s criticism of the view of Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā (163.13–166.5), according to which the external reality is also denied to absence. The last portion (166.7–167.6) of this part of NM is a sort of appendix, in which reference is made to the division of abhāva. Jayanta admits only the twofold division, the prior absence and the posterior absence, subsuming the absolute absence and the mutual absence under the prior absence. Both the two parties of the first dispute accept the external reality of absence, and therefore the difference of their views just lies in the issue of how to know it. To cite the model example of their discussion on this issue, MKum argue that the absence of a pot on the ground before one’s eyes is known by the absence of the function of all the means of knowledge which would grasp it, had it been there. According to them, absence is known by absence, whereas existence is known by existence. On the other hand, N insist that the absence of a pot should be known by visual organ (in general, the sense faculty) together with the ground. The other party of the second dispute, namely Buddhists, reject the ontological reality of absence and therefore the sphere of their discussion is greatly different and much wider. Nevertheless, the second controversy shares many issues with the first one and may be regarded with a dispute on the epistemology of absence or negation in a broader sense. The section 4 tries to clarify the main points of debate on the epistemology absence in a narrower sense and a broader sense as well. The section 4 gives an introductory account of what they discuss and how they argue on the issue of epistemology of absence, taking the wider version of it into consideration. The section 5 makes an analytical study of the first dispute. An attempt is made to shed light on the historical place of Jayanta’s arguments against the views of MKum by comparing them with the commentaries of Uṃveka, Sucarita and Pārthasārathi on the Ślokavārttika, abhāvapariccheda, v. 11, v. 27 and v. 28, the three verses cited by Jayanta. As a result, the present author supports the observation of Beaulieu [2021] that Jayanta and Uṃveka share the “Recollection Thesis” (Beaulieu [2021: 614]) on the epistemology of past absence. Other pieces of evidence are also shown for the similarity of Jayanta to Uṃveka. The section 6.1 provides a Japanese translation and explanation of the portion of Vācaspati’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā which deals with the debate between MKum and N, and the section 6.2 gives the same to the corresponding commentary of Udayana in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi. The argument of MKum for their view of “Absencialism” (Beaulieu [2021:610]) and against Nyāya’s “Perceptualism” (Beaulieu [2021:606]) that Vācaspati shows there is substantially the same with that of Uṃveka, but the Nyāya’s view he proposes in answer for their “Perceptualism” is quite different from that of NM. According to Vācaspati, the past absence is inferentially known by the inferential mark (liṅga) of the absence of recollection of a recollectable (smartavyāsmaraṇa), the absence of recollection of a recollectable is grasped by the inner organ (manas) through the inner organ’s relation with the absence of the recollection called “saṃyuktaviśeṣaṇa-bhāva.” This view undoubtedly belongs to the category of “Recollection Failure Thesis” (Beaulieu [2021: 623]). Udayana silently accepts Vācaspati’s view and adds several arguments for Vācaspati’s “Recollection Failure Thesis.” It is noteworthy that Udayana criticizes the recollection failure view which is only found in Pārthasārathi’s commentary. Furthermore, the remarkable similarity is demonstrated between Udayana’s arguments and Gaṅgeśa’s anupalabdhivāda. As a conclusion, the present author proposes that Gaṅgeśa silently accepted Vācaspati’s recollection failure view and added some supportive explanation on the basis of Udayana’s arguments for Vācaspati’s view. It is highly possible that Vācaspati introduced the innovative recollection failure view into Nyāya’s epistemology of past absence earlier than Pārthasārathi did it to improve MKum’s epistemology of past absence, when we notice that Udayana, not yet Vācaspati, anticipated MKum’s argument found in Pārthasārathi’s recollection failure view. The present author highly evaluates Beaulieu [2021] and the present study owes a lot to his remarkable contribution, but the present author propose a correction to his view that Gaṅgeśa should have been largely indebted to Pārthasārathi when he innovated his “Recollection Failure View”. |
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| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | 広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター研究成果報告書（2024年度） | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic (2024) | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | 広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic,Hiroshima University | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
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| 言語 | jpn | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||
| 出版タイプ | ||||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||||
| ID登録 | ||||||||||
| ID登録 | 10.15027/0002040418 | |||||||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||||
| 助成情報 | ||||||||||
| 助成機関識別子タイプ | Crossref Funder | |||||||||
| 助成機関識別子タイプURI | https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691 | |||||||||
| 助成機関名 | 日本学術振興会 | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 助成機関名 | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 研究課題番号URI | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20420/ | |||||||||
| 研究課題番号 | 21H00472 | |||||||||
| 研究課題名 | インド哲学における「無」の思想 | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 研究課題名 | The concept of absence and negation in Indian philosophy | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 助成情報 | ||||||||||
| 助成機関識別子タイプ | Crossref Funder | |||||||||
| 助成機関識別子タイプURI | https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691 | |||||||||
| 助成機関名 | 日本学術振興会 | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 助成機関名 | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 研究課題番号URI | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20420/ | |||||||||
| 研究課題番号 | 23K20420 | |||||||||
| 研究課題名 | インド哲学における「無」の思想 | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 研究課題名 | The concept of absence and negation in Indian philosophy | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1880-6376 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
ja : 比較論理学研究 en : The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic 号 23(特別号), p. 31-73, ページ数 43, 発行日 2025-03-25 |
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