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  1. 広島大学の刊行物
  2. 比較論理学研究
  3. 23号(特別号)

龍樹の解脱観・涅槃観 : 仏教は虚無の信仰か

https://doi.org/10.15027/0002040416
https://doi.org/10.15027/0002040416
b0537e6e-7e17-4bbe-a036-534b9ebf2c09
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
Ann-ResProjCent-CompStudLogic_23_1.pdf Ann-ResProjCent-CompStudLogic_23_1.pdf (437 KB)
Item type デフォルト(1)
公開日 2025-04-25
タイトル
タイトル 龍樹の解脱観・涅槃観 : 仏教は虚無の信仰か
言語 ja
タイトル
タイトル Nāgārjuna on mokṣa and nirvāṇa: Is Buddhism the Cult of Nothingness?
言語 en
作成者 桂, 紹隆

× 桂, 紹隆

ja 桂, 紹隆

en KATSURA, Shōryū

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アクセス権
アクセス権 open access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 A French philosopher, Roget-Pol Droit (1949~), in Le Culte du Neant, Les Philosphes et le Bouddha (1997; Japanese translation by H. Shimada & M. Tagiri, 2002), clearly presented that when European intellectuals in the nineteenth century first encountered the teaching of the Buddha and the doctrines of his later interpreters, they believed with a strong fear that the teaching of the Buddha and his followers is the cult of nothingness, for they believed that the goal of Buddhist religious practice, i.e., is nirvāṇa is ‘nothingness’ or ‘extinction of the soul.’ Even the great French pioneering scholar of Buddhism, Eugène Burnouf (1801~1852) in his Introduction à l’histoire du Bu ddhsime indien (1844) promoted their fear by describing nirvāṇa by the simile of extinction of a lamp light. Droit, however, has shown that with the development of the modern scientific studies of Buddhism such a fear gradually disappeared.
Their fear that nirvāṇa is nothingness reminds the debate between the Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntika on the nature of asaṃskṛta-dharma, especially, nirvāṇa, in the Abhidharmakośa II.55, in which the former criticizes the latter’s idea that nirvāṇa is a kind of nonexistence. To this criticism the Sautrāntika replies that nirvāṇa is not an absolute nonexistence but a nonexistence of all defilements like extinction of a lamp light and that even when all defilements disappear the body with a pure mind remains to exist. The Sautrāntika concludes that asaṃskṃta-dharmas such as nirvāna is without svabhāva, in other words, they are not real entities (vastu) like saṃskṛta-dhamras. The Sarvāstivādin, on the other hand, concludes that asaṃskṛta-dharmas are real entities but without cause. It is clear that both parties have their own theoretical difficulties.
Going back to the early Buddhist canon, Kogen Mizuno (1901~2006) in his article “On asaṃskṛta-dharma” (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu, 10-1, 1962) concludes that asaṃskṛta-dharma is not an existent but a state of awakening or that of an awakened person; it is essentially nirvāṇa. Kazuyoshi Katayama (1942~) in his article “nirvāṇa in Pāli Buddhism” (Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu Kenkyu Kiyo, vol. 59, 2001), basing upon Uddāna, concludes that nirvāna is a state of the end of sufferings (duḥkha).
According to Nāgārjuna and his followers, Buddhist doctrinal concepts such as saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛ - ta, saṃsāra and nirvāna or mokṣa, karma and phala, and utpāda and nirodha, being empty of svabhāva, are not real from the ultimate point of view (paramārthataḥ) but they have an educational purpose of leading people to mokṣa or nirvāṇa and they are real from the conventional point of view (saṃvṛtyā). Therefore, it is not proper to characterize Nāgārjuna and his followers as nihilists or nāstikas.
His main work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII.5 says: “Mokṣa is attained through the cessation of karma and defilements; karma and defilements arise because of falsifying conceptualizations (vikalpa); they in turn arise from prapañca (linguistic multiplicity); but prapañca ceases to exist in/by emptiness.” Furthermore, he says: “[When prapañca ceases to exist,] what is to be named ceases and the domain of objects of consciousness ceases (XVIII.7)” and “[The reality (tattva) is] not to be known with the help of others, quiescent, not hypostatized/proliferated by prapañcas, free from falsifying conceptualizations, and not having many separate meanings — this is the nature of the reality (XVIII.9).” From these verses it is clear that for Nāgārjuna mokṣa is attained by the realization of emptiness that can extinguish prapañcas which produce falsifying conceptualizations, which in turn produce karma and defilements, the main causes of saṃsāra.
In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter XXIV, Nāgārjuna claims that Buddhist doctrines of the four nobles’ truths, the three jewels of the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, the cause and the effect, and all worldly activities (saṃvyavahāra) are possible only when they are empty of their intrinsic natures (svabhāva). In XXIV.18 he identifies the teaching of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītyasamutpāda) with ‘emptiness’, ‘dependent conceptualization’ (upādāya-prajñapti), and ‘the middle path’.
In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter XXV, he declares that nirvāna too is possible only when it is empty of its intrinsic nature. Furthermore, he presents the following negative tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi):
I  It is not the case that nirvāṇa is an existent (bhāva).
II  It is not the case that nirvāṇa is a nonexistent (abhāva).
III  It is not the case that nirvāṇa is both an existent and a nonexistent.
IV  It is not the case that nirvāṇa is neither an existent nor a nonexistent.
This simply indicates that nirvāṇa is beyond the conceptualizations of existence and nonexistence and that it cannot be described in terms of those concepts.
Towards the end of this paper I suggested that apart from Nāgārjuna and his followers, the early Buddhists and the Yogācāra-vijñānavādins gave more reality to mind (citta) or consciousness (vijñāna) and put a positive role in their explanation of saṃsāra, mokṣa and nirvāna. In any case I would like to conclude that Buddhism is not the cult of nothingness or nihilism. In Appendix I refer to Fumiyasu Ishikawa’s interesting remarks on Kantian concepts of negation that seem to correspond to the two uses/meanings of negation in Indian grammatical and philosophical tradition.
言語 en
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター研究成果報告書(2024年度)
言語 ja
内容記述
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic (2024)
言語 en
出版者
出版者 広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター
言語 ja
出版者
出版者 Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic,Hiroshima University
言語 en
言語
言語 jpn
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ departmental bulletin paper
出版タイプ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
ID登録
ID登録 10.15027/0002040416
ID登録タイプ JaLC
助成情報
助成機関識別子タイプ Crossref Funder
助成機関識別子タイプURI https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691
助成機関名 日本学術振興会
言語 ja
助成機関名 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
言語 en
研究課題番号URI https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20420/
研究課題番号 21H00472
研究課題名 インド哲学における「無」の思想
言語 ja
研究課題名 The concept of absence and negation in Indian philosophy
言語 en
助成情報
助成機関識別子タイプ Crossref Funder
助成機関識別子タイプURI https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691
助成機関名 日本学術振興会
言語 ja
助成機関名 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
言語 en
研究課題番号URI https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20420/
研究課題番号 23K20420
研究課題名 インド哲学における「無」の思想
言語 ja
研究課題名 The concept of absence and negation in Indian philosophy
言語 en
収録物識別子
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 1880-6376
書誌情報 ja : 比較論理学研究
en : The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic

号 23(特別号), p. 1-18, ページ数 18, 発行日 2025-03-25
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