{"created":"2025-02-27T04:05:35.390774+00:00","id":2015656,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"5cac8a19-1d64-4b2f-9855-bdbdfa398abf"},"_deposit":{"created_by":41,"id":"2015656","owner":"41","owners":[41],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"2015656"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:hiroshima.repo.nii.ac.jp:02015656","sets":["1727147343679:1730442355837:1730442358360"]},"author_link":[],"item_1617186331708":{"attribute_name":"Title","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_1617186419668":{"attribute_name":"Creator","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Caro-Burnett, Johann","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"familyNames":[{"familyName":"Caro-Burnett","familyNameLang":"en"}],"givenNames":[{"givenName":"Johann","givenNameLang":"en"}]}]},"item_1617186476635":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"open access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2"}]},"item_1617186609386":{"attribute_name":"Subject","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Political Economy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Mechanism Design","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Impatient Players","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Security Council","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_1617186626617":{"attribute_name":"Description","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members via Security Council seats.","subitem_description_language":"en"},{"subitem_description":"This study is based on the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Yale University.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1617186643794":{"attribute_name":"Publisher","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"広島大学大学院国際協力研究科"}]},"item_1617186702042":{"attribute_name":"Language","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_1617186819068":{"attribute_name":"identifier_registration","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.15027/50131","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_1617187024783":{"attribute_name":"開始ページ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_start_page":"1"}]},"item_1617187056579":{"attribute_name":"bibliographic_information","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2020-12","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"8","bibliographicPageEnd":"53","bibliographicPageStart":"1","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"10","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"IDEC DP2 Series"},{"bibliographic_title":"IDEC DP2 Series"}]}]},"item_1617258105262":{"attribute_name":"item_1617258105262","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_1617265215918":{"attribute_name":"出版タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_1617605131499":{"attribute_name":"File","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_access","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2023-03-18"}],"displaytype":"simple","filename":"IDEC-DP2_10-8.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"1.9 MB"}],"mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"objectType":"fulltext","url":"https://hiroshima.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2015656/files/IDEC-DP2_10-8.pdf"},"version_id":"8b05c3cc-1b89-45de-84cf-856ff7a324bf"}]},"item_1732771732025":{"attribute_name":"旧ID","attribute_value":"50131"},"item_title":"Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations","item_type_id":"40003","owner":"41","path":["1730442358360"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2023-03-18"},"publish_date":"2023-03-18","publish_status":"0","recid":"2015656","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations"],"weko_creator_id":"41","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2025-06-02T03:56:45.064148+00:00"}