

Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge's Theory of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag*¹

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1 Introduction

The present study focuses on the Tibetan concepts of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* as articulated in the works of Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), the sixth abbot of Gsang phu ne'u thog monastery. Phywa pa considers both *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* to be objects known by negating something to be negated (*dgag bya*), the former referring to a negative factor known by discarding all positive properties, and the latter to one in which some positive properties remain. In this paper, *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* are translated as “no-thing-ness” and “not-that-ness,” rather than as non-implicative and implicative negation, as they are generally understood.² The following discussion proceeds with an examination of Phywa pa's interpretation of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* and his critique of earlier Tibetan theory on these concepts. Finally, an annotated translation of Phywa pa's *Dbu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po* (125.122.22) is provided.

2 Positive and Negative Properties

Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge discusses the implications of Madhyamaka argumentation of emptiness based on the reason of “neither one nor many,” employing the epistemic concepts of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag*. His exegesis of the “neither one nor many” argument is derived, to some extent, from Kamalaśīla's (ca. 740–795) discussion in his *Madhyamakāloka*, where Kamalaśīla raises a significant question: does the reasoning of “neither one nor many” establish an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) or a non-implicative negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)? After a detailed analysis, he suggests that both interpretations can be considered valid.³ This topic was extensively debated at Gsang phu ne'u thog monastery,⁴ ultimately contributing to the development of Phywa pa's theory of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag*.

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²The term “nothingness” for *med dgag* was first introduced by Hookham (1991: 31). As demonstrated below, *med dgag*, or “no-thing-ness,” refers to a thing understood through non-implicative negation. The Tibetan term *med dgag*, literally translating to “negate [something] as being nonexistent,” is best represented as “no-thing-ness,” given that *med* signifies the absence of existence or “no thing.”

³MĀD 219b1f. (cf. Kobayashi 1989: 87f.; Ichigō 1991: 243; Keira 2004: 207): *gang yang bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub pa dag ci med par dgag pa'i ngo bo zhig yin nam | 'on te ma yin pa'i ngo bo yin* | (“Furthermore, do the [property] to be established and the one establishing [the thesis] have as their essence non-implicative negation or implicative negation?”) Kamalaśīla counters the criticism raised by an opponent—that the reasoning falls into the fallacy of inconclusiveness (*ma nges pa*, **anaikāntika*), regardless of whether one adopts implicative negation or non-implicative negation—and suggests that both cases can be valid, a view later inherited by Phywa pa (Keira 2004: 217, fn. 399; Hugon 2015: 64f.; Keira 2024).

⁴*Bstan rim chen mo* 663.23f.: *'dir bsgrub bya'i chos ni bden pa'i rang bzhin med par dgag pa tsam yin gyi | ma yin par dgag pa ni ma yin no* || (“The property to be established in this [argumentation] is exclusively a non-

In his work on Madhyamaka philosophy, *Dbu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po* (also known as *Dbu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun*), Phywa pa discusses what is established by the Madhyamaka argumentation, drawing on Kamalaśīla's ideas as a foundation. He employs the epistemic concepts of *meg dgag* and *ma yin dgag* without emphasizing their transformation from the Indian original semantic concepts of *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*. According to Phywa pa, there are two types of properties established through argumentation in general: positive properties (*sgrub pa'i chos*) and negative properties (*dgag pa'i chos*). A positive property is one that can be understood on its own, without needing an image of its opposite. In contrast, a negative property is one that is understood in dependence upon the emergence of an image of its opposite.

“Therefore, it is to be explained thus.

A positive property *x* is defined by the following conditions: The concept of an opposing element *x*, like causal efficacy, causal generation, disintegration at another moment, or an object of cognition, can manifest [in the mind] without the necessity of the concept of [another] opposing element, non-*x*, to manifest. And it becomes apprehensible as *x*, once the concept of ‘*x*’ itself manifests [in the mind] independently.

A negative property *y* is defined by the following conditions: The concept of the object to be negated, non-*y*, manifests [in the mind]. Then, based on that manifestation, the concept of an opposing element *y*, like lack of causal efficacy, lack of causal generation, or lack of disintegration, also manifests [in the mind], and subsequently becomes apprehensible as *y*.”⁵

In short, a positive property is something that is known without the need for negation, whereas a negative property is something that is known only through the process of negation. For instance, causal efficacy (*don byed pa*, **arthakriyā*) is considered a positive property since it can manifest in the mind on its own, without requiring the presence of an image of “lack of causal efficacy,” which is an opposing element of the given property. Conversely, lack of causal efficacy (*don byed pas stong ba*) is regarded as a negative property since it is apprehended only in relation to the emergence of an image of “causal efficacy,” the object of negation, and its denial.

3 No-thing-ness and Not-that-ness

Phywa pa then introduces the concepts of *ma yin dgag* and *med dgag* (also written as *myed dgag* in archaic form), as follows:

implicative negation of intrinsic being of substantiality, not an implicative negation.”); *De nyid nam spyod* 17b6 (cf. Hugon and Vose 2024: 105): ‘*dir bsgrub bya ni med dgag yin gyi ma yin dgag ni ma yin no* | (“What is to be established here is a non-implicative negation, not an implicative negation.”)

⁵*Snying po* 87.1ff. (cf. *Rgyan bshad* 5b1f.; Hugon 2015: 63, 76, 77): *des na 'di ltar brjod de don byed pa dang rgyus bskyed pa dang dus gzhan du 'gag pa dang blo'i yul lasogs pa bzlog pa 'ga' zhig gi don spyi 'char ba na bzlog pa'i don spyi 'char ba la ma ltos par rang nyid kyi don spyi rang dbang du shar nas zhen du rung ba rnams ni sgrub pa'i chos zhes bya'o || don byed pas stong ba dang rgyus bskyed pa myed pa dang 'gag pa myed pa lasogs pa dgag bya'i don spyi shar ba la ltos nas de las bzlog pa'i don spyi shar ste zhen du rung ba ni dgag pa'i chos zhes bya'o ||*

“Both purely positive properties and the combination of the negative and positive are [considered] not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*). Purely negative properties, on the other hand, are [termed as] no-thing-ness (*myed dgag*). Therefore, no-thing-ness is defined as that which can be apprehended by cognition as a purely negative property when determining its concept individually. And not-that-ness is defined as that which can be apprehended without a positive property being discarded when determining its concept individually.”⁶

“Purely positive properties encompass such things as [the property of] being a product, existence, and the like. Purely negative properties encompass such things as lack of causal efficacy, lack of [the property of] being a product, and the like. The combination of the negative and positive includes such things as the property of being manifest [in the mind], yet empty of intrinsic being of substantiality, and the like.”⁷

According to Phywa pa's system, all properties (*chos*) are divided into two categories: no-thing-ness (*myed dgag*) and not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*). Purely negative properties (*dgag pa 'ba' zhig pa*), such as the “lack of causal efficiency” and so forth, fall under the category of no-thing-ness. Conversely, all remaining properties, which include a combination of positive and negative properties (*dgag sgrub tshogs pa*), such as illusory nature of things, as well as purely positive properties (*sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa*), such as being a product, are classified as not-that-ness.

0 properties (*chos*)

- 1 no-thing-ness (*myed dgag*) = purely negative properties (*dgag pa 'ba' zhig pa*)
- 2 not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*)
 - 2.1 purely positive properties (*sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa*)
 - 2.2 combination of the positive and negative properties (*dgag sgrub tshogs pa*)

Phywa pa does not categorize *ma yin dgag* as a separate subdivision of the negative property (*dgag pa*), distinct from the positive property (*sgrub pa*).⁸ In his perspective, the term “negative” strictly pertains to *med dgag* alone, while *ma yin dgag* encompasses all other properties, including positive properties exemplified by “being a product.”

When contemplating the property of being a product, there is no necessity for an opposing concept (*bzlog pa*) like “non-product” to manifest in one's mind. As a result, being a product is designated as a positive property. Moreover, when grasping the concept of being a product,

⁶*Snying po* 87.9ff. (cf. Hugon 2015: 63, 77): *sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa dang dgag sgrub tshogs pa ma yin dgag yin la dgag pa 'ba' zhig pa myed dgag yin pas myed dgag gi mtshan nyid ni ldog pa de kha yar nges pa na dgag pa 'ba' zhig par blos zhen par bya ba yin la | ma yin dgag gi mtshan nyid ni ldog pa de kha yar nges pa na sgrub pa'i cha ma dor bar zhen par bya ba yin no ||*

⁷*Snying po* 87.6ff. (cf. Hugon 2015: 63): *sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa ni byas pa dang yod pa lasogs pa'o || dgag pa 'ba' zhig pa ni don byed pas stong ba dang byas pas stong ba lasogs pa'o || dgag sgrub tshogs pa ni snang yang bden pa'i rang bzhin gyis stong ba lasogs pa'o ||*

⁸Hugon (2015: 63) remarks: “Indeed, for Phywa pa, as for his teacher rGya dmar pa, *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* are not two subdivisions of negation (*dgag pa*), distinct from affirmation (*sgrub*). Rather, they exhaust the possibilities for both negative and positive phenomena, for negation, affirmation, and the combination of both.” See also Hugon 2015: 86, n. 40.

there is no need to “discard a positive property” (*sgrub chos dor ba*). Hence, it meets the criteria of *ma yin dgag* or not-that-ness. The same criteria for *ma yin dgag* are also applicable to “the combination of the positive and negative.”

This unique concept by Phywa pa has been embraced by subsequent scholars like Gtsang nag pa brtson 'grus seng ge (12th cent.), Rma bya byang chub brtson 'grus (d. 1185), Sa skya paṇḍita kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251), and others.⁹ Phywa pa illustrates the concept of not-that-ness using the example of “the property of being manifest in the mind, yet empty of intrinsic substantiality.” Because this property emerges in the mind independently of its opposing concept (*bzlog pa*), it possesses a positive aspect. Moreover, as it is a property devoid of intrinsic existence, it also has a negative aspect. Consequently, it is a blend of both positive and negative aspects. When such a property is apprehended, a positive factor manifesting in the mind remains intact without being discarded, aligning with the definition of not-that-ness.

For Phywa pa, the concept of *med dgag*, or no-thing-ness, is interchangeable with *nam gcad*, a negative element (*lit.* “what is cut off”), while the concept of *ma yin dgag*, or not-that-ness, corresponds to *yongs gcod*, a positive element (*lit.* “what remains after cutting around”).

Furthermore, by employing the concepts of no-thing-ness and not-that-ness, Phywa pa elucidates the condition of identity relation (*bdag gcig pa'i 'brel pa*, **tādātmya*), which obtains between the logical reason and the property to be established as not-that-ness in the “neither one nor many” reasoning. If a certain property *x* does not discard another property *y* due to their inseparability, then these two properties share an identity relation. The former, *x*, functions as the pervaded property (*khyab bya*, **vyāpya*) and can be either no-thing-ness or not-that-ness. The latter, *y*, functions as the pervader (*khyab byed*, **vyāpaka*) and must always be not-that-ness. On the basis of this framework, Phywa pa explains how the inferential sign “neither one nor many” functioning as the sign of an essential property (*rang bzhin gyi rtags*) can establish not-that-ness.

Phywa pa's theory, which distinguishes *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* based on whether “a positive property is discarded” or not, was generally accepted by his disciples. For instance, Gtsang nag pa brtson 'grus seng ge, one of his followers, articulates this idea as follows:

“Thus [the definitions of the positive and negative] are as follows. [1] A positive property is that which is an [existing] factor and which can be independently determined without depending on the appearance of the generality of the object to be negated (*dgag bya'i spyi*). It is exemplified by ‘manifestation [in the mind]’. [2] A negative property is that which exists as the [result of] pure negation or exclusion of a positive property. A negative property is exemplified by ‘emptiness’. [3] The concept of their combination is a positive property pertaining to negation, and it is termed not-that-ness. It is exemplified by ‘illusory

⁹Similar to Phywa pa, Gtsang nag pa, Rma bya, and Sa skya paṇḍita regard the combination of the positive and negative as not-that-ness (*Legs bshad bsdu pa* 18b2f.; *Rigs tshogs rgyan* 4a9; *Rigs gter rang 'grel* 127b5). However, Tsong kha pa opposes this theory, arguing that it blurs the distinction between the positive and negative. For instance, consider the statement: “A Brahmin should not drink alcohol” (*bram zes chang mi btung ngo*), which exemplifies *med dgag* (in this context, indicating “non-implicative negation”). Although this statement combines a positive element (*bram ze*, “Brahmin”) with a negative element (*mi btung*, “should not drink”), Tsong kha pa contends that it does not fall under *ma yin dgag* or an implicative negation (*Legs bshad snying po* 109a3ff.; cf. Nomura 2001: 13f.).

nature'.

The second of these is said to be no-thing-ness since positive properties are discarded [in the process of its determination]; and the other two are said to be not-that-ness since positive properties are not discarded [in that process]."¹⁰

The theory of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag*, proposed by Phywa pa and Gtsang nag pa, seemed to have gained acceptance until the era of Mtshur ston gzhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210).¹¹ Nevertheless, it faced criticism from his disciple Sa skya paṇḍita, who aimed to precisely distinguish between the positive factor manifesting in the mind (*snang ba'i bsgrub pa*) and the one known by exclusion (*sel ba'i bsgrub pa*), as well as to differentiate between positive and negative elements within not-that-ness.¹² Sa skya paṇḍita's approach involved adopting early Gsang phu theory, which Phywa pa had rejected. This theory proposed that the differentiation between no-thing-ness and not-that-ness hinges on the presence or absence of "projection of other elements" (*chos gzhan 'phen pa*). This theory found acceptance among later generations, including notable figures like Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419) and others.

4 Phywa pa's Criticism of Early Gsang phu Doctrine

The distinction between no-thing-ness and not-that-ness based on the presence or absence of "projection of other elements" was a perspective already present within the early tradition of the Gsang phu monastery. Phywa pa critically engages with this perspective and develops a debate with a hypothetical opponent, referred to as "a certain learned scholar" (*mkhas pa'i skye bo 'ga' zhig*), who defines not-that-ness as "that which directly makes known the projection of an additional element" and no-thing-ness as "that which directly makes known the non-projection of an additional element." His ideas are articulated as follows:

¹⁰*Legs bshad bsdu pa* 18b2f.: *des na 'di ltar chos gang zhig dgag bya'i spyi 'char ba la ma ltos par rang dbang du nges su rung pa ni sgrub pa yin te snang pa lta bu'o || sgrub pa bkag ldog tsam du gnas pa ni dgag pa ste dgag pa stong nyid lta bu'o || de dag tshogs pa'i ldog pa ni bkag pa'i bsgrub pa ste ma yin par dgag pa zhes bya ba brdzun pa lta bu'o || de dag las bar pa ni sgrub chos dor bas myed par dgag pa dang gnyis po ni sgrub chos ma dor bas ma yin par dgag pa zhes brjod do ||*

¹¹Mtshur ston defines *med dgag* as "that which discards positive properties" (*sgrub chos dor ba*) and *ma yin dgag* as "that which does not discard positive properties" (*bsgrub chos ma dor ba*). He illustrates the positive concept (*bsgrub ldog*) with the term "pot," the negative concept (*dgag ldog*) with "absence of a pot," and the concept of their combination (*de dag tshogs pa'i ldog pa*) with "the ground where a pot is absent" (*Shes rab sgron ma* 78.8ff.).

¹²*Rigs gter rang 'grel* 127a5ff.: *kha cig med dgag ma yin dgag gi mtshan nyid | bsgrub chos dor ma dor la byas nas ma yin dgag dang mngon sum gnyis gcig tu byed pa ni | sgra dang tshad ma'i gzhung lugs rgya chen po ma mthong bas snang ba'i bsgrub pa dang sel ba'i bsgrub pa ma phyed cing | ma yin dgag gi bsgrub pa dang | dgag pa'i cha ma phyed par zad do ||* ("After defining no-thing-ness and not-that-ness based on whether positive properties are discarded or not, some individuals equate no-thing-ness with the object of direct perception. However, [this perspective stems from a misconception resulting from] an insufficient understanding of the extensive theories of grammar and epistemology. They do not differentiate between the positive factor manifesting [in the mind] and the one known by exclusion, nor do they even distinguish between the positive and negative elements inherent in not-that-ness."); *Rigs gter rang 'grel* 127b1f.: *yang bsgrub chos ma dor ba ma yin dgag yin na mngon sum yang ma yin dgag tu thal ste | bsgrub chos ma dor ba'i phyir ro ||* ("Furthermore, if that which does not discard positive properties is termed not-that-ness, then it follows that the object of direct perception is also not-that-ness because positive properties are not discarded [in the process of its determination, occurring subsequent to perception].")

1. Not-that-ness is instantiated by the illusory nature (*sgyu ma lta bu*, **māyopamatva*) of things, as it projects an additional element—“manifestation” (*snang ba*)—following the negation of “reality” (*bden pa'i dngos po*).
 - Object to be negated: “reality.”
 - Additional element projected: “manifestation.”
2. No-thing-ness is instantiated by the truth of emptiness (*stong pa nyid*, **śūnyatā*), as it does not project any additional element after negating “ultimate reality” (*don dam pa'i dngos po*).
 - Object to be negated: “ultimate reality.”
 - No additional element emerges; emptiness is merely the negation of ultimate reality.

Furthermore, the opponent argues that not-that-ness should be defined as that which directly (*dngos su*), rather than indirectly (*shugs la*), makes known the projection of an additional element following negation.¹³ This is because he contends that a positive property may indirectly project an additional element through implication. As he argues, if not-that-ness is defined simply as “that which makes known the projection of an additional element,” even positive properties would also fall under the category of not-that-ness, thereby losing their “positive” character and becoming “negative.”

Before addressing the problematic aspects of this theory, Phywa pa offers a brief affirmative comment on the opponent’s argument. He acknowledges that positive properties are, in a certain sense, “negative” insofar as they fall under the category of not-that-ness. In Phywa pa’s own system, not-that-ness is defined as that which can be apprehended without discarding any positive element (*sgrub pa'i cha ma dor ba*). As a result, even positive properties—such as causal efficacy, the property of being a product, existence, and so forth—are characterized by not-that-ness, given that they can be grasped without discarding any positive element.

Then, Phywa pa poses a question: how can it be asserted that no-thing-ness merely negates the object to be negated without projecting an additional element? By raising this issue, he appears to suggest that no-thing-ness is also capable of projecting an additional element following the negation of the object to be negated. In response, the opponent presents several instances of no-thing-ness and argues that none of them involves the projection of additional elements. For example, emptiness consists solely in the negation of ultimate reality (*don dam pa'i dngos po bkag pa nyid*), with no extraneous elements introduced in the process of its apprehension. Likewise, the principle of “neither one nor many” is solely the negation of real oneness and plurality (*yang dag pa'i gcig dang du ma bkag pa nyid*), with no additional elements projected into cognition. On this basis, the opponent argues that these cases suffice to establish that no-thing-ness is never capable of projecting additional elements following negation.

¹³This point is not explicitly addressed by Gro lung pa, Rgya dmar ba, and 'Jad pa gzhon nu byang chub, as they do not clarify whether the projection of an additional element is known directly or indirectly. *De nyid rnam spyod* 17b6f. (cf. Hugon and Vose 2024: 105): *de gnyis {kyi khyad par} kyang mi 'dod pa rnam par bcad nas {shul du} don gzhan 'phen pa {ma yin dgag la} dang mi 'phen pa {med dgag la} 'o ||* (“Furthermore, the distinction between these two lies in the fact that, while *med dgag* allows additional elements to be projected [into cognition] after having eliminated undesirable factors, not-that-ness does not [allow additional elements to be] projected.”) Cf. *Bstan rim chen mo* 663.24ff.; *Kun btus ti ka* 5b7f.

Against this, Phywa pa contends that the same reasoning applies to instances classified under not-that-ness. For example, the property of “being a product,” characterized as not-that-ness, would not project an additional element if understood as the mere negation of not being a product (*ma byas pa bkag pa*). Likewise, “illusory nature,” also falling under not-that-ness, would not involve the projection of an extra element if taken as the mere negation of not being illusory (*sgyu ma lta bu ma yin pa bkag pa*).

Regarding the understanding of “illusory nature,” the opponent raises an objection. If this were the case, the object of negation should be “not being illusory.” However, this is not so, since “ultimate reality” is precisely what is negated when one apprehends “illusory nature.” The opponent further argues that when “ultimate reality” is negated, “illusory nature” is invariably cognized in conjunction with an additional element, “manifestation” (*snang ba*). Hence, the opponent concludes that “illusory nature” necessarily entails the projection of an additional element.

In response, Phywa pa argues that the same line of reasoning extends to cases characterized as no-thing-ness, such as emptiness. From a certain individual's perspective, emptiness can be understood as the negation of the ultimate self of persons (*gang zag gi bdag don dam bkag pa*), and in that case, the object to be negated would be “ultimate self of persons,” rather than “ultimate reality.” When one apprehends emptiness in that manner, it is possible that an additional element, the selflessness of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag med*), is subsequently projected into consciousness as a result of negation.

As can be expected, the opponent points out the problem arising from confusing a general term (*spyi*) with a specific term (*bye brag*). According to the opponent, when emptiness is conceived as no-thing-ness, what is to be negated is that which directly contradicts emptiness, namely, “ultimate reality,” rather than a specific concept such as “the ultimate self of persons.” The opponent maintains that if a given entity *x* is characterized by no-thing-ness, the object to be negated in relation to *x* should be non-*x*, which directly contradicts *x* (*de dang dngos 'gal*), rather than merely differing from it. Therefore, he argues that emptiness should always be understood as the negation of ultimate reality, with no additional element being projected. In other words, since the general term “ultimate reality” subsumes both the ultimate self of persons and the ultimate self of phenomena, negating the former entails negating both of the latter. Consequently, according to the opponent, it is not true that emptiness projects any further element following the negation of the general term.

- General term: “ultimate reality”
 - Specific term 1: “the ultimate self of persons”
 - Specific term 2: “the ultimate self of phenomena”

Phywa pa then argues that the same reasoning applies to the concept of “illusory nature.” He contends that the object to be negated in relation to “illusory nature” should be identified as the general term “not being illusory,” which directly contradicts it, rather than the specific concept of “ultimate reality.” In accordance with the parallel discussion in the *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel*, we may consider another specific term, such as “non-manifestation” (*snang med*), which is to be subsumed under the general term “not being illusory.” Given this assumption, as Phywa pa

states, there is no compelling reason to assert that, when the general term “not being illusory” is refuted, only one specific term, “ultimate reality,” serves solely as the target of negation.

- General term: “not being illusory”
 - Specific term 1: “ultimate reality”
 - Specific term 2: “non-manifestation”

From here, the debate turns highly speculative, relying on theoretical assumptions, which leads to a series of undesirable consequences. In order to justify the claim that “ultimate reality” (*don dam pa'i dngos po*) is the object to be negated, the opponent argues that since some individuals mistakenly regard it as a positive property (*sgrub pa'i chos*), it is precisely the object to be negated. If “ultimate reality” is negated by reasoning, it can never be regarded as a positive property, thereby eliminating this misunderstanding. As a result, “ultimate reality” is identified as the object to be negated rather than affirmed. Alternatively, it is possible that the opponent’s argument is based on a play on words rather than valid logic: someone incorrectly conceives of it as *sgrub pa'i chos*, “a property that is affirmed,” and thus it must be *dgag bya*, “that which is to be negated.”

Against this, Phywa pa offers a rejoinder, arguing that the same reasoning applies to “the self of persons,” which he identifies as the object to be negated. He contends that since some individuals mistakenly regard it as permanent (*rtag pa*), rather than something else, it must be negated. If “the self of persons” is negated and proven to be nonexistent, it can never be regarded as permanent, thereby eliminating this misunderstanding. Consequently, “the self of persons” serves as the object to be negated rather than affirmed.

The opponent extends Phywa pa’s hypothetical argument by introducing an additional layer of reasoning, which leads to an unintended consequence. According to Phywa pa, if “the self of persons” is conceived as permanent, it qualifies as the object to be negated. On this assumption, the opponent argues that if it is conceived as impermanent (*mi rtag pa*), it does not qualify as such. In that case, if someone realizes that “the self of persons” lacks impermanence, the negation of what is to be negated would not take place, as there would be no object to be negated for him. However, in reality, determining that it lacks impermanence should properly be understood as the negation of what is to be negated—namely, the negation of impermanence. Indeed, since “the self of persons” is neither permanent nor impermanent, given its nonexistence, impermanence should be regarded as its object of negation; and the determination of its not being impermanent should constitute the negation of what is to be negated.

In response, Phywa pa formulates a *reductio ad absurdum* argument based on the opponent’s theory. According to the opponent, if “ultimate reality” is conceived as a positive property, it qualifies as the object to be negated. Conversely, if it is conceived as a negative property, it does not qualify as such, implying that the conception of it as a negative property is not something to be ceased (*dgag par zhen pa dgag bya ma yin*). If this consequence holds universally, it follows that the conception of “not being a product” as a negative property is also not something to be ceased (**ma byas pa dgag par zhen pa dgag bya ma yin*). However, if this is the case, even when someone attempts to determine that sound is a product after ceasing to grasp “not being a product” as a negative property, the cessation of what is to be ceased would not occur (*dgag bya*

ma bkag par 'gyur), as that conception is not regarded as something to be ceased. In reality, however, the conception of “not being a product” as a negative property is something to be ceased in order to proceed with determining that something is a product.

Here, the term *dgag bya* appears to be used ambiguously, as it can mean either “what is to be negated” or “what is to be ceased.” Phywa pa's argument exploits this ambiguity through sophistry. The main focus of Phywa pa here seems to be not just to point out the flaws in the opponent's theory, but to thoroughly dismantle it. It should not be assumed that everything stated here reflects Phywa pa's own views. The key point, however, is that what should be negated or ceased can be defined in various ways depending on the perspective one takes.

5 Concluding Remarks

Phywa pa understands *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* as epistemological concepts rather than as terms directly related to the semantics of negation. The term *med dgag* refers to a property of an object known solely through negation. When it is apprehended, no positive element remains in consciousness. By contrast, *ma yin dgag* refers to a property of an object known through both negation and affirmation. When it is apprehended, positive elements are not entirely discarded. In addition to properties that combine both negative and positive attributes, *ma yin dgag* also includes purely positive properties.

From this perspective, Phywa pa rejects the definitions given by earlier Tibetan scholars: namely, that *med dgag* is that which does not project an additional element in the process of negating an object, whereas *ma yin dgag* is that which does project an additional element in the process of negating an object. Phywa pa regards these definitions as mistaken because *med dgag* can, in some cases, project an additional element, while *ma yin dgag* can, in some cases, fail to do so.

However, Phywa pa's critique is not purely theoretical; it also employs rhetorical strategies, including wordplay and sophistry, resembling the logic of *rtags gsal* that would later develop in the monastic tradition of the Dge lugs pa.

Nevertheless, the epistemological concepts of *med dgag* and *ma yin dgag* proposed by Phywa pa hold significant importance in the history of Tibetan Buddhist thought. His framework laid the groundwork for later developments, including Dol po pa's theory of Buddha-nature and Tsong kha pa's Madhyamaka philosophy.

6 An Annotated Translation of *Snying po* 125.122.22

125.122.22

གཉིས་པ་བཀག་པའི་བྱད་པར་ནི་མྱེད་དགག་དང་མ་ཡིན་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། མྱེད་དགག་
དང་(Bka' 34a6) མ་ཡིན་དགག་བསྐྱབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པའི་ཚུལ་དང་། མྱེད་དགག་སྐྱབ་¹⁴པ་ལ་ཚུངས་པ་སྤང་།

¹⁴སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

བ་དང་། མ་ཡིན་དགག་སྒྲུབ་¹⁵པ་ལ་བརྟུན་པ་སྤང་བ་བཞིས་ངེས་པར་བྱའོ། །

The second topic, “the distinguishing feature of a negative entity,” should be determined by the following four points: [1] the definitions of no-thing-ness (*myed dgag*) and not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*), [2] the theory of regarding no-thing-ness and not-that-ness as that which is to be established, [3] dispelling objections concerning the establishment of no-thing-ness, and [4] dispelling objections concerning the establishment of no-that-ness.

125.122.221

དང་པོ་ནི་མཁས་པའི་སྒྲེ་བོ་འགའ་ཞིག་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་འཕེན་པ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་
ནི་མ་ཡིན་དགག་སྒྲེ། བདེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བཀག་ནས་¹⁶ཆོས་གཞན་སྤང་བ་འཕངས་པའི་¹⁷སྒྲུབ་(Bka'
^{34a7}) མ་ལྟ་བུ་ལསོགས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ་¹⁸། །དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་སྒྲི་¹⁹འཕེན་པ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་
པ་ནི་སྤྲོད་དགག་སྒྲེ། སྤྲོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བཀག་པ་ལས་ཆོས་གཞན་སྤྲོད་པ་ལྟ་
བུའོ། །དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པ་ལས་གཞན་གྲགས་ལ་རྟོགས་པ་²⁰དགག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཡིན་ན་སྒྲུབ་²¹པའང་
དགག་པར་ཐལ་ལོ་ཞེས་གསུང་ངོ་། །²²

[1: The definitions of no-thing-ness and not-that-ness]. A certain learned scholar says the following.

(Opponent:) Not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*) refers to that which directly makes known the projection of an additional element (*chos gzhan 'phen pa*) following the negation of the object to be negated. This is illustrated by “illusory nature” (*sgyu ma lta bu*, **māyopamatva*) and the like, as it projects an additional element, “manifestation” (*snang ba*), after the negation of “reality” (*bden pa'i dngos po*). No-thing-ness (*myed dgag*) refers to that which directly makes known the non-projection of an additional element (*chos gzhan myi 'phen pa*) following the negation of the object to be negated. This is illustrated by “emptiness” (*stong pa nyid*, **sūnyatā*), wherein no other element beyond the “negation of ultimate reality” (*don dam pa'i dngos po*) is obtained. If [an additional element] is comprehended indirectly rather than directly, [what is known after the negation] is not a negative [property]. If it were, then positive [properties] would also be negative.

¹⁵སྒྲུབ་] T ; བསྒྲུབ་ Bka'

¹⁶བཀག་ནས་] T ; བཀག་པ་ལས་ Bka'

¹⁷སྤང་བ་འཕངས་པའི་] T ; འཕངས་པའི་ Bka'

¹⁸ལསོགས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ་] Bka' ; ལསོགས་པའོ་ T

¹⁹སྒྲི་] Bka' ; མི་ T

²⁰རྟོགས་པ་] T ; རྟོགས་པས་ Bka'

²¹སྒྲུབ་] T ; བསྒྲུབ་ Bka'

²²Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a2f.: དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་འཕེན་པ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་ {པར་བྱ་བ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ལ་དགག་བྱ་
བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མི་འཕེན་པ་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་} པ་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ནོ། །གྲགས་ལ་རྟོགས་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཡིན་ན་བསྒྲུབ་པ་འང་དགག་པར་
ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ།

- *The distinction between no-thing-ness and not-that-ness based on the presence or absence of “the projection of an additional element” (chos gzhan ’phen pa) was a perspective already present within the early tradition of the Gsang phu monastery. Phywa pa critically engages with this perspective and develops a debate with a hypothetical opponent referred to as “a certain learned scholar” (mkhas pa’i skye bo ’ga’ zhig).*
- *The opponent identifies “illusory nature” as not-that-ness, as it projects an additional element, “manifestation,” after the negation of “reality.”*
 - *The object to be negated: “reality.”*
 - *The additional element projected: “manifestation.”*
- *The opponent identifies “emptiness” as no-thing-ness, as it does not project any additional element after the negation of “ultimate reality.”*
 - *The object to be negated: “ultimate reality.”*
 - *After negation, no additional element emerges.*
 - *Emptiness is identified as the mere “negation of ultimate reality.”*
- *According to the opponent, a positive property may indirectly (shugs la) project an additional element through implication, following the negation of a certain object. Therefore, not-that-ness should be defined as that which directly, not indirectly, makes known the projection of an additional element following the negation.*

(Bka’ 34b1) དེ་ལ་སྐྱབ་²³པ་དགག་པར་ཐལ་བ་ནི་འདོད་པ་ཉིད་དེ་སྐྱབ་²⁴པ་ཐོད་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།²⁵

(Phywa pa:) Regarding that, we do accept the consequence that positive [properties] would also be negative, since all positive properties are subsumed within [the category of] not-that-ness [and thus negative].

- *In Phywa pa’ own system, not-that-ness is defined as that which can be apprehended without a positive element being discarded (sgrub pa’i cha ma dor ba).*
- *Consequently, even positive properties—such as causal efficacy, the property of being a product, existence, and so forth—are characterized by not-that-ness, as they can be apprehended without discarding any positive element.*

གཞན་ཡང་སྐྱབ་དགག་གིས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པ་ལས་ཚོས་གཞན་སྐྱབ་²⁶འཕེན་པར་ཇི་ལྟར་བཞིན།

(Phywa pa:) However, on the other point, how can it be asserted that no-thing-ness merely negates the object to be negated without projecting an additional element?

²³སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka’

²⁴སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka’

²⁵Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a3: སྐྱབ་པ་དགག་པར་ཐལ་བ་ནི་འདོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ་བསྐྱབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

²⁶སྐྱབ་] Bka’ ; མི་ T

- *Phywa pa seems to hold that no-thing-ness is also capable of projecting an additional element following the negation of the object to be negated.*

དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བཀག་པ་ཉིད་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཚྭ་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལས། ཡང་དག་པའི་གཅིག་དང་
 ཅུ་མ་བཀག་པ་ཉིད་གཅིག་དང་ཅུ་བྲལ་གྱི་ཚྭ་པ་ཡིན་པ་^(Bka' 34b2) དང་། དོན་བྱེད་པ་བཀག་པ་
 ཉིད་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བའི་ཚྭ་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལསོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེས།

(Opponent:) This is because [it is established by considering the following instances]: the “negation of ultimate reality” alone constitutes the conceptual essence (*ldog pa*) of what “emptiness” is; the “negation of the real oneness and plurality” alone constitutes the conceptual essence of what “neither one nor many” is; and the “negation of causal efficacy” alone constitutes the conceptual essence of what “the lack of causal efficacy” is.

- *In this context, the term nyid (“alone”) functions as a restrictive particle, excluding other elements beyond the negation itself.*
- *The opponent seeks to demonstrate through these instances that no-thing-ness does not project any additional elements.*
- *All instances of no-thing-ness “x” can be understood simply as “the negation of non-x.”*
- *In the present paragraph, the term ldog pa, translated here as “conceptual essence,” appears to be interchangeable with don ldog or mtshan nyid; it denotes the nature or defining characteristics of a given property.*

འོ་ན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཀྱང་དགག་བྱ་²⁷བཀག་པ་ལས་ཆོས་གཞན་སྟེ་²⁸འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མ་བྱས་པ་
 བཀག་པ་བྱས་པའི་ཚྭ་པ་ཡིན་པ་དང་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བ་བཀག་པ་དོན་བྱེད་པའི་ཚྭ་པ་
 དང་སྐྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པ་བཀག་པ་སྐྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་^(Bka' 34b3) ཚྭ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།²⁹

(Phywa pa:) Then, not-that-ness would also be something that does not project an additional element after the negation of the object to be negated [and thus satisfies the definition of no-thing-ness]. Because the “negation of not being a product” constitutes the conceptual essence of what “being a product” is; the “negation of the absence of causal efficacy” constitutes the conceptual essence of what “causal efficacy” is; and the “negation of not being illusory” constitutes the conceptual essence of what “illusory nature” is.

²⁷དགག་བྱ་] T ; ཆོས་བྱ་ Bka'

²⁸སྟེ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

²⁹Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a3f. གཞན་ཡང་ {དངོས་འགལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་} དོན་བྱེད་པ་བཀག་པ་ལས་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བ་ཆོས་གཞན་དུ་
 མེད་པ་དང་ཡང་དག་གི་རང་བཞིན་བཀག་པ་ལས་ {སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཆོས་གཞན་དུ་མེད་ན་དང་ཡང་དག་གི་ཅིག་དང་ཅུ་མ་བཀག་པ་ལས་} ཡང་དག་གི་
 ཅིག་དང་ཅུ་བྲལ་ཆོས་གཞན་དུ་མེད་པས་མེད་དགག་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མི་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལྟར་ {དངོས་འགལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་} དོན་
 བྱེད་པས་བཀག་པ་སྟོང་བ་ཉིད་དོན་བྱེད་པ་དང་འཇིག་མེད་བཀག་པས་འཇིག་པ་དང་མ་བྱས་པ་བཀག་པ་ཉིད་བྱས་པ་དང་སྐྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུ་ {མ་ཡིན་པ་
 བཀག་པ་ཉིད་སྐྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུ་} ཡིན་པས་ {མ་ཡིན་དགག་ལ་ཆོས་གཞན་+++དུ་མེད་པས་} མེད་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཁྱབ་ཆེས་ལ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་གི་
 མཚན་ཉིད་མི་སྲིད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

- *Phywa pa argues that the same reasoning applies to instances characterized as not-that-ness.*
- *The property of “being a product,” characterized as not-that-ness, would not project an additional element if it were understood as the mere negation of not being a product.*
- *Similarly, “illusory nature,” characterized as not-that-ness, would not project an additional element if it were understood as the mere negation of not being illusory.*

གཡ་ཏེ་སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་དགག་བྱ་སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་
བཀག་པ་ལས་གཞན་སྤང་བ་འཕངས་པས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པ་ལས་ཆོས་གཞན་འཕངས་པ་ཡིན་ནི་ཞེ་
ན།³⁰

(Opponent:) The object to be negated in relation to “illusory nature” is not “not being illusory,” but rather “ultimate reality.” Accordingly, since an additional element, namely “manifestation,” is projected after the negation of that, it is accurate to say that an additional element is projected after the negation of the object to be negated.

- *The opponent does not consider “illusory nature” to consist merely in “the negation of not being illusory,” as the object to be negated in this context is “ultimate reality” (don dam pa'i dngos po), rather than “not being illusory.”*
- *Consequently, he asserts that “illusory nature” projects an additional element, “manifestation,” following the negation of “ultimate reality.”*

སྤྲོང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་འང་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་དོན་དམ་ཡིན་(Bka'
34b4) ལ་དེ་བཀག་པ་ལས་གཞན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་སྤེད་འཕངས་པས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་
འཕེན་པར་འགྱུར་རོ།³¹

(Phywa pa:) Similarly, the object to be negated in relation to “emptiness” is not “ultimate reality,” but rather “the ultimate self of persons.” Since an additional element, namely “the selflessness of phenomena,” is projected after the negation of that, it would that an additional element is projected after the negation of the object to be negated.

- *Phywa pa argues that the same reasoning applies to instances characterized as no-thing-ness.*
- *If “emptiness” were understood as “the negation of the ultimate self of persons” (*gang zag gi bdag don dam bkag pa), it would project an additional element, “the selflessness of phenomena” (chos kyi bdag myed), following the negation of the ultimate self of persons.*

³⁰Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a4f.: གཡ་ཏེ་སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་དགག་བྱ་སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་བུ་མ་ཡིན་ན་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མི་
འཕེན་པར་འགྱུར་ཡང་ {བརྒྱད་འགལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་འཕེན་པ་ཡོད་དེ་} སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་དགག་བྱ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་
བཀག་ནས་སྤང་བའི་ཆོས་འཕངས་པས་ཆོས་གཞན་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་ནི་ཞེ་ན། {བརྒྱད་འགལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་འཕེན་པ་མེད་དགག་ལ་ཡང་
མཛུངས་ཟེར་བ་}

³¹Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a5: འོན་སྤྲོང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་དེ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མི་འཕེན་པ་བདེན་ཡང་
སྤྲོང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡིན་པས་དེ་བཀག་པ་ལས་ཆོས་གཞན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་པ་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

- *The object to be negated: the ultimate self of persons.*
- *The additional element projected: the selflessness of phenomena.*

སྒྲོང་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པ་ན་དེ་དང་དངོས་འགལ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་³²སྤྱི་ཁྱེགས་བཞིན་དུ་བྱེ་བྲག་གང་
ཟག་གི་བདག་ཁོ་ན་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་སྤྱད་དོ་ཞེ་ན།³³

(Opponent:) There is no [compelling] reason to [assert] that only the specific concept, “the self of persons,” constitutes the object to be negated, even though, when something is determined to be emptiness, the general concept of “ultimate reality,” which directly contradicts it, is refuted.

- *The opponent contends that, contrary to Phywa pa’s argument, the reasoning does not extend to “emptiness.”*
- *It is unreasonable to claim that when the general concept (spyi), “ultimate reality,” is being negated, the specific concept (bye brag), “the self of persons,” serves as the target of negation.*
- *The opponent maintains that, if something x is characterized as no-thing-ness, the object to be negated in relation to x should be non-x, which directly contradicts x (de dang dngos ‘gal).*

སྤྱི་མ་ཉྩ་བྱུང་ངེས་པ་ན་འང་དེ་དང་དངོས་འགལ་སྤྱི་མ་ཉྩ་བྱུང་མ་^(Bka’ 34b5)ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཁྱེགས་བཞིན་དུ་
བྱེ་བྲག་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་དགག་བྱར་བཟོད་པ་ལ་རྒྱ་མཚན་སྤྱད་དོ།³⁴

(Phywa pa:) Similarly, there is no [compelling] reason to assert that only the specific concept, “ultimate reality,” constitutes the object to be negated, even though, when some thing is determined to be illusory, the general concept of “not being illusory,” which directly contradicts it, is refuted.

- *Phywa pa argues that the same reasoning applies to the case of “illusory nature.”*
- *He contends that the object to be negated in relation to “illusory nature” should be identified as the generic term “not being illusory,” which directly contradicts it, rather than the specific concept of “ultimate reality.”*

དེ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་སྤྱབ་³⁵པའི་ཚས་སྤྱུ་ཞེན་པ་ཡོད་པས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན།³⁶

³²དངོས་པོའི་ J T ; དངོས་པོ་ཙམ་གྱི་ Bka’

³³Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a6: གང་ཟག་དང་ཚས་གྱི་བདག་གཉི་ག་ཁྱེགས་པ་ལ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཁོ་ན་དགག་བྱར་བཞག་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་
མེད་དོ་ཞེ་ན།

³⁴Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a6: བདེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་དང་སྤྱང་མེད་གཉི་ག་ཁྱེགས་པ་ལ་བདེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཁོ་ན་དགག་བྱར་འཇོག་པའི་རྒྱ་
མཚན་མེད་དོ།

³⁵སྤྱབ་ J T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka’

³⁶Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a6: དེ་སྤྱབ་པར་ཞེན་པས་དགག་བྱར་བཟོད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན།

(Opponent:) Since [it is possible that] someone [mistakenly] conceives it [i.e., ultimate reality], rather than something else, as a positive property, it is precisely what must be negated.

- *To justify the claim that “ultimate reality” (don dam pa'i dngos po) is the object to be negated, the opponent argues that it must be negated because some individuals mistakenly regard it as a positive property.*
- *The underlying logic is as follows: if “ultimate reality” is proven to be nonexistent, it can never be regarded as a positive property, thereby eliminating such a misunderstanding; consequently, “ultimate reality” is identified as the object to be negated rather than affirmed.*
- *Alternatively, the opponent's argument may instead be based on a play on words rather than being grounded in valid reasoning: someone incorrectly conceives of it as sgrub pa'i chos, “a property that is affirmed,” and therefore must be dgag bya, “that which is to be negated.”*

གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལ་རྟག་པར་ཞེན་པ་ཡོད་པས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ནོ།³⁷

(Phywa pa:) Since [it is possible that] someone [mistakenly] conceives the self of persons, rather than something else, as permanent, it is precisely what must be negated.

- *Phywa pa argues that the same reasoning applies to “the self of persons,” which he identifies as the object to be negated.*
- *The underlying logic is as follows: if “the self of persons” is proven to be nonexistent, it can never be regarded as permanent, thereby eliminating others' misunderstanding; consequently, “the self of persons” serves as the object to be negated.*
- *Phywa pa's argument appears to be highly hypothetical, intended to refute the opponent's perspective, and does not necessarily reflect his own view.*

སྟི་³⁸རྟག་པར་ཞེན་པས་དགག་བྱ་མ་^(Bka' 34b6)ཡིན་ན་སྟི་³⁹རྟག་པས་སྟོང་བར་ངེས་པས་དགག་བྱ་མ་
བགག་པར་⁴⁰འགྱུར་རྟེ་ཞེ་ན།⁴¹

(Opponent:) When someone conceives [the self of persons] as impermanent, it would not be what must be negated [for him]. If so, when he [comes to correctly] determine that it lacks [the property of] impermanence, the negation of what is to be negated would not occur.

- *The opponent expands Phywa pa's hypothetical argument by adding another layer of hypothetical reasoning, which results in an unintended consequence.*

³⁷Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a6: གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཁོ་ན་ལ་རྟག་པར་ཞེན་པས་དགག་བྱ་བར་བཞུགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

³⁸སྟི་] Bka' ; མི་ T

³⁹སྟི་] Bka' ; མི་ T

⁴⁰མ་བགག་པར་] Bka' ; བགག་པ་ཕྱེད་པར་ T

⁴¹Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a6f.: དགག་བྱ་བར་བཞུགས་པའི་རྟག་པར་ཞེན་པ་ཡིན་ན་སྟི་རྟག་པས་གཏན་མི་འགོག་པར་འགྱུར་རྟེ། དེས་ན་
དེ་ངེས་པས་བསྐྱོག་པ་སེལ་པ་དེ་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པས་བདེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་སེལ་པ་དེར་འདུས་ཆད་དགག་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན།

- As Phywa pa argues, if “the self of persons” is conceived as permanent, it qualifies as the object to be negated. Conversely, the opponent contends that if it is conceived as impermanent, it does not qualify as the object to be negated.
- When a certain individual conceives “the self of persons” as impermanent, it would not constitute what must be negated for him. Then, even if the same person comes to realize that “the self of persons” lacks the property of impermanence, the negation of what is to be negated would not occur since there is no object to be negated for him.
- In fact, the determination of its lacking impermanence should properly be understood as the negation of what is to be negated (i.e., the negation of impermanence).
- It is unclear whether the opponent asserts that the self of persons lacks the property of impermanence. More likely, he may hold that it lacks both impermanence and permanence, given its nonexistence.

དགག་པར་ཞེན་པ་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ན་བྱས་པ་ལསོགས་པ་སྐྱབ་པ་ན་⁴²མ་བྱས་པ་དགག་པར་ཞེན་པ་
འགོག་པས་དགག་བྱ་མ་བཀག་པར་འགྱུར་རོ།⁴³

(Phywa pa:) Suppose that the conception [of ultimate reality] as a negative property is not something to be ceased (*dgag bya*). Then, in such cases, like establishing [sound's] being a product or any other instances, when one ceases to conceive “not being a product” as a negative property, the cessation of what is to be ceased would not occur.

- Phywa pa develops a *reductio ad absurdum* argument based on the opponent's theory, although the structure of his reasoning differs slightly from that of the opponent.
- Here, the term *dgag bya* appears to be used ambiguously, as it can be interpreted to mean either “what is to be negated” or “what is to be ceased.”
- According to the opponent's theory, if “ultimate reality” is conceived as a positive property, it qualifies as the object to be negated. Conversely, if it is conceived as a negative property, it does not qualify as such, implying that the conception of it being a negative property is not something to be ceased (*dgag par zhen pa dgag bya ma yin*).
- If this consequence holds universally, it follows that the conception of “not being a product” as a negative property is also not something to be ceased (**ma byas pa dgag par zhen pa dgag bya ma yin*).
- However, if this is the case, even when someone moves on to determine that sound is a product by ceasing to grasp “not being a product” as a negative property, the cessation of what is to be ceased would not occur (*dgag bya ma bkag par 'gyur*), as that conception is not what is to be ceased.
- In fact, the conception of “not being a product” as a negative property is what is to be ceased in order to proceed with the determination of being a product.

⁴²སྐྱབ་པ་ན་] T ; བསྐྱབ་པ་ Bka'

⁴³Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a7f.: དགག་བྱར་བཅོལ་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་སྐྱབ་པར་ཞེན་པ་ཡིན་ན་དགག་པར་ཞེན་པ་གཏན་མི་འགོག་པར་འགྱུར་
རོ། དེས་ན་སྐྱབ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ངེས་པས་ཀྱང་སྐྱབ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པས་དེ་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ལ་དེ་བཀག་པ་ལས་སྐྱབ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་ཆོས་གཞན་མེད་པས་མ་
ཡིན་དགག་ལའང་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མི་འཕྲུག་པས་བྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། དེས་ན་སྐྱབ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་བཅོལ་དོ།

དེས་ན་དགག་བྱ་ནི་ལྷོག་པ་དེའི་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་ལ་དེ་བཞག་པ་ལྷོག་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ཐོང་ཁྱད་
 དགག་(Bka' 34b7) བྱ་བཞག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་སྟེ་⁴⁴འཕྲུལ་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་པས་སྟེང་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཏེ་
 ཅང་བྱུང་པ་དང་མ་ཡིན་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་སྟེ་⁴⁵སྟོང་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཀོ། །

Therefore, the object to be negated consists in a property that is directly incompatible with the given concept, and its negation constitutes that very concept. Consequently, [we may say that] all properties, without exception, do not project an additional element following the negation of what is to be negated. Therefore, the definition of no-thing-ness [as postulated by you] is overly encompassing, while the definition of not-that-ness [as given by you] is untenable.

- *Phywa pa concludes the debate by pointing out the fallacy in the opponent's definitions of no-thing-ness and not-that-ness.*
- *According to Phywa pa, all properties do not project an additional element after negation, since any given thing x consists in the negation of non- x without any further element being projected in consciousness.*
- *In this sense, all properties meet the criteria of the opponent's theory of no-thing-ness. Hence, the opponent's definition of not-that-ness suffers from the fallacy of over-application.*
- *Furthermore, Phywa pa argues that the opponent's definition of not-that-ness is untenable, since, in a certain sense, all properties do not project an additional element beyond the negation.*

དེས་ན་འདི་ལྟར་བཟོད་དེ་དོན་བྱེད་པ་དང་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་དུས་གཞན་དུ་⁴⁶འགག་པ་དང་སྟོའི་ཡུལ་
 ལས་གསུམ་པ་བསྐྱོག་⁴⁷པ་འགལ་ཞིག་གི་དོན་སྟེ་འཆར་བ་ན་བསྐྱོག་⁴⁸པའི་དོན་སྟེ་འཆར་⁴⁹(Bka' 35a1) བ་
 ལ་མ་ལྷོས་པར་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་སྟེ་རང་དབང་དུ་ཤར་ནས་ཞེན་དུ་རུང་བ་རྣམས་ནི་སྐྱབ་⁵⁰པའི་ཆོས་
 ཞེས་བྱའོ། །⁵¹

Therefore, it is to be explained thus. A positive property x is defined by the following conditions: The concept of an opposing element x , like causal efficacy, causal generation, disintegration at another moment, or an object of cognition, can manifest [in the mind] without the necessity of the concept of [another] opposing element, non- x , to manifest. And it becomes apprehensible

⁴⁴སྟེ།] Bka' ; མི་ T

⁴⁵སྟེ།] Bka' ; མི་ T

⁴⁶དུ་] T ; ན་ Bka'

⁴⁷བསྐྱོག་] T ; ལྷོག་ Bka'

⁴⁸བསྐྱོག་] T ; ལྷོག་ Bka'

⁴⁹འཆར་] T ; ཤར་ Bka'

⁵⁰སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

⁵¹Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 61b9: འོ་ན་མེད་དགག་དང་མ་ཡིན་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། སྟོང་ཆོས་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པ་དང་དགག་པའི་
 ཆོས་གཉིས་ཏེ། འགལ་ལྷོས་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱས་པ་ལ་མ་ལྷོས་པར་ལྷོག་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་སྟེ་རང་དབང་དུ་ཤར་ནས་ཞེན་པར་བྱ་བ་བསྐྱབ་པའི་ཆོས་ཏེ།
 དོན་བྱེད་ཅུས་པ་དང་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་ཤེས་བྱ་ལས་གསུམ་པའོ། །

as *x*, once the concept of “*x*” itself manifests [in the mind] independently.

- A positive property is something that is known without the need for negation.
- For instance, causal efficacy (*don byed pa*, **arthakriyā*) is considered a positive property since it can manifest in the mind on its own, without requiring the presence of an image of “lack of causal efficacy,” which is an opposing element of the given property.

དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བ་དང་རྒྱས་བསྐྱེད་པ་སྐྱེད་པ་དང་འགག་པ་སྐྱེད་པ་ལསོགས་པ་དགག་བྱའི་དོན་
སྐྱི་ཤར་བ་ལ་⁵²ལྟོས་ནས་དེ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པའི་དོན་སྐྱི་ཤར་ཏེ་⁵³ཞེན་དུ་རུང་བ་ནི་དགག་པའི་ཚས་ཞེས་
བྱའོ།⁵⁴

A negative property *y* is defined by the following conditions: The concept of the object to be negated, non-*y*, manifests [in the mind]. Then, based on that manifestation, the concept of an opposing element *y*, like lack of causal efficacy, lack of causal generation, or lack of disintegration, also manifests [in the mind], and subsequently becomes apprehensible as “*y*.”

- A negative property is something that is known only through the process of negation.
- For instance, lack of causal efficacy (*don byed pas stong ba*) is regarded as a negative property since it is apprehended only in relation to the emergence of an image of “causal efficacy,” the object of negation, and its denial.

དེ་ལ་སྐྱབ་⁵⁵པ་འབའ་ཞིག་(Bka' 35a2) པ་ནི་བྱས་པ་དང་ཡོད་པ་ལསོགས་པའོ། །དགག་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་
པ་ནི་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བ་དང་བྱས་པས་སྟོང་བ་ལསོགས་པའོ། །དགག་སྐྱབ་⁵⁶ཚོགས་པ་ནི་སྤང་ཡང་
བདེན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་སྟོང་བ་ལསོགས་པའོ། །

Regarding that, purely positive properties encompass such things as [the property of] being a product, existence, and the like. Purely negative properties encompass such things as lack of causal efficacy, lack of [the property of] being a product, and the like. The combination of the negative and positive includes such things as the property of being manifest [in the mind], yet empty of intrinsic being of substantiality, and the like.

སྐྱབ་⁵⁷པ་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་དང་དགག་སྐྱབ་⁵⁸ཚོགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ལ་དགག་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་

⁵²ཤར་བ་ལ་] T ; ཤར་བ་ལསོགས་པ་ལ་ Bka'

⁵³ཏེ་] Bka' ; སྐྱི་ T

⁵⁴Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 61b9f.: དགག་བྱའི་དོན་སྐྱི་ཤར་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་དེ་ལས་བསྐྱོག་པར་ཞེན་པར་བྱ་བ་དགག་པའི་ཚས་ཏེ་དོན་བྱེད་པས་
སྟོང་བ་དང་བྱས་པས་སྟོང་བ་ལསོགས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །

⁵⁵སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

⁵⁶སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

⁵⁷སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

⁵⁸སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

མྱེད་དགག་ཡིན་པས་མྱེད་^(Bka' 35a3) དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་ལྡོག་པ་དེ་ཁ་ཡར་ངེས་པ་ན་དགག་པ་
འབའ་ཞིག་པར་སྒྲོས་ཞེན་⁵⁹པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་ལྡོག་པ་དེ་ཁ་ཡར་
ངེས་པ་ན་སྐྱབ་⁶⁰པའི་ཆ་མ་དོར་བར་ཞེན་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།⁶¹

Both purely positive properties and the combination of the negative and positive are [considered] not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*). Purely negative properties, on the other hand, are [termed as] no-thing-ness (*myed dgag*). Therefore, no-thing-ness is defined as that which can be apprehended by cognition as a purely negative property when determining its concept individually. And not-that-ness is defined as that which can be apprehended without a positive element being discarded when determining its concept individually.

- In Phywa pa's system, all properties (*chos*) are divided into two categories: no-thing-ness (*myed dgag*) and not-that-ness (*ma yin dgag*).
- Purely negative properties (*dgag pa 'ba' zhig pa*), such as the “lack of causal efficiency” and so forth, fall under the category of no-thing-ness.
- Conversely, all remaining properties, which include a combination of positive and negative properties (*dgag sgrub tshogs pa*), such as illusory nature of things, as well as purely positive properties (*sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa*), such as being a product, are classified as not-that-ness.

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གཉིས་པ་མྱེད་དགག་དང་མ་ཡིན་དགག་བསྐྱབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི་ཡང་དག་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མས་
སྟོང་བས་⁶²ཡང་དག་^(Bka' 35a4) པའི་དངོས་པོར་ཡོད་པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་བཀག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་མྱེད་དགག་སྐྱབ་
⁶³ན་བྱུང་བྱེད་མྱེད་⁶⁴དམིགས་པ་སྟེ། རྗེས་དཔག་དེ་ཡང་⁶⁵དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་རིགས་པའི་
ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

The second topic: the theory of regarding no-thing-ness and not-that-ness as that which is to be established [by the logical reason]. If the mere negation of the verbal expression, “It exists as a real entity,” i.e., its no-thing-ness, is established by the “lack of real oneness and plurality,” then this constitutes [a reason] based on the non-perception of a pervader. Furthermore, when

⁵⁹ཞེན་] T ; ངེས་ Bka'

⁶⁰སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

⁶¹Cf. *Yid kyi mun sel* 62a1f.: དེ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་དོན་བྱེད་པ་ལསོགས་པ་དང་དགག་བསྐྱབ་ཚོགས་པ་སྐྱང་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་
པ་ལསོགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཉིད་ {ཡིན་པས་ཡང་དགག་} ལྡོག་པ་དེ་ཁ་ཡར་བ་ལ་ཞེན་པ་ན་བསྐྱབ་པའི་ཆ་མ་དོར་བར་ཞེན་པར་བྱ་བའོ། དོན་
བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་པ་དང་ཡང་དག་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་སྟོང་པ་དང་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཅིག་དང་དུ་མས་སྟོང་པ་ལསོགས་པ་དགག་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་རྣམས་
མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པས་ [...]]

⁶²སྟོང་བས་] Bka' ; སྟོང་བ་ T.

⁶³སྐྱབ་] T ; བསྐྱབ་ Bka'

⁶⁴མྱེད་] Bka' ; མི་ T

⁶⁵དེ་ཡང་] Bka' ; དེའང་ T

the actual object to be established is taken into account, that inferential cognition is [understood as] consciousness arising from reasoning.

- *The structure of the reasoning is as follows:*
 - *The logical reason: “lack of real oneness and plurality.”*
 - *What is to be established: “the mere negation of the verbal expression, ‘It exists as a real entity’.”*
 - *The type of the reason: the non-perception of a pervader (khyab byed myi dmigs pa, *vyāpakānupalabdhi).*
- *Both the logical reason and what is to be established are characterized as no-thing-ness (myed dgag).*
- *The inferential cognition involved here is a form of “consciousness arising from reasoning” (rigs pa’i shes pa).*

ཡང་དག་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་སྟེན་དགག་ལས་རང་བཞིན་སྟེན་པའི་ཐ་སྟོན་དུ་བྱར་རུང་བ་དཔོག་
པ་དང་། ཡང་དག་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མས་སྟོང་བར་⁶⁶སྒྲུང་བའི་རྟགས་ལས་(Bka’ 35a5) སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་
བྱར་དཔོག་པ་ལསོགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དཔོག་པ་རྣམས་ནི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཏེ་རྗེས་དཔག་དེའང་
དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཐ་སྟོན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་འོ། །

The inference of not-that-ness, such as the inference of the applicability of the verbal expression: “It lacks intrinsic being” based on the “absence of real oneness and plurality,” or the inference of illusory nature based on the inferential sign “manifesting as something lacking real oneness and plurality” is [based on] the inferential sign of an essential property. If the actual object to be established is taken into account, that inferential cognition is [understood as] the consciousness relating to convention.

- *The structure of the reasoning (1) is as follows:*
 - *The logical reason: “absence of real oneness and plurality.”*
 - *What is to be established: “the applicability of the verbal expression: ‘It lacks intrinsic being’.”*
 - *The type of the reason: an essential property (rang bzhin, *svabhāva).*
- *The structure of the reasoning (2) is as follows:*
 - *The logical reason: “manifesting as something lacking real oneness and plurality.”*
 - *What is to be established: “illusory nature.”*
 - *The type of the reason: an essential property (rang bzhin, *svabhāva).*
- *What is to be established here is characterized as not-that-ness (ma yin dgag).*
- *The inferential cognition involved here is a form of “consciousness relating to convention” (tha snyad pa’i shes pa).*

⁶⁶བར་ གྲུང་པའི་ Bka’

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གསུམ་པ་བྱེད་དགག་བསྐྱབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་ཚུད་⁶⁷པ་སྤང་བ་ནི་གལ་ཏེ་བདེན་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཐ་སྙད་
བཀག་པ་ཚམ་ངེས་པ་ན་⁶⁸ཞེན་ཡུལ་ལ་ཡོངས་གཙོ་བྱེད་⁶⁹པའི་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་གཅད་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་
(Bka' 35a6) རོལ་ཞེན། དོན་བྱེད་པར་ངེས་པ་ལ་འང་རྣམ་གཅད་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡོངས་གཙོ་བྱེད་པར་
འགྱུར་རོ།།

The third topic: dispelling objections concerning [the theory that] views no-thing-ness as what is to be established [through inference].

(Opponent:) When the mere negation of the verbal expression, “It exists as a real entity,” is ascertained, no positive element (*lit.* “what remains after cutting round”) occurs within the conceived object, and consequently, no negative element (*lit.* “what is cut off”) would arise either.⁷⁰

(Phywa pa:) In a similar fashion, when something is ascertained to have causal efficacy, no negative element occurs [within the conceived object], and consequently, no positive element would arise either.⁷¹

- *The debate concerns the reasoning outlined above:*
 - *The logical reason: “lack of real oneness and plurality.”*
 - *What is to be established: “the mere negation of the verbal expression, ‘It exists as a real entity.’”*
- *The mere negation of the verbal expression, “It exists as a real entity,” constitutes the conceived object (zhen yul); it qualifies as no-thing-ness (myed dgag); and it involves no positive element (yongs gcod).*
 - *In the current discussion, the term yongs gcod appears to be employed as an object noun, denoting “what remains after cutting round” (*paricchinna), and is translated here as “positive element.” Similarly, the term rnam gcad seems to be used as an object noun, referring to “what is cut off” (*vyavacchinna), and rendered as “negative element.”*
 - *Alternatively, these terms may also be understood as action nouns, signifying “positive determination” (*pariccheda; lit. “cutting round”) and “negative determination” (*vyavaccheda; lit. “cutting off”). Accordingly, alternative translations are provided in the footnotes.*

⁶⁷ཚུད་] T ; བཅུད་ Bka'

⁶⁸ངེས་པ་ན་] T ; ངེས་པ་ Bka'

⁶⁹བྱེད་] Bka' ; ཡོད་ T

⁷⁰(Alternative translation:) When the mere negation of the verbal expression, “It exists as a real entity,” is ascertained, no **positive determination** (*lit.* “**cutting round**”) occurs **regarding** the conceived object, and consequently, no **negative determination** (*lit.* “**cutting off**”) would arise either.

⁷¹(Alternative translation:) In a similar fashion, when something is ascertained to have causal efficacy, no **negative determination** (*lit.* “**cutting off**”) occurs [**regarding** the conceived object], and consequently, no **positive determination** (*lit.* “**cutting around**”) would arise either.

- *The opponent appears to maintain that a positive element necessitates its corresponding negative element, suggesting that in the absence of the former, the latter cannot arise.*
- *Phywa pa develops a reductio ad absurdum argument grounded in the opponent's theory, asserting that even in the case of establishing causal efficacy with respect to a certain entity, no positive element can arise without a corresponding negative element.*
- *In actuality, causal efficacy, which serves as the conceived object in the given reasoning, is a positive element and should be apprehended as such through the inference that establishes it.*

རྣམ་གཅད་བྱེད་པར་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བ་བཅད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། ཡོངས་གཙོ་བྱེད་པར་མ་གྲུབ་
སྟེ་ཅིར་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཡོངས་སྟབས་བཅད་དོ། །

(Opponent:) It is not established that no negative element (*lit.* “what is cut off”) arises, because the lack of causal efficacy is eliminated (*lit.* “cut off”) [through inference].⁷²

(Phywa pa:) It is not established that no positive element (*lit.* “what remains after cutting round”) arises, because [the subject] is determined (*lit.* “cut round”) as not being established in any respect whatsoever.⁷³

- *The opponent asserts that “the lack of causal efficacy” is eliminated by establishing the causal efficacy of a given subject, implying that “the negation of the lack of causal efficacy” (*don byed pas stong pa bkag pa*) precisely constitutes a negative element occurring in the process of inference.*
- *In response, Phywa pa argues that “not being established in any respect whatsoever” is determined through the reasoning of “neither one nor many,” implying that “not being established in any respect whatsoever” constitutes a positive element.*

ཅིར་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡོངས་གཙོ་བྱེད་ཡིན་ན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བ་
བཞག་(Bka' 35a7) པ་⁷⁴རྣམ་གཅད་ཡིན་ན་བྱེད་དགག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་རོ། །

(Opponent:) If “not being established in any respect whatsoever” is a positive element, [what is established by reasoning] would be not-that-ness.

(Phywa pa:) If “the negation of the lack of causal efficacy” is a negative element, [what is established by reasoning] would be no-thing-ness.

- *According to the opponent, if a certain reasoning makes known a positive element, what is thereby established (*bsgrub bya*, **sādhya*) should be regarded as not-that-ness.*

⁷²(Alternative translation:) It is not established that no **negative determination** (*lit.* “cutting off”) arises, because the lack of causal efficacy is eliminated (*lit.* “cut off”) [through inference].

⁷³(Alternative translation:) It is not established that no **positive determination** (*lit.* “cutting round”) arises, because [the subject] is determined (*lit.* “cut round”) as not being established in any respect whatsoever.

⁷⁴སྟོང་བ་བཞག་པ་] Bka' ; སྟོང་བ་ T

- Based on this premise, he asserts that if “not being established in any respect whatsoever” is a positive element, the reasoning that entails it should be what establishes not-that-ness.
- However, the reasoning that establishes the mere negation of the verbal expression, “It exists as a real entity,” should, in fact, be what establishes no-thing-ness rather than not-that-ness.
- Employing parallel reasoning, Phywa pa argues that if a certain reasoning makes known a negative element, what is thereby established should qualify as no-thing-ness.
- Consequently, Phywa pa asserts that if “the lack of causal efficacy” is a negative element, the reasoning that entails it should be what establishes no-thing-ness.
- However, the reasoning in question (e.g., “Sound has causal efficacy because it is a product”) should be what establishes not-that-ness rather than no-thing-ness.

བསྐྱབ་པ་བཅད་ན་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ཡང་དགག་པ་བཅད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པས་ཐལ་བ་བྱབ་པ་
མེད་དོཞེན། བསྐྱབ་པ་⁷⁵ཡོངས་སུ་བཅད་ན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ཡང་དགག་པ་⁷⁶ཡོངས་སུ་བཅད་
པ་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པས་ཐལ་བ་བྱབ་པ་མེད་དོ།

(Opponent:) If a positive property is eliminated, [what is established by reasoning] should be no-thing-ness. However, if a negative property is eliminated, [what is established by reasoning] should be not-that-ness. Consequently, the *prasaṅga* argument lacks logical entailment.

(Phywa pa:) If a positive property is determined, [what is established by reasoning] should be not-that-ness. However, if a negative property is determined, [what is established by reasoning] should be no-thing-ness. Consequently, the *prasaṅga* argument lacks logical entailment.

- The opponent argues that if a positive property is eliminated by a certain reasoning, what is thereby established is to be regarded as no-thing-ness, but that if a negative property is eliminated, what is thereby established is to be regarded as not-that-ness.
- This implies that what is established by the reasoning that eliminates a negative property, i.e., the lack of causal efficacy, qualifies as not-that-ness. Consequently, the opponent thus refutes the previous *prasaṅga* argument, which states that if “the negation of the lack of causal efficacy” is a negative element, what is established by reasoning would be no-thing-ness.
- Employing parallel reasoning, Phywa pa argues that if a positive property is determined by a certain reasoning, what is thereby established is to be regarded as not-that-ness, but that if a negative property is determined, what is thereby established is to be regarded as no-thing-ness.
- This implies that what is established by the reasoning that determines a negative property, i.e., not being established in any respect whatsoever, qualifies as no-thing-ness. Consequently, Phywa pa thus refutes the previous *prasaṅga* argument, which states that if “not being established in any respect whatsoever” is a positive element, what is established by

⁷⁵བསྐྱབ་པ་] Bka' ; བྱབ་པར་ T

⁷⁶དགག་པ་] Bka' ; དགག་པར་ T

reasoning would be not-that-ness.

མྱེད་དགག་ཡིན་ན་རྣམ་གཅད་དང་བྱད་ཅི་ཡོད་ཅེ་ན། (Bka' 35b1) དགག་པ་རྣམ་གཅད་མ་ཡིན་
དགག་⁷⁷ཡིན་ན་ཡོངས་གཙོད་དང་བྱད་ཅི་ཡོད།

(Opponent:) If it [i.e., what is established by determining a negative property] constitutes no-thing-ness, how does it differ from a negative element (*lit.* “what is cut off”)?

(Phywa pa:) If [what is established by] eliminating a negative property constitutes not-that-ness, how does it differ from a positive element (*lit.* “what remains after cutting round”)?

- *To simplify, these two questions concern the distinction between no-thing-ness and negative elements, as well as between not-that-ness and positive elements.*
- *These questions are straightforward inquiries, not rhetorical questions implying negation. As will become clear from the following discussion, there is no difference between the former two and the latter two.*

བྱད་མྱེད་དེ་དངོས་འགལ་བཅད་པ་དང་འགལ་བླ་བསྐྱབས་པ་⁷⁸ལྷོག་པ་ཐ་མྱི་⁷⁹དང་དོ་ཞེ་ན། འདིར་
ཡང་བྱད་⁸⁰མྱེད་དེ་བདེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བཀག་པ་ཉིད་དེས་སྟོང་བའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །

(Opponent:) It [i.e., not-that-ness] does not differ [from a positive element]. For what remains after eliminating a directly incompatible element and what is established as its opposite are not conceptually distinct.

(Phywa pa:) In our position as well, it [i.e., no-thing-ness] does not differ [from a negative element], because the mere negation of reality constitutes the conceptual essence of its emptiness.

- *The opponent admits that not-that-ness is conceptually indistinguishable from a positive element.*
- *This implies that what is established by reasoning that eliminates a negative property constitutes both not-that-ness and a positive element.*
- *Applying the theory to the given argument, the following analysis holds.*
 - *The directly incompatible element: “the lack of causal efficacy.”*
 - *What remains after eliminating a directly incompatible element: “causal efficacy.”*
 - *Its opposite: “causal efficacy.”*
- *Employing parallel reasoning, Phywa pa argues that no-thing-ness is conceptually indistinguishable from a negative element.*
- *This implies that what is established by reasoning that determines a negative property constitutes both no-thing-ness and a negative element.*

⁷⁷མ་ཡིན་དགག་] T ; མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ Bka'

⁷⁸བསྐྱབས་པ་] T ; བསྐྱབས་པ་ Bka'

⁷⁹མྱི་] Bka' ; མི་ T

⁸⁰བྱད་] Bka' ; བྱབ་པ་ T

- Applying the theory to the given argument, the following analysis holds.
 - The directly incompatible element: “reality” (*bden pa'i dngos po*) or “being established as something.”
 - The negative property (or negative property): “not being established in any respect whatsoever.”
 - What is established through the determination of a negative property: “its emptiness” (*des stong pa*), i.e., the emptiness of reality.

མ་ཡིན་དགག་ལ་ཡོངས་གཙོ་དང་བཟོད་ནས་བྱེད་དགག་ལ་ནམ་གཅད་^(Bka' 35b2) ཏུ་བཟོད་ན་⁸¹མ་
ཡིན་དགག་⁸²བྱེད་པས་བྱེད་དགག་བྱེད་པར་ཐལ་བ་ནི་བྱུང་བ་བྱེད་དོ། ། །

If [the opponent] rephrases not-that-ness as “positive element” (*lit.* “what remains after cutting round”) and no-thing-ness as “negative element” (*lit.* “what is cut off”), then [it becomes clear that the original] *prasaṅga* argument, which asserts that no-thing-ness does not arise because not-that-ness does not arise, lacks logical entailment.

- The original *prasaṅga* argument is: “When the mere negation of the verbal expression, ‘It exists as a real entity,’ is ascertained, no positive element occurs within the conceived object, and consequently, no negative element would arise either.
- This can be simplified as: “No-thing-ness does not arise because not-that-ness does not arise.”
- The absurdity of this *prasaṅga* argument becomes more evident if “not-that-ness” is redefined as “positive element” (*lit.* “what remains after cutting round”) and “no-thing-ness” as “negative element” (*lit.* “what is cut off”).
- For it cannot be said that nothing is cut off simply because nothing remains after the process of cutting around.

གལ་ཏེ་དོན་དམ་པར་ཡོད་པའི་སྟངས་བཞག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་སྟངས་བསྐྱབ་པ་འམ་⁸³དོན་བསྐྱབ་
པ་⁸⁴ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་སྐྱེས་བྱེད་པར་ཏུ་བྱས་པར་ཐལ་ལ་དེ་འདོད་ན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་
རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལྟར་ན་སྟངས་བཞག་པའི་བྱེད་དགག་དེ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཏུ་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་འདོད་
ན་མཚན་བྱ་གང་མཚན་པར་བྱེད།

If the negation of the verbal expression, “It exists ultimately,” is what is to be established [through reasoning], that [reasoning] should either establish convention or establish a state of affairs. If the former is the case, [what is to be established] would be something characterized by sound; but if this is accepted, it would amount to not-that-ness. If the latter is the case, then

⁸¹MN: རྟོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་བྱེད་པས་ (“since its opposite, which constitutes not-that-ness, does not exist”)

⁸²མ་ཡིན་དགག་] T ; བྱེད་དགག་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ Bka’

⁸³བསྐྱབ་པ་འམ་] Bka’ ; སྐྱབ་པས་ T

⁸⁴བསྐྱབ་པ་] Bka’ ; སྐྱབ་ T

no-thing-ness, which is [characterized as] the negation of verbal expression, would serve as the definiens; but if this is accepted, what kind of definiendum is being defined?

- *Here begins a new debate on the nature of reasoning: whether it is reasoning that establishes convention (tha snyad bsgrub pa) or reasoning that establishes a state of affairs (don bsgrub pa).*
- *As a general rule, reasoning that establishes convention consists of a definiens (mtshan nyid) applied as the logical reason and a definiendum (mtshon bya) applied as the property to be established; and reasoning that establishes a state of affairs consists of a definiendum applied as the logical reason and a definiens applied as the property to be established (cf. Hugon 2009).*
- *If the reasoning in question is intended to establish convention, then the property to be established—namely, the negation of the verbal expression—should be characterized by a positive element, namely sound, since “convention” (tha snyad) is something verbalized through linguistic sound. However, if this were the case, the negation of the verbal expression would amount to not-that-ness, whereas in reality, it consists in no-thing-ness, which is characterized solely by negative elements.*
- *If the reasoning in question is intended to establish a state of affairs, then the property to be established—namely, the negation of the verbal expression—should function as a definiens. However, if this is the case, another question arises: what kind of definiendum is being defined?*

དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོས་སྟོང་བའི་ཐ་སྟེན་མཚན་ནོ་⁸⁵ཞེ་ན། དཔུང་བཅོལ་པའི་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བས་ཀྱང་དེ་མཚན་ལ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཐ་སྟེན་བཀའ་པས་ཀྱང་དེ་མཚན་པས་མཚན་བྱ་གཅིག་⁸⁶ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་མར་འགྱུར་རེ་ཞེ་ན།

(Opponent:) One may say as follows: the verbal expression, “It is empty of ultimate reality,” is defined [as the negation of the verbal expression, “It exists ultimately”]. However, the same [definiendum] is also defined as “the lack of causal efficacy that withstands analysis.” Furthermore, it is also defined as “the negation of the verbal expression, ‘It is ultimate reality’”. Accordingly, one and the same definiendum would have multiple definiens.

- *According to the opponent, the definiendum, i.e., the verbal expression, “It is empty of ultimate reality,” allows for multiple definiens, as follows:*
 - *The negation of the verbal expression, “It exists ultimately.”*
 - *The lack of causal efficacy that withstands analysis.*
 - *The negation of the verbal expression, “It is ultimate reality.”*
- *In the opponent’s view, if one and the same definiendum had multiple definiens, it would be absurd.*

⁸⁵ནོ་] T ; རྟོ་ Bka’

⁸⁶གཅིག་] Bka’ ; ཅིག་ T

ཐ་སྟན་སྒྲུབ་^(35b4) ཏུ་མི་འདོད་པས་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཏུ་མི་འགྱུར་⁸⁷ལ། འདི་དོན་སྒྲུབ་⁸⁸ཡིན་པས་
མཚན་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཐལ་བ་ནི་འདོད་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་⁸⁹དེས་མཚན་བྱའང་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོས་སྟོང་བའི་ཐ་
སྟན་མཚན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

(Phywa pa:) It is not acceptable to regard this as reasoning that establishes convention; therefore, [what is to be established] cannot be not-that-ness. Rather, it establishes a state of affairs; thus, we accept the consequence that [what is to be established] functions as a definiens. In such cases, what is to be defined by it is the verbal expression, “It lacks ultimate reality.”

- Like the opponent, Phywa pa also regards the reasoning in question as one that establishes a state of affairs, implying that the property to be established functions as a definiens.
- In Phywa pa's view, the definiendum, i.e., the verbal expression, “It lacks ultimate reality,” admits only one definiens: the negation of the verbal expression, “It exists ultimately.”
- Therefore, in his view, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the definiens and the definiendum.

མཚན་བྱ་གཅིག་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཏུ་མར་ཡང་སྟེ་⁹⁰འགྱུར་ཏེ་དཔྱད་བཟོད་པའི་དོན་བྱེད་པས་སྟོང་བས་
དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་དོན་ལས་ཐ་དད་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་ནས་སྒྲས་ཞེན་ཏུ་རུང་^(Bka' 35b5)བའི་ཐ་སྟན་མཚན་ལ།
དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཐ་སྟན་བཀག་པའི་སྟེད་དགག་གིས་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཐ་སྟན་ཏུ་བྱར་
རུང་བ་ལས་ཐ་དད་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་ནས་སྒྲས་ཞེན་ཏུ་རུང་བའི་ཐ་སྟན་མཚན་པས་མཚན་བྱ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

(Phywa pa:) It is not the case that one and the same definiendum allows for multiple definiens, because [the definiens as postulated by the opponent] correspond to distinct definienda. The reason is as follows. The phrase “the lack of causal efficacy that withstands analysis” defines a verbal expression that becomes apprehensible through language by being distinguished from the state of affairs constituting ultimate reality. Likewise, the negation of the verbal expression, “It is ultimate reality”—which constitutes no-thing-ness—defines a verbal expression that becomes apprehensible through language by being distinguished from the applicability of the verbal expression, “It is ultimate reality.”

- Phywa pa argues that “the lack of causal efficacy that withstands analysis” and “the negation of the verbal expression, ‘It is ultimate reality’,” correspond to distinct definienda.
- The definiendum of the former is a verbal expression derived from a critical analysis of the state of affairs denoted by “ultimate reality,” whereas the definiendum of the latter is a verbal expression derived from a critical analysis of the applicability of the verbal expression, “It is ultimate reality.”

⁸⁷མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཏུ་མི་འགྱུར་] T ; མ་ཡིན་དགག་མ་ཡིན་ Bka'

⁸⁸དོན་སྒྲུབ་] T ; དོན་ Bka'

⁸⁹ཡིན་ཞིང་] Bka' ; ཡིན་པས་ T

⁹⁰སྟེ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་དག་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་ཁེགས་པ་ན་ཕུང་པོ་གསུམ་པ་རྟོག་པའི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་དུའང་མེད་
 པས་དཔུང་བཅོད་པའི་དོན་བྱེད་(Bka' 35b6) པ་ཁེགས་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཐ་སྟངས་བཞག་
 པའི་མེད་དགག་གི་དོན་བསྐྱབ་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར། རྟོག་དང་ལྟོག་ཤལ་དང་ལྟན་པ་གྲུབ་པ་ན་རྟོག་དང་
 ལྟོག་ཤལ་དང་མི་ལྟན་པ་ཁེགས་ཀྱང་བ་ལང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཐ་སྟངས་བཞག་པའི་དོན་བསྐྱབ་དུ་ཡོད་པ་
 དང་། ལྟངས་བཞི་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་གྲུབ་པ་ན་ལྟངས་ཅུང་ཡོད་པའི་དོན་ཁེགས་ཀྱང་ཐ་སྟངས་བཞག་
 པའི་དོན་(Bka' 35b7) དང་འབྲས་བུ་ཁེགས་པ་ན་རྒྱ་རྩ་པ་ཐོགས་མེད་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྟངས་བཞག་པའི་དོན་དང་།
 ཤིང་མེད་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ན་ཤ་པའི་དོན་ཁེགས་ཀྱང་ཐ་སྟངས་བཞག་པའི་དོན་བསྐྱབ་⁹¹པར་འབྱུང་རོ་ཞེ་ན།

(Opponent:) If real oneness and plurality are rejected, then no third possibility can exist even within the domain of conceived objects of conceptual thought. As a result, whereas “causal efficacy that withstands analysis” is rejected, the state of affairs of no-thing-ness, [expressed as] “the negation of the verbal expression, ‘It is ultimate reality’,” can be established. Likewise, when it is established that [a certain animal] has a cervical vertebra and a dewlap, the state of affairs of the negation of a verbal expression, “It is not a cow,” can be established, whereas its not having a cervical vertebra and a dewlap is negated. Similarly, when an inferential sign of the non-perception of a perceptible entity is established, the state of affairs of the negation of a verbal expression [can be established], whereas the state of affairs of perceptibility is refuted. When [the existence of] an effect is refuted, the state of affairs of the negation of a verbal expression, “There is a cause possessing an unimpeded ability,” [can be established]. Likewise, when it is established that there is no tree, the state of affairs of the negation of a verbal expression can be established, whereas the state of affairs of being a *śimśapā* is refuted.

དེ་ཐོད་ལ་བསྟོག་པའི་དོན་བཞག་པའི་དོན་བསྐྱབ་དུ་མེད་པས་དོན་བསྐྱབ་དུ་མེད་པར་གསུངས་ཀྱི་ཐ་
 སྟངས་བཞག་པའི་མེད་དགག་གི་དོན་ནི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཁེགས་པ་ན་འང་(Bka' 36a1) བསྐྱབ་དུ་ཡོད་པས་ན་
⁹²སྟོབ་དཔོན་ཚོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བརྗོད་པ་ལ་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ་
 བཞིན་རོ་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

(Phywa pa:) It is stated [by Dharmakīrti] that a state of affairs is cannot be established, considering that, in all these cases, the state of affairs of “the negation of the opposite meaning” cannot be established. However, the state of affairs of no-thing-ness, namely, the negation of a verbal expression, can be established even when a definiens is refuted. Therefore, Ācārya Dharmakīrti taught: “Just as the statement, ‘He is not one who begets [a child]’, establishes that the person is not a father.”⁹³

⁹¹བསྐྱབ་] Bka' ; སྐྱབ་ T

⁹²ཡོད་པས་ན་] Bka' ; ཡོད་པས་ T

⁹³PVin I 3.13ff. (cf. Vetter 1966: 34f.; Tosaki 1986: 8): *tan nimittopadarśanenānupalabdhenāstīti vyavahārah sādhyate mūḍham prati, jananakhyātyā pitṛtvavat | adṛśyānupalambhe 'pi nimittābhāvāt sad-vyavahārapratishedhaḥ, ajananakhyātyā 'pitṛtvavat* | (“Thus, by presenting a reason—namely, ‘because it is not perceived, it does not exist’—a verbal expression is established for the ignorant. Just as the statement, ‘He is one who begets [a child]’, establishes that the person is a father. Likewise, in the case of the non-perception of an

- *There are cases where a definiendum is negated following the negation of a definiens, as exemplified by an instance indicated by Dharmakīrti.*⁹⁴
- *The statement, “He is not one who begets [a child],” establishes that the person is not a father. Here, a certain man’s not being one who begets a child constitutes “the negation of the definiens,” and his not being a father constitutes “the negation of the definiendum.”*

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བཞི་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་བསྐྱབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་སྤང་བ་ནི་གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་དག་པའི་⁹⁵གཅིག་དང་བྱ་
མས་སྟོང་བའི་སྤྱད་དགག་གིས་ཡང་དག་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་སྟོང་བའི་ཐ་སྟོན་བསྐྱབ་⁹⁶(Bka' 36a2) པ་
ན། རྟགས་དེ་གྲགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡིན་པས་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡིན་ན་སྤྱད་དགག་དང་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཆོས་བདག་གཅིག་⁹⁷པའི་འབྲེལ་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡོད། དབྱེར་སྤྱད་པར་གནས་པས་⁹⁸བདག་གཅིག་⁹⁹པ་
མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཡིན་ན་སྤྱི་དབྱིགས་པའི་¹⁰⁰རྟགས་དང་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་བདག་གཅིག་¹⁰¹པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ནི་
ན།

The fourth topic: dispelling objections concerning [the theory that] views not-thing-ness as what is to be established [through inference].

(Opponent:) If the verbal expression, “It lacks real intrinsic nature,” is established by means of [the inferential sign of] no-thing-ness—namely, the absence of real oneness and plurality—then the inferential sign is a sign based on well-established things (*grags pa*, **prasiddha*), and thus, it must be a sign of an essential property (*rang bzhin*, **svabhāva*). But if this is the case, how can an identity relation (*bdag gcig pa'i 'brel pa*, **tādātmya*) between no-thing-ness and the property to be established [i.e., not-that-ness] be maintained? The mere fact that [two things] exist in an inseparable manner does not entail that they stand in an identity relation. If it did, then [the property applied as] an inferential sign of non-perception and the property to be established would necessarily be identical.

- *When the reasoning of “neither one nor many” establishes the applicability of the verbal expression, “It lacks real intrinsic nature,” it serves to clarify the linguistic convention regarding how to use the correct expression to denote the state of affairs, rather than to*

imperceptible entity, the negation of the verbal expression, ‘It exists’, is established based on the absence of a reason. Just as the statement, ‘He is not one who begets [a child]’, establishes that the person is not a father.”)

⁹⁴ *Shes rab 'od zer* 41b4: *mtshan nyid bkag pas mtshon bya 'gog pa'i dpe' ni skyed par byed pa ma yin pa zhes pa'o* | (“An instance of a case where a definiendum is negated following the negation of a definiens is stated [in the text] as: ‘He is not one who begets [a child]’.”)

⁹⁵གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་དག་པའི་] T ; ཡང་དག་པའི་ Bka'

⁹⁶བསྐྱབ་] Bka' སྐྱབ་ T

⁹⁷གཅིག་] Bka' ; ཅིག་ T

⁹⁸པས་] Bka' ; པར་ T

⁹⁹གཅིག་] Bka' ; ཅིག་ T

¹⁰⁰སྤྱི་དབྱིགས་པའི་] Bka' ; མི་དབྱིགས་པའི་ T

¹⁰¹གཅིག་] Bka' ; ཅིག་ T

clarify the previously unknown nature or property of the subject. Therefore, the inferential sign applied in the reasoning is a sign based on well-established things.

- A sign based on well-established things is a subcategory of the sign of an essential property. This implies that the sign, i.e., the absence of real oneness and plurality, and the property to be established, i.e., the verbal expression, “It lacks real intrinsic nature,” are of the same nature.
- The question arises as to how the identity relation between the two is established.
- The opponent argues that an identity relation cannot be established by the mere fact of inseparability.
- Consider the following reasoning: There is no smoke on the ocean because there is no fire there. The inferential sign, namely, the absence of fire (mye myed), functions as a sign of non-perception of a cause (rgyu mi dmigs pa).¹⁰²
- Although the absence of fire (mye myed) and the absence of smoke (du myed) exist in an inseparable manner, they do not share an identity relation, since both are no-thing-ness and lack intrinsic being that would enable them to share such a relation.¹⁰³

དབྱེར་སྤྱད་པ་ ཚམ་གྱིས་བདག་གཅིག་¹⁰⁴པ་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་ཆོས་(Bka' 36a3) འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་མ་ཡིན་
 དགག་གི་ཆོས་གཞན་དབྱེར་སྤྱད་གྱིས་མི་འདོར་བ་བདག་གཅིག་¹⁰⁵པ་ཡིན་ཡ། དེ་ནི་འདི་ལའང་ཡོད་
 དེ་ཁྱབ་བྱ་སྤྱད་དགག་ཡིན་ཡང་དེས་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དབྱེར་སྤྱད་གྱིས་སྤྱི་¹⁰⁶འདོར་པའི་ཕྱིར་
 རོ།།

(Phywa pa:) The mere fact of inseparability does not constitute an identity relation. Rather, if a certain property does not discard another property, which is not-that-ness, due to inseparability, then they stand in an identity relation. This [identity relation] holds in the present case as well, because although the pervaded is no-thing-ness, it does not discard the pervader, which is not-that-ness, due to inseparability.

- Like the opponent, Phywa pa does not think that the mere fact of inseparability constitutes identity relation.
- To avoid the aforementioned undesirable consequence, Phywa pa maintains that an identity relation holds only when one property does not negate another due to their inseparability, and that the latter property must be not-that-ness.

¹⁰²Yid kyi mun sel 61a1: rgyu mi dmigs pa ni mtsho chen po 'di la du ba med de me med pa'i phyir ro zhes pa lta bu'o || ("The non-perception of a cause is illustrated as follows: There is no smoke on this vast ocean because there is no fire.")

¹⁰³Shes rab 'od zer 9a1: dbyer myed tsam ni bdag gcig pa ma yin te | mye myed dang du myed la'ang dbyer myed yod kyang bdag gcig ma yin pa'i phyir ro || ("The mere fact of inseparability does not constitute an identity relation because, although the absence of smoke and the absence of fire exist in an inseparable manner, they do not share identity relation.")

¹⁰⁴གཅིག་] Bka' ; ཅིག་ T

¹⁰⁵གཅིག་] Bka' ; ཅིག་ T

¹⁰⁶སྤྱི་] Bka' ; མི་ T

- According to *Phywa pa*, one of the constituents of an identity relation can be either *no-thing-ness* or *not-that-ness*.
- In the present case, the reasoning under consideration involves an inferential sign—namely, the absence of real oneness and plurality—which constitutes *no-thing-ness* and serves as the pervaded property. Meanwhile, the property to be established—the verbal expression, “It lacks real intrinsic nature”—constitutes *not-that-ness* and functions as the pervader.
- Consequently, an identity relation holds between these two properties, thereby classifying the inferential sign as one of an essential property.

ཁྱབ་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་དགག་བྱེད་མེད་པར་མི་འདོར་ཡང་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་བྱེད་དགག་ཡིན་པས་བདག་ཅིག་པར་
¹⁰⁷མི་རུང་ན་སྒྲ་དོན་ལ་^(Bka' 36a4) དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པས་¹⁰⁸སྒྲ་བས་དངོས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྟངས་སྒྲུབ་¹⁰⁹པ་
 དང་། སྒྲ་རུང་མ་དཀྱིགས་¹¹⁰པ་བྱེད་དགག་ལས་བྱམ་པ་བྱེད་པའི་ཐ་སྟངས་སྒྲུབ་¹¹¹པ་ལམས་གསུངས་པ་
 ལའང་བདག་ག་ཅིག་¹¹²པ་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །

(Phywa pa:) [One may think that] even if the pervaded property does not discard the pervader, which is *not-that-ness*, due to their inseparability, an identity relation cannot arise [between them] because the pervaded property is *no-thing-ness*. However, if this were the case, it would follow that an identity relation would also fail to hold in cases such as the establishment of the verbal expression, “It is a non-entity,” with respect to [the subject] “the referent of a word” on the basis of [the inferential sign] “lack of causal efficacy,” or the establishment of the verbal expression, “The pot does not exist,” on the basis of [the inferential sign] “non-perception of a perceivable object,” which is *no-thing-ness*.

- If a certain property *x* does not discard another property *y* due to their inseparability, then these two properties share an identity relation.
 - The former, *x*, functions as the pervaded property (*khyab bya*, **vyāpya*) and can be either *no-thing-ness* or *not-that-ness*.
 - The latter, *y*, functions as the pervader (*khyab byed*, **vyāpaka*) and must always be *not-that-ness*, which encompasses both a purely positive property (*sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa*) and a combination of the positive and negative properties (*dgag sgrub tshogs pa*).
- *Phywa pa* provides examples where an identity relation holds between *no-thing-ness* as the pervaded and *not-that-ness* as the pervader.

¹⁰⁷པར་] Bka' ; པ་ T

¹⁰⁸རྣམས་པས་] Bka' ; པས་ T

¹⁰⁹སྒྲུབ་] T ; བསྒྲུབ་ Bka'

¹¹⁰དཀྱིགས་] Bka' ; དཀིགས་ T

¹¹¹སྒྲུབ་] T ; བསྒྲུབ་ Bka'

¹¹²ག་ཅིག་] Bka' ; ཅིག་ T

- In the reasoning: “The referent of a word (*sgra don*, *śabdārtha) is a non-entity because it lacks causal efficacy,” the inferential sign, “lack of causal efficacy,” functions as the pervader and constitutes no-thing-ness, whereas the property to be established, “the applicability of the verbal expression, ‘It is a non-entity,’” functions as the pervader and constitutes not-that-ness.
- In the reasoning: “The pot does not exist because it is not perceived,” the inferential sign, “non-perception,” functions as the pervader and constitutes no-thing-ness, whereas the property to be established, “the applicability of the verbal expression, ‘The pot does not exist,’” functions as the pervader and constitutes not-that-ness.

ཡང་གཤམ་ཏེ་ཡང་དག་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མས་སྟོང་བའི་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་པས་སྒྲུ་མ་ལྟ་བུར་སྒྲུབ་¹¹³པ་ན་སྒྲུ་
མ་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པར་གཤམ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན། བྱས་པས་སྒྲུ་¹¹⁴རྟག་(Bka' 36a5) པ་བསྒྲུབ་¹¹⁵པ་ན་འང་སྒྲུ་
¹¹⁶རྟག་པ་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པར་སྒྲུ་¹¹⁷འགྱུར་རམ་¹¹⁸།

(Opponent:) It follows that, if [a certain entity] is established as illusory by means of [the inferential sign] “manifesting as something that lacks both real oneness and plurality,” then [the property to be established] “illusory nature” would be ultimate reality.

(Phywa pa:) In the case where [a certain entity] is established as impermanent by means of [the inferential sign] “begin a product,” does it then follow that [the property to be established] “impermanence” is ultimate reality?

- The final debate concerns the status of what is to be established by the “neither one nor many” reasoning.
- Phywa pa maintains that what is to be established by this reasoning is either ultimate reality or concealing reality.
- However, the opponent argues that the illusory nature, established by the inferential sign “lack of real oneness and plurality,” should be ultimate reality, likely assuming that whatever Madhyamaka reasoning establishes always pertains to ultimate reality.
- Phywa pa refutes this claim by drawing a parallel to the reasoning that establishes a certain entity’s impermanence based on the sign “being a product.”

སྒྲུ་¹¹⁹རྟག་པ་ཙམ་དང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པའི་སྒྲུ་¹²⁰རྟག་པ་འང་བསྒྲུབ་དུ་བྱུང་ངོ་ཞེ་ན། སྒྲུ་མ་ཙམ་འམ་ཀུན་

¹¹³སྒྲུབ་] T ; བསྒྲུབ་ Bka'

¹¹⁴སྒྲུ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

¹¹⁵བསྒྲུབ་] Bka' ; སྒྲུབ་ T

¹¹⁶སྒྲུ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

¹¹⁷སྒྲུ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

¹¹⁸རམ་] Bka' ; ལ་ T

¹¹⁹སྒྲུ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

¹²⁰སྒྲུ་] Bka' ; མི་ T

ཇོ་བོ་ལྷོ་མ་ལྷོ་བྱ་བ་སྐྱབ་བྱ་བྱི་¹²¹ རུང་ངམ། ། །

(Opponent:) Mere impermanence [without qualification] and impermanence as a concealing reality can also be established.

(Phywa pa:) Does it then follow that mere illusory nature [without qualification] and illusory nature as a concealing reality can also be established?

- *The opponent argues that the latter reasoning establishes both “impermanence” without qualification and “impermanence” as a concealing reality, implying that reasoning does not necessarily determine the ontological status of the property to be established—whether it is ultimate or concealing reality.*
- *Based on this premise, Phywa pa counters that, if this were the case, the “neither one nor many” reasoning should likewise establish both “illusory nature” without qualification and “illusory nature” as a concealing reality.*

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チャパ・チューキセンゲの med dgag と ma yin dgag の理論

根本 裕史

本研究は、サンプ・ネウトク僧院の第六代座主チャパ・チューキセンゲ (Phywa pa chos kyi seng ge: 1109–1169) の『中観真実真髓論』(*Dbu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po*) に基づき、チベット仏教で発達した med dgag と ma yin dgag の概念を考察し、その特色を明らかにするものである。チャパは med dgag と ma yin dgag の両者を「否定されるべき対象 (dgag bya) を否定することによって認識される対象」とみなし、前者を「全ての肯定的属性を切り捨てることによって認識される否定的属性」、後者を「肯定的属性と共に認識される否定的属性」として理解している。従来、これらは一般的に「非定立的否定」(non-implicative negation, Skt. prasajyapratiṣedha) および「定立的否定」(implicative negation, Skt. paryudāsa) として理解されてきたが、本論文では med dgag を「存在否定態」(no-thing-ness, あるいは「不在」) と訳し、ma yin dgag を「述定否定態」(not-that-ness, あるいは「準不在」) と訳し、その上でチャパによる med dgag および ma yin dgag の解釈と、彼に先行するチベット人の解釈への批判を検討し、最後に『中観真実真髓論』(125.122.22) の訳註を提示する。

以下、その考察内容をやや詳しく述べる。チャパの否定理論において重要なのは、彼が存在否定態と述定否定態を、否定辞の意味論とは関連づけずに、認識論的な概念として理解している点である。彼によれば、存在否定態とは否定のみによって知られる対象の属性であり、それが知られる際、いかなる肯定的要素も意識の中に残らない。一方、述定否定態は否定と肯定の両方によって知られる対象の属性であり、それが知られる際には、肯定的要素が完全に切り捨てられること (sgrub chos dor ba) ことはなく意識の中に残存する。述定否定態の範疇の中には、否定的属性と肯定的属性の組み合わせ (dgag sgrub tshogs pa) の他に、純粋な肯定的属性 (sgrub pa 'ba' zhig pa) も含まれる。実に全ての属性 (x) は、概念的に知られる時には、必ずそれでないもの (非 x) の否定という形で知られるので「否定的」である。チャパが純粋な肯定的属性 (例: 所作性など) を述定否定態の中に含めたのはそのような理由からである。

チャパはこうした観点から、彼以前のチベット人が与える両概念の定義——存在否定態とは否定対象の否定に伴って他要素を投影 (chos gzhan 'phen pa) しないものであり、述定否定態とは否定対象の否定に伴って他要素を投影するものである——を退ける。チャパがそのような定義を誤りとみなす理由は、存在否定態も他要素を投影することがあり得るからであり、また ma yin dgag が述定否定態が他要素を投影しないこともあり得るからである。ただし、チャパの議論は、完全に彼自身の理論に立脚した批判なのではなく、言葉遊びや詭弁の要素を多分に含んだ論駁である点に注意すべきである。これは後のゲルク派僧院で発展するタクセル (rtags gsal) の問答に類似するものである。

チャパの否定の理論は、彼の直弟子のツァンナクパ・ツォンドウ・センゲ (Gtsang nag pa brtson 'grus seng ge: 12 世紀) などに継承されたが、サキヤ派のサキヤ・パンディタ・クンガ・ギェルツェン (Sa skya paṇḍita kun dga' rgyal mtshan: 1182–1251) によって批判され、後のゲルク派 (新カダム派) でもそのままの形で受容されることはなかった。

いずれにせよ、チャパが示した認識論的な存在否定態と述定否定態の概念はチベット仏教思想史の中で極めて大きな意味を持つ。後のトルポパ・シェーラプ・ギェルツェン (Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan: 1292–1361) の他空説や、ツォンカパ・ロサンタクパ (Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa: 1357–1419) の中観哲学の理論的基盤を与えたと言える。