

Doctoral Dissertation

Jihad and Madrasas Strategic Actors and Policy Domains in Islamic
States: Analysis of the Strategic Cultures and Security Policies of
Afghanistan and Pakistan

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
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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the military facet of jihad, and madrasas from strategic and political perspectives to see how they have been used under strategic and political interests of different state and non-state actors in Islamic world. Given the fact that jihad is a religious doctrine of war revealed in Quran, its execution always have necessitated and required religious justification and validation by highly established Islamic religious institutions. Thus, viewed in this light, this assessment affords considerable attention towards those madrasas that as important religious institutions are used as tools to provide Islamic legal rulings, *fatwas*, to political, strategic and security policies of state and non-state actors throughout Islamic history. Consequently, analysing from this angle, this dissertation adopts the historicist approach in which it will emphasise importance of jihad and madrasa history in order to understand historical changes and demonstrate their potential role as tools to justify strategies and security policy patterns of state and non-state actors in Islamic world. For any significance analysis on jihad, one must understand what makes jihad as appealing force in Islamic societies and also must have knowledge of why jihad in some Islamic societies has remained as potential influential force and religious ordain whereas in some other Islamic societies its role remained modest or futile. Thus, in order to demonstrate an empirical analysis on how jihad and madrasas shape strategic preference of particular Islamic states, this assessment by referring to two Islamic states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, discusses the degree to which jihad and madrasas as variable can be used to explain strategic cultures and specific outcomes in defence policies. This study is based on analytical research framework. It will primarily use the source of literature of past discussion. The most important reason for relying on this kind of literature is to make the changing role and status of madrasas and jihad clear in

the way in which they have remained key in making strategic preference to state and non-state actors throughout Islamic history. Secondly, this dissertation also utilises primary resources such as news, governmental and non-governmental or inter-governmental reports, as well as interviews conducted during the field research in Afghanistan. The contemporary analysis and perceptions of jihad are mainly if not in general demonstrate Huntington's extreme negative analysis of Islam as unanimous bellicose cultural unit against the West. The works and rhetoric of Muslim extremists, political and terrorist leaders such as Qutb, Ladin, and Zawahiri may have inspired scholars such as Huntington, Ibn Warraq, and Lincoln. However, irrespective of the their important roles as godfathers of the contemporary proliferating multidimensional jihad, one must also observe political and strategic backgrounds under which each of these leaders have emerged as strong influential religious figures who could successfully convince some groups of Muslims by their vision and interpretation of jihad. In this context, this assessment is a significant endeavour that offers a different angle of analysis of jihad and madrasa. It evaluates jihad and madrasas from a strategic perspective in which it emphasises that jihad and madrasas have been variable potential forces that have been used as tool to serve strategic interests of different state and non-state actors within Islamic world. It will also provide a new window of analysis on the way in which it demonstrates that jihad and madrasas within Islamic world played important role to depict religious justification for cultural, strategic, and politically motivated wars, let alone as an anti-Western force, which is general consideration in the contemporary academia.

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Chapter One

Introduction: Jihad and Madrasas Integral to Strategic Culture

Jihad and madrasa attracted considerable attention from the scholars of social science, theologians, politicians, policy makers, and strategists, particularly since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) in the United States (US) in which the act of terror was labelled as jihad against the West (particularly against US and Israel). Nonetheless, since the dawn of Islam as a universal religio-political power in the mid 7th century, jihad occupied a prominent place within the Islamic military discourse. Although Quran discourages the employment of illegitimate force,¹ Muslims leaders employed jihad in furtherance to mobilise strategic, cultural, and politically loaded wars throughout Islamic history. In this context, one of the first jihad that occurred within the Islamic world goes back to the very early age of Islam, when a group of Muslims who were called *Kharijits*², exiled, – they were people who first supported the forth Caliph of Islam, Ali Ibn Talib, on the issue of Islamic Caliphate leadership against Amir Muawiyah, the governor of Al-Sham (Syria), but later denied – under the *Takfir* doctrine (excommunicating fellow Muslim from Islam) religiously justified and bestowed Islamic legal ruling, *fatwa*, to conduct jihad against both the forth Caliph and the governor of Al-Sham in 7th century.

This dissertation focuses on the military facet of jihad, and madrasas from strategic and political perspectives to see how they have been used in line with political and strategic interests of different state and non-state actors in Islamic world. Given the

¹ Quran repeatedly warns and forbids employment of illicit use of force in various places, see Quran (17:33; 4:93-94; 2:191-).

² One of the earliest rebellion against the Islamic authority or leadership happened during the 3rd caliphate, Uthman bin Affan, which divided Muslim *ummah* into two warring political entities, the *kharijiyah* those who first supported Ali ibn Abi Talib as successor Muslim caliph, but later denied and fought against him. This was one of the first major jihads of its kind in Islamic history that happened within Islamic world. For detailed analysis see John, L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* 4th ed. (United States: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 17.

fact that Quran recognises and regulates use of force, jihad, under certain canons and conditions, its execution always have necessitated and required religious justification and validation by highly established Islamic religious institutions. Thus, viewed in this light, this assessment affords a considerable attention towards those madrasas that as important religious institutions are used as tools to provide Islamic legal rulings, *fatwas*, to political, strategic and security policies of state and non-state actors throughout Islamic history. Consequently, this dissertation adopts the historicist approach in which it will emphasise importance of jihad and madrasa history in order to understand historical changes and demonstrate their potential role as tools to justify strategies and security policy patterns of state and non-state actors in Islamic world.

For any significance analysis on jihad, one must understand what makes jihad as appealing force in Islamic societies and also must have knowledge of why jihad in some Islamic societies has remained as potential influential force and religious ordain whereas in some other Islamic societies its role remained modest or futile. Thus, in order to demonstrate an empirical analysis on how jihad and madrasas shape strategic preference of particular Islamic states, this assessment by referring to two Islamic states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, discusses the degree to which jihad and madrasas as variable can be used to explain strategic cultures and specific outcomes in defence policies.

In the contemporary academia, particularly in social science (international relations, international politics, security and strategic studies) the terms such as jihad, madrasa, strategic culture, and security have gained ground as discursive contexts that provide scholars with different outlooks and angles of analysis. To adopt a perspective in which precise Islamic and non-Islamic epistemological and ontological analysis to be embraced to draw a sort of criteria to demonstrate a desired purpose of analysis, it is

important to outline criteria for terms such as jihad, madrasa, security, and strategic culture before discussing on any of these topic under this assessment. Given the importance of the Western theoretical and epistemological scholarships as well as Islamic concepts and epistemological analysis, particularly in defining subjects such as jihad, madrasas, security and strategy, this dissertation refers to both sources of knowledge interchangeably under an appropriate context when needed.

1.1 Definitions: Jihad, Madrasa, Security Threat, and Strategic Culture

The diversity in definition is ‘useful way to identify a purpose.’³ Since, scholars from different academic fields such as international relations, security studies, politics, law, humanities, strategic studies, theology, and scholars of peace studies, analyse and study subjects such as jihad, security, culture, and strategy from different angles based upon their discernment and particular purposes, it is useful to have some clarity about what we take jihad, madrasa, security and strategic culture to be in this assessment.

i) Jihad

Interestingly, when jihad is analysed through Quranic discourses and the way in which the Prophet had practiced, it can be said that jihad neither constitutes a fundamental base of Islam nor it is a duty or commitment that requires submission. Nevertheless, jihad is an Islamic doctrine of war that is enacted as use of force by a legitimate authority/state to halt aggression against humanity or as defence war against unprovoked assault under certain rules, regulations, and responsibilities.⁴ Additionally,

³ See Micheal N. Barnett, “Culture”, in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 2nd Ed. ed Paul D. Williams edited by Paul D. Williams, 170-186. (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 185.

⁴ See Javed, Ahmed Ghamidi, trans. Shehzad Saleem, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Lahore: Shirkat Printing Press, 2009), 542-544, also see Onder, Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law* (Oxon: Routhledge, 2014), 53-56.

the commitment to conduct jihad stipulates authorised collective Islamic community/state under a legal mandate.⁵ The legal mandate demands righteous intention (punishment of aggressor), proportionality (possibility of success), legitimate authorisation, war as a measure of last resort (absence of other means of justice, inevitability of war), discrimination between civilian and warriors, and uphold humanitarian attitude towards war prisoners.⁶ To summarise, jihad necessitates righteous intention – with ultimate aim to uphold peace and justice – as well as the way in which jihad is to be conducted stipulates Islamic ethics of warfare. Viewed from this angle, it can be said that jihad as just war doctrine is equivalent to those of Catholic just war doctrine – *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* –⁷ in which the ultimate goal is to end structural and sectarian violence by upholding justice and peace.

When referred to glossary definition of jihad, it literally means, ‘struggle or strive’⁸ and at the same time as touched upon earlier it means use of force under the Islamic principles of warfare. Viewed in this light, it can be said that philosophically there are two concepts of jihad. First is the jihad in which Muslims afford greater exertion for self-virtual purity, goodness, and courteous manner. This type of jihad according to some scholars such as Mirza Iqbal Ashraf is the ‘Greater Jihad’, *Jihade-e*

⁵ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 542.

⁶ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 49-50.

⁷ Given the importance of ultimate aim of just recourse to and just conduct in, to sustain peace and security by upholding justice, Bakircioglu finds Islamic just war doctrine comparable to those of Christian just war conducts. However, he underlines the Western secular perception and Islamic religious perception of world politics as crucial difference between Islamic and Catholic just war doctrines. Nevertheless, analysis of Western perception of politics as free from religion is naïve, simplistic and highly controversial. Even the secularist political structures in one way or other are religious in their perception of politics or have their roots in religion. Ramadan describes there is no religion without politics and no politics without religion. See Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 50. Also see Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 261-261.

⁸ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 67, also see Mirza, Iqbal Ashraf, *Current Conflicts: Is Islam the Problem? Islamic Philosophy of War and peace* (United States: iUniverse, Inc., 2008), 17; Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, (United State of America: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 56.

Akbar.⁹ The second concept is the military facet of jihad. Islam regulates war under two conditions; first, to be conducted in self-defence against unprovoked assault and second under just war reasons.¹⁰ This dissertation focuses on the military facet of jihad, which have been interpreted, understood, and disseminated diversely by Muslim scholars of different schools of thought as well as non-Muslim scholars of Islamic studies.

There is an ample amount of literatures existing in the larger context of discussing and debating righteous conceptualisation, theorisation, definition, analysis, and understanding of jihad by referring to decontextualized, cherry-picked literal interpretations of fundamental sources of Islam, Quran and *Sunnah* (the Prophet Muhammad's practice of Islam in the light of Quran). The diverging interpretations based on different discernments constitute curriculum of madrasas and mosques in Islamic world. In addition, each madrasa or mosque is an autonomous authority in interpreting and disseminating desired version of jihad in Islamic communities. Hence, as mentioned previously, madrasas and mosques (generally each madrasas encompasses mosque and each mosques is centre of religious education for Muslim adolescences) not only play important role in provision of Islamic religious education, but they are also potentially key institutions that contribute in formation of political structures of different states in Islamic world.

ii) Madrasa

Irrespective of Islam, the religious knowledge and pedagogies have been disseminated under the guidance of divinely inspired books (Torah, Bible, and Quran) that were

⁹ Ashraf, *Current Conflicts: Is Islam the Problem? Islamic Philosophy of War and peace*, 8, also see Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 56-57.

¹⁰ Ibid

revealed to prophets by god and/or human-written holy inscriptions such as Sutras. However, what makes Islamic knowledge more sophisticated is the way in which Quranic text –particularly the verses that discourse the use of force – is interpreted, understood, and discerned diversely pertinent to diverging political and strategic interests of state and state actors throughout Islamic history. In fact, Islamic knowledge, (*ulum*), Islamic creed (*al-Aqaed*) and jurisprudence (*Fiquha*), have developed following the Prophet’s death. In fact, this was an effort by some renowned Islamic scholars including companions of the Prophet Muhammad to reform Islamic law by creating new juristic system to answer Muslims needs as well as meet the challenges and demands of changing socio-cultural, political environments in Islamic world.¹¹ Nevertheless, the devised justice tools had not afforded a monolithic system of jurisdiction. Diversity in interpretation of fundamental source of Islam (Quran and *Sunnah*) by different madrasas under different methods, concepts, and discernments not only divided the Islamic legal system, but also religiously and politically fragmented Islamic world into diverse, competitive, and sometime contentious sects (*Shia* and *Sunni*) since very early age of Islamic history.

The word madrasa literally means school, or place of education.¹² Generally all madrasas encompass mosques and almost all mosques are centres of Islamic education, particularly for primary level Muslim children. Thus, when mosque is referred under this assessment, it means both place for performing prayer as well as madrasa. Notably, throughout history of Islamic education, Muslims of different cultures and traditions have adopted divergent system of pedagogies in Islamic world. For example, in some region such as Saudi Arabia, historically, Islamic pedagogy took place in

¹¹ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 27.

¹² See A.H. Monjurul Haque, “Contribution of Madrasa in Historical Perspective”, *Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1, no 4 (April, 2013), 11.

informal ways known as *halqa* (circle) that were carried out under the supervision of *shaykhs* (scholars) in places such as private homes, and mosques.¹³ This kind of pedagogy is still in practice in various parts of Afghanistan. While in other regions like Iran, madrasas were built as institutions for higher Islamic education¹⁴.

Given the importance of madrasas as centres that regulate justificatory bases of Islamic war through Quran under different interpretation, jihad has become a multidimensional concept that is employed in furtherance of the military interests of various state and non-state actors in Islamic world. Notably, having their inspiration from the firm belief that Islam is an absolute religion and there is no law above Islamic law, madrasas decry tenability and authority of the secular (Western) state laws in Islamic world. Thus, the way in which some madrasas take Islam to be is a religion that provide ‘individuals with authority [that can cause a] political struggle [and endows] ideological resistance that can operate with or without a leading figure.’¹⁵

Significantly, although religion of Islam was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, by one god, Almighty Allah, through Gabriel who taught the Prophet the divinely inspired holy book of Quran, the contemporary Islam does not impart a monolithic system of practice. Rather Islam in modern era is fragmented into diverging, competitive, and sometimes-contentious sects that impart Islamic knowledge through madrasas and mosques using diverse principles and methods of interpretations pertinent to political and strategic interests of state, and non-state actors

¹³ Since the religion of Islam in its very existence is a religion of book, the pedagogies in earliest times were performed in systematised way in which the Prophet himself taught Quran to his companions for further detail on the role of earliest madrasas in Islamic world see Robert W. Henfer, ‘Introduction: The Culture, Politics and Future of Muslim Education’, in *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, eds. Robert W. Henfer and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, (UK: Princeton University Press 2007), 6.

¹⁴ See Richard T. Mortel, ‘Madrasas in Mecca during the Medieval Period: A Descriptive Based on Literary Sources’ *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 60 (2) (1997), 236.

¹⁵ See William, Maley, *Twentieth-Century Wars: The Afghanistan Wars*. 2nd edn. (China: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 49.

in Islamic world. For example, the way in which Iranians interpret, understand, and practice Islam is different when compared to Saudi Arabian version of Islam. Although, both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are Muslim nations and their flags are imprinted by the name of Allah, diversity in terms of the way in which they interpret the fundamental sources and practice Islam have made them politically and religiously hostile towards each other. In the same way madrasas in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan impart differently comparing to their counterparts in Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thus, the question rises whose Islam is righteous? Or who represents the true Islam? What matters here is not to afford a righteous answer to these questions, but rather to demonstrate how Islamic knowledge, particularly the Islamic doctrine of war, jihad, is variegated under different madrasas and mosques in different Islamic state around the globe. Seen from this perspective, it can be summarised that the provision of legal ruling, *fatwa*, to conduct jihad through madrasas and mosques is pertinent to political, cultural, economic, strategic, and military interests of different state and non-state actors in Islamic world.

iii) The Contemporary Security Threats

In the contemporary world, the conventional cannons of international security and politics are no more satisfactory to understand existing security issues in domestic, regional, and international levels. To understand characteristics, features and causes of the contemporary security problems, one must look across range of other fields such as society, culture, humanities, economic, environmental issues, and religion alongside conventional approach – militarism, state power – to security studies. According to Paul D. Williams ‘security problems are so complex and interdependent that they

require analysis and solutions that international relations cannot provide alone.’¹⁶ Particularly, since the end of the Cold War, the term security has evolved into a multidimensional elastic concept that covers all aspects of human life (social, economic, political, culture, religious, and military). Scholars of different schools of thought (realist, neo-realist, liberalist, feminist, constructivist, and environmentalist) define security from different but interrelated aspects. Lucia Zedner stated that “[se]curity varies in its importance; in its location between states, private, and civil society...and in its very meaning”.¹⁷ In the same way, “[i]t is also important to recognise that not all groups, and hence not all threat agendas, are of equal political significance”.¹⁸ For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘security threats’ means any direct (physical attack by means of military intrusion; conventional) and/or indirect threats (proxy war) that jeopardise state authority, sovereignty, and the security of its people.

The post-Cold War era failed to end the history as Francis Fukuyama suggested in late 1980s that ‘[w]hat we may be witnessing is not just the end of cold war, or passing of a particular period of post cold war history, but the end of history.’¹⁹ Rather, the world in the post-Cold War has become more insecure, unpredictable where there is no clear line of demarcation between good and evil. In the contemporary era, states are getting lesser and lesser room to manoeuvre their importance in domestic and international security. In contrast, the non-state organisation, such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), Harakat-ul Mujahedin, Lashkar-e Taiba and their affiliates are gaining greater and greater rooms to manoeuvre political, strategic and military power in present days. However, it is not to emphasise that states are not

¹⁶ See Paul D., Williams, ‘Security Studies: An Introduction,’ in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 5.

¹⁷ See Lucia, Zedner, *Security* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 11.

¹⁸ See Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 9.

¹⁹ See Francis, Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, *The National Interest* (1989), 2,.

important players in domestic, international politics and international security. Viewing from this perspective, Waltz may have been true to state that '[s]tates perform essential political, social and economic functions, and no other organization rivals them in these respects.'²⁰ However, what is important to note here is the way in which non-state actors have developed into potential forces that are able to destabilise national, regional and international security by forcing ability of states to refute, defeat and/or control them. For example, given the contemporary role of radical Islamism, particularly the way in which jihad is used to manoeuvre political and strategic interests by various non-state actors in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, states and inter-governmental organisation such as United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Unions and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have failed to take a counteractive policy response to overcome the humanitarian challenges that are created by non-stated Islamic jihadists. However, it has become a cliché amongst scholars of social science, politicians, strategists, and policymakers, particularly in the West to see jihad as potential threat to international security, particularly against the West. Notably, the perception of jihad and Islam, today, in the Western world may come in line with Bruce Lincoln's understanding of jihad and Islam, who in his book *Holy Terror*, stated that '[w]e must accept their view [Muslims] of the West – America, above all – as monolithically minimalist and utterly debased in its style of religiosity.'²¹ These kinds of literal and narrow assessment equating entire Muslim world as anti-Western minimalist are indeed appealing in the contemporary world of academics, international relations and international politics.

²⁰ See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and American Power," *Center for The National Interest*, 59 (Spring 2000), 51.

²¹ See Bruce, Lincoln, *Holy Terrors, Thinking about Religion after September 11* (United States: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 16.

Significantly, in the aftermath of 9/11 scholars in social science, policymakers and strategists afforded detailed scrutiny to the religion of Islam, particularly on the role of madrasa in Islamic world. The verdict that concluded the Islamic non-state terrorist group, al-Qaeda, carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, expanded scholars and media's inquiries – particularly Western – and everyone started questioning about the role of madrasas, mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as to whether they are centres imparting religious education or places for training Islamic radical terrorists.

iv) Strategic Culture

Before discussing how strategic cultures of Islamic states has remained under the strong influence of Islam, it is important to analyses how security is perceived by polity and decision making bodies of states in Islamic world. As touched upon earlier, since the 9/11 the interpretation, perception, and analysis of security studies transformed into a multidimensional concept as such that threats to security (domestic or international) have become religiously motivated and politically loaded unpredictable menaces that do not recognise borders. To meet new challenges scholars of security studies have started articulating a broad range of newly recognised threats to security of humankind such as identity, culture, gender, environmental threats, poverty, religion and human rights. Under this new approach the school of thought so called 'wideners' – Barry Buzan was one of the renowned wideners who took security studies beyond its conventional approach adding culture, religious, and national

identity as important component of security study –²² advocated importance of non-material, ideational factors in the contemporary security studies.

Significantly, given the fact that culture plays important role in shaping identities and social structures of communities and states, it is considered to be a determining factor by some scholars such as Jack Snyder²³ to analyse and foresee strategic behaviours, and defence policy patterns of different states around the world. This may have been true, if one examines how nations in the contemporary world have bound to fight for their identities, which indeed are production of their cultures. Seen in this light, the question thus rises, what makes man to fight for ideational factors such as identity, culture, and religion. When identity is analysed, it can be said that humankind borrow their identities from their traditions. The *Oxford Dictionary*, defines tradition as customs and belief that passes from generation to generation.²⁴ Viewed from this aspect, it can be said that tradition constitutes culture. Culture under this assessment is defined as variable value of human groupings that changes constantly in relation to human needs and developments.

Aristotle defines humankind as social animal who cannot live alone.²⁵ Khadduri describe that man alone cannot defend himself against any threat, but only by means of social and cultural grouping²⁶ he can protect his rights. Viewed in this light, it can be said that an Afghan will fight for Afghan culture that gives him identity and Pakistani man for Pakistani culture. Within this context, one may ask about the role of Islam or

²² See Paul, Roe, "Social Security" in *Contemporary Security Studies*, 3rd Ed, ed. Alan Collins (UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 177.

²³ Jack L. Snyder is one of pioneers who discussed culture as determining factor that can be used to predict strategic behaviours of states. He has written comprehensive report on how culture can be used to define strategic preference of former Soviet politburo under a possible limited nuclear warfare. See Jack L. Snyder, 'The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations', *Rand Corp.* Report R-2154-AF, September 1977, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf>. (accessed March 16, 2015).

²⁴ See Oxford Dictionary, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/tradition?q=Tradition> (accessed October 12, 2015)

²⁵ Aristotle, trans. Benjamin Jowett, *Politics*, (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999), 6.

²⁶ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 4.

place for Islamic identity in Muslim world. The answer lies in fact that Islam does not afford an identity per se or to a specific group of people. Indeed, Islam indiscriminately embraces people of different cultures and traditions unless their cultural tenets do not contradict with the fundamental principles of Islam. In other words Islam claims to be universal and talks on interests based on universal welfare of humanity. However, given the example of the battles conducted between *Banu Umayya* – *Umayyayh* clan, family of the third caliph of Islam, Uthman bin Affan and the governor of Syria, Muawiyyah Ibn Abi Sufyan – and *Banu Hashim* also known as *Ahl al Bayt* – family of the Prophet Muhammad – at the dawn of Islam in 7th century and jihads between Islamic dynasties such as Ummiyyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Ottoman, Samanid and Timurid throughout Islamic history, it can be said that Islam has been used as shield to protect cultural identities in Muslim world. Thus, Islamic doctrine of war, jihad, and madrasas are generally used as tools to serve cultural, social, political identities and strategic interests of state and non-state actors in Islamic world.

In the context of role of culture demonstrating strategic preference of states, Michael Barnett concluded that cultures ‘shape strategic preference, attitudes towards violence, willingness to take risks, readiness to suffer casualties and obey the rules of war.’²⁷ Notably, the term culture like democracy, strategy, and security is complex concept with no unified definition. According to Barnett, ‘[n]ot only is the world awash in culture, [rather cultures] is awash in different definitions.’²⁸ Culture under this assessment will be examined in relation to the way in which it influences and determines strategic preference and the security policy patterns of states in Islamic world. Thus, culture under this assessment will be illustrated in the context of strategy, so called strategic culture. The strategic culture in this context refers to the ‘collectivity

²⁷ See Barnett, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 185.

²⁸ Barnett, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 175.

of the beliefs, norms, values and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security issues and environment, and shapes their response to these'.²⁹ Viewed in this light, it can be said that culture is a variable that can be used to explain strategic preference and security policy of states, particularly in regions where it dominates society, politics, and security. Considering the fact that culture in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has remained under the strong influence of Islamic ideology, jihad and madrasas as variable tools play important roles in shaping strategic cultures of both states. Consequently, this dissertation analyses strategic cultures and security policy patterns of Afghanistan and Pakistan through the lens of jihad and madrasas considering them as variable and determining factor that can be used to define strategic cultures of both states.

1.2 The Problem Statement

The hackneyed concept of contemporary jihad has become one of the most debated subjects of security studies in the Western world. Particularly since the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the US, the epistemological understanding as well as the moral and legal legitimacy of jihad has become one of the main bones of contention within and between the West and Islamic world. This is not to say that jihad, particularly in its military meaning, was not an important theme in earlier times. In fact, as touched upon earlier, since the dawn of Islam in the early 7th century, it occupied a prominent place within the Islamic military discourse.

²⁹ See Hasan Askari Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Strategic Culture,' in *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, eds. Micheal R. Chambers (United States: The University of Michigan 2002), 305

In the contemporary world jihad has become a multidimensional, elastic concept that is employed in furtherance of the military interests of various state and non-state actors. This is achieved in large part through religious justifications of such acts through certain madrasas around the Islamic world. The possibility of constructing equally convincing but contradictory readings of the primary sources of Islam enable Muslim scholars or activists across the globe to promote their own reading of jihad in line with their socio-political and ideological stances. This phenomenon led every Muslim to perceive jihad based on his/her perception, analysis, and interests. Consequently, each Muslim scholar interpreted jihad referring to different passage, different context in Quran as well as to cherry-picked decontextualized Islamic historical events and wars.

Significantly, the main problem under this assessment is not only the way in which the primary source of Islam is interpreted in so many different and challenging ways, but also how and where do such politically loaded diverse interpretations of jihad have appealing force in Islamic world. Given the fact that madrasas and mosques do not only command respect within societies in Afghanistan Pakistan, but also dominate social, political and cultural aspect of peoples' life – mainly mass unlettered population – it can be said that madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan have become potential variable tools to serve strategic and political interests of state and non-state actors in the region. For example, the security forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan fighting against Pakistani and Afghan Taliban including their affiliate terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, shout "*Allahu Akbar*" (God is great) whenever they launch a rocket or mortar bombs. In the same way, Afghan and Pakistani Talibans along with their al-Qaeda and ISIL counterparts, cry "*Allahu Akbar*" whenever they detonate a planted bomb and conduct suicide attacks against government forces, or civilians who

are living in government controlled areas. Likewise, fighters who die on each side of the war are honoured by the title of martyrdom (endless joyful life in *janna*, heaven). The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan advocate religious justification for conducting jihad against the opposition and vice versa. As a result, contemporary jihad has become tool to conduct everlasting indiscriminate carnage with no geographic locus in the contemporary era. The provision of Islamic legal ruling to conduct jihad by political activists and radical commentators to promote their own readings of jihad in line with their socio-political and ideological stances has become inevitable problem that threatens international security. Given the example of contemporary jihad that is simultaneously happening against diverse enemies (Muslims and non-Muslims) at same time in different places (US, Europe, Australia, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia), jihad is not solitary threat to security of the West, rather it encompasses both Islamic and Western world.

To summarise, as noted earlier, jihad have been an effective tool to leverage political, and strategic interests of various state and non-state actors in Islamic world. Given in the example Afghanistan and Pakistan where religion dominates societies, jihad through madrasa and mosques has become potential strategic and political tool that can be used as variable to explain strategic cultures and defence policy patterns of state and non-state actors. Thus, this assessment considers jihad and madrasas as two important issues that need to be explored from strategic and political perspectives in order to understand how jihad has become multidimensional threat to security.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The contemporary analysis and perceptions of jihad are mainly if not in general are in line with Huntington's extreme negative analysis of Islam as unanimous bellicose

cultural unit against the West. The works and rhetoric of radical commentators, political leaders and terrorist leaders such as Sayyed Qutb, Osama bin Laden, and Al-Zawahiri may have inspired scholars such as Huntington, Ibn Warraq, and Lincoln. However, irrespective of their important roles as godfathers of the contemporary proliferating multidimensional jihad, one must also observe political and strategic backgrounds under which each of these leaders have emerged as strong influential religious figures who could successfully convince some groups of Muslims by their vision and interpretation of jihad across the globe. In this context, this assessment is a significant endeavour that offers a different angle of analysis of jihad and madrasa. It evaluates jihad and madrasas from a strategic perspective in which it emphasises that jihad and madrasas have been variable potential forces that have been used as tool to serve strategic interests of different state and non-state actors within Islamic world. It will also provide a new window of analysis on the way in which it demonstrates that jihad and madrasas within Islamic world have played important role to depict religious justification for cultural, strategic, and politically motivated wars, let alone as an anti-Western force, which is general consideration in the contemporary academia. For Muslim leaders to pursue strategic, political, cultural or economically loaded wars, it has been necessary to pledge Muslim population, particularly those who have strong affinity towards Islam that the way in which they are fighting is righteous and thus it is religiously justified. Viewed in this perspective, this assessment is a significant endeavour, which demonstrates that jihad and madrasas must not only be seen from a religious perspective, rather broader analysis, particularly the strategic and political aspects of jihad and madrasas are key to understand how they have been playing important role in shaping strategic preference and defence policies of state and non-state actors in Islamic world.

1.4 Objective of the Study

The main objective of this dissertation is to examine how doctrine of jihad and madrasas play important roles as actors to determine strategic cultures and defence policy patterns of Islamic states. Viewed from this perspective, this assessment explores role of madrasas in relation to the way in which whether by producing civil servants, judicial officials, theologians, and religious scholars madrasas retain their conventional position in Islamic world or by depicting religious justification to strategic and politically loaded wars they serve interests of different actors (state and non-state) in Islamic world. And/or by producing narrow-minded radical religious hardliners – particularly those who denounce critical thinking in Islamic knowledge, epistemology and ontology – contribute in the expansion of contemporary jihad around the world. In order to meet the main objective this dissertation will look at three main research questions; first, what is madrasa and is the contemporary role of madrasa in Islamic world compatible to its conventional role as centres for Islamic religious education or not. To answer this question, this research focuses on historical analysis of madrasas in Islamic world in relation to the way in which they emerged as centres for Islamic religious and scientific educations. Additionally, it focuses on how madrasas played important roles shaping social, political, cultural structures and identities of Islamic states. Further, it examines contemporary role of madrasas, particularly in the context of their role as tools to provide religious validations for strategic and political policies patterns of states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as it assesses how madrasas by decreeing religiously motivated wars under the doctrine of jihad serve strategic and political interests of non-state actors.

The second question refers to, what is Islamic doctrine of war and how has jihad been serving geopolitical and strategic interest of state and non-state actors

(Islamic or non-Islamic) throughout history. In this context, it will analyse the term jihad from the Islamic legal perspectives. Additionally, it will assess whether the way in which jihad is considered as self-defence force and last resort – when all other means to sustain peace and refute crime against humanity is failed – is compatible and contextual to the contemporary jihad in Islamic world or not. Within this context, in order to provide empirical case study, roles of jihad and madrasas will be explored in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And finally the third question will focus on do madrasa and jihad serve as actors and domains for strategic and defence policies in Islamic world. In this context, this research assesses jihad and madrasas in relation to the way in which they contribute to shape strategic cultures of states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given the historical importance of Islam, as tool to contain Soviet communism during the Cold War in Afghanistan, it is important to examine the role of madrasas and the doctrine of jihad, particularly from a perspective that how Islamic religious education and rhetoric of jihad to protect Islam have served strategic and political interests of Islamic and Western states during the Cold War. Further, importantly, it is essential to focus on the way in which the old proxies of the Eastern and Western blocs have been updated in sophisticated ways to serve the proxies of regional states under the jihad doctrine through some madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Viewed in this light, this paper accounts role of madrasa and jihad as actors that can be used to determine strategic preference of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the region as well as against each other. For example, in the context of foreign and defence policy patterns, Pakistan has supported a range of non-state terrorist organisations, such as Afghan Taliban, Haqqani group, Harakatul Mujahedin (Movement of Mujahedin, Islamic) and Lashkar-e Taiba (Soldiers of Purity) in order to afford political and strategic pressure on Afghanistan on one side and the other to contain Indian hegemony in South Asia. Given the

importance of ongoing religiously motivated non-state warfare in Afghanistan supported by Pakistan, it can be said that Pakistan maintains a policy of using jihad as strategic tactic against Afghanistan. Reciprocally, Afghanistan has remained involved in the insecure regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Baluchistan province of Pakistan where series of non-state actors conduct jihad against Pakistani state.

1.5 Research Area

Afghanistan and Pakistan is chosen for a number of reasons, the most important is in relation to the way in which religion of Islam dominates all aspects of lives in these two countries. Additionally, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been focal point of political, strategic and security interests of regional and international powers as well as they have remained subject to utmost protracted religious violence, particularly since the start of the Cold War in South Asia. This can be easily observed if one scrutinises how rhetoric of jihad have served strategic and political interests of different state and non-state actors during the Cold War and later during civil wars in Afghanistan. Further, jihad preserves its de facto role as tool to serve political and strategic interests of various actors in the contemporary global war on terror mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Notably, presence of some madrasas that have gained recognition in producing radical Islamist militants such as Darul Uloom Haqqaniya, in Akora Khatak, Khayber Pakhtunkhwa province, Lal Masjid, Jamia Hafsa, in Rawal Pindi, Pakistan, has made Pakistan focal point of interest under this assessment.

On the other hand, in Afghanistan madrasas were considered important mean for Afghan leaders to control domestic politics and manipulated foreign strategic policies, particularly since the Cold War arrival in the country. Recently in a news

report by the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Persian on 17 October 2015, it is stated that madrasas are increasingly being target of religiously motivated political movements and extremism in Afghanistan by a number of non-state actors such as Hizb-e Islami, Hizb-al-Tahrir, the Taliban, and Jundullah.³⁰

1.6 Conceptual Framework

Although, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, Islam, Jihad and madrasas have become markedly amplified as important subjects of scrutiny in Western and non-Western worlds, this is not unprecedented, there have been protracted debates amongst the Muslim scholars on the issues such as diversity in interpretations of jihad and reform in madrasa curriculum in the Islamic world. In fact, what is important under this assessment is not to add another analysis on religious perception of jihad and madrasa or to characterise between the righteous or erroneous interpretations and implication. But rather, what matter here is to understand how madrasas and jihad have been strategically and politically used as tools by state and non-state actors. Particularly, the madrasas that played key role in providing religious justifications to strategic and politically loaded wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For example, *mullahs* through madrasas and mosques advocated the US and its allies led war against Soviets as righteous religious war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequently, this trend was employed by state and non-state Islamic actors in furtherance to mobilise politically and strategically loaded wars in the region. Particularly, given the importance that international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL play significant role in shaping politics, strategies and security structures in contemporary

³⁰ See BBC Persian, trans. Author, "Increase in extremist activities in Afghan madrasas," http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/10/151007_k02-afghan-schools-politicisation, (accessed 17 October, 17, 2015)

era, it is important to understand how and why jihad was chosen by many Islamic and non Islamic actors as tools to manipulated desired political and strategic interests, particularly since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

When strategy is concerned the ultimate objective becomes how to win a war.³¹ War according to strategic theorist, the Prussian officer, Carl von Clausewitz, “is instrument of policy”.³² Seen from this angle, policy should never be thought of as something self-directed. In fact, a policy necessitates strategy without a strategy policy does not work. Clausewitz described war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”³³ To achieve a policy object that is to coerce our enemy to do our will require a well-calculated strategy. A well-calculated strategy must seriously consider all variable elements of war such as economy, culture, and religion beside the potential military capacity and ability of the enemy state. “No one starts a war...without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct.”³⁴ Viewed in this light, it can be said that whenever strategists in a country build their strategies towards any particular country, they contemplate those valuable elements that play key role constructing state’s social, political, cultural, economic, and religious structures. For example, the US foreign strategies during the Cold War built on ‘free trade, and democracy’ may have gained recognition in the West, but it was not going to attract anyone in Afghanistan and Pakistan where the US strategists had planned to conduct proxy war against Soviets. For Afghans and Pakistanis it was their religion (Islam) that constituted all aspect of their life. Thus, for American strategist Islam had become important instrument to leverage their strategic interests against

³¹ See Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory,’ in *Strategy in the Contemporary World* 3rd ed. Eds., John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 61.


³² See Carl von Clausewitz, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War*, in Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (New Jersey: Princeton University press, 1989), 88.

³³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

³⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579.

Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Consequently, the US strategists with the help of their allies (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) choreographed their interest of war under the Cold War politics as a religiously justified, righteous Islamic war, so called Afghan jihad against Russian infidels in Afghanistan (See figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Culture and Religion, Strategic Domains



Importantly, for Muslims, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan the very existence of nature, knowledge is based upon religious ontology, epistemology, Islamic tenets and philosophy. The Afghan and Pakistanis view world, the very existence of nature through the lens of Islamic epistemology that is Quran and *sunnah*. Hence,

perception of security, culture, politics, and social identity in front of public eye and elite in polity are based on Islamic epistemology and ontology. At the same time, cultural beliefs in these two countries play important role in social and political spheres. For example, Afghan and Pakistanis are first identified by their affiliations to their countries and/or tribal and ethnic identification then to Islam. Thus, as shown in Figure 1.1, Islamic knowledge through religious education and madrasas, as well as cultural values and beliefs have been playing important roles not only in shaping societies and political structures of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also have strong influences on constructing strategic and defence policy patterns of these two states. Islamic worldview, epistemology in practice and theory ‘remained intrinsically tied with Islamic education tradition’³⁵. Notably, influence of religion of Islam through madrasas in the context of doctrine of jihad has been successful strategic policy in different epochs – jihad during the colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War eras – as well as important variable that played important role in shaping strategic cultures of Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, the way in which madrasas advocated rhetoric of jihad justifying religiously righteous have served strategic interests of state and non-state actors in regional and international levels (see Figure 1.1). Remarkably, this phenomenon becomes further complex in its form when two competing states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan share religious, ethnic and cultural affinity towards each other. Thus, it can be said that in the globalised society where borders of states no longer create barriers for social, cultural and religious activities, penetrating distinct societies of different countries, particularly those with ethnic, cultural and religious affinity, events in one society can easily penetrate others across the borders as shown

³⁵ See Ibrahima, Diallo, “Introduction: The interface between Islamic and Western pedagogies and epistemologies: Features and divergences”, *International Journal of Pedagogies and Learning* 7, no. 3 (December, 2012), 175.

in Figure 1.1. Hence, in addition to materialist factors, ideational factors such as religion and culture play significant role in shaping strategic preference and defence policies of states such as Pakistan and Afghanistan where religion and culture dominates all aspects of people's life.

1.7 Methodology

This study is based on analytical research framework. It will primarily use the source of literature of past discussion. The most important reason for relying on this kind of literature is to make the changing role and status of madrasas and jihad clear in the way in which they have remained key in making strategic preference to state and non-state actors throughout Islamic history. This is important to understand how madrasas, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan played key role motivating political movements and violence. Consequently, this assessment adopts the historicist approach in which it will emphasise the importance of madrasa history and Islamic doctrine of war in order to understand historical changes and demonstrate their potential role in politics, strategy, and defence policies of Islamic states. As a result, books, journals, and published articles will remain essential focus of interest under this assessment.

Secondly, this dissertation also utilises primary data collection based on news, governmental and non-governmental or inter-governmental reports, as well as interviews conducted during the field research in Afghanistan. The field researches conducted under this assessment are based upon group discussions and unstructured one to one interviews with governmental officers, directors, and politicians. The first primary fieldwork conducted was from May 2013 to October 2013 in Afghanistan. During this time, I conducted one to one unstructured interviews with people's representative from Qala-e-Zal district of Qunduz province, a member of parliament

Mr Abdul Nazar Turkmen, Balk Education Director Mr Qais Mher Ayeen and the Director of Darul Ulum Asadiya – a government registered *madrasa* in Mazar-e Sharif, Afghansitan – Mr Qari Ghafoor.

The second fieldwork conducted in August 2014. During this time, I interviewed (unstructured) and discussed on the role of madrasas in Afghanistan as well as on the issues of jihad led by non-state actors against the Afghan forces with Lieutenant General Mirza Muhammand Yarmand, he was former Deputy Minister of Ministry of Interior, Chief Investigator with Ministry of Interior, and chief intelligence officer in Badakhshan province, Waheed Omar, the former Presidential Spokesperson, and Director of Communication and Information of Dr Abdullah Abdullah during the Presidential Election in 2014, Miss Mujhgan Amiri, the founder of Dar ul-Ulum Husseinia, for Girls, Mazar-e Sharif and Muhammd Islam Osmani, dean of Dar ul-Ulum Hazrat-e Imam Muslim, Mazar-e Sharif. The reason for this dissertation to conduct interviews in unstructured form was the security concerns of the interviewees. Hence, the interview questions followed the circumstances in which each interview was conducted.

1.8 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into six chapters.

i) Chapter One

This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of research background. Firstly, in order to provide a precise purpose of terminologies used under this assessment, this chapter draws a sort of criteria for each term. Secondly, it accounts, the problem statement, significant of the study, objectives, methodology, conceptual framework of the dissertation including the research area.

ii) Chapter Two

In order to examine any field in academia, particularly in social science, thoroughly and extensively, it is important to call upon wide range of available past discussions (primary and secondary) prior to write on any particular subject. Consequently, chapter two in this dissertation focuses on a wide range of literature reviews (primary and secondary) to explore role of madrasa and jihad forming foreign strategies and defence policy patterns of Islamic states, particularly the Islamic republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

iii) Chapter Three

The third chapter accounts Islam from a historical perspective. In this context, it examines the role of religion in Islamic world. Particularly, it assesses the way in which Muslim scholars have interpreted and carried out the annotated translations, so called *tafsir* of the Quran and *sunnah* (Prophet's tradition, the way of life). Following to this, this part also examines how Muslim religious scholars after the demise of the Prophet of Islam started interpreting and translating Quran and *sunnah* by adopting different methods and concepts which resulted in formation of different Islamic schools of thought, such as Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i as well as Jafari. From this standpoint, this chapter also assess how madrasas' of different schools of thought by advocating different versions of Islam have been playing important role in shaping political, cultural and security structures of societies in the Islamic world.

iv) Chapter Four

In order to provide an empirical example and comprehensive analysis on the role madrasas and jihad as actors shaping strategic culture this study picks Afghanistan as

case study in this chapter. There is more than one reason for choosing Afghanistan as case study under this research, the most important of which is the way in which religion and culture dominates politics, economy, strategy, and security of the country. Consequently, chapter four assesses role religion of Islam in diverging tribal and non-tribal societies of Afghanistan. Also this chapter accounts on the role of madrasa in shaping social and political structures of different societies within Afghanistan.

v) Chapter Five

Similarly to Chapter four, this chapter accounts importance of Islam and, particularly in building Pakistani politics, strategy and security structures. In addition to this, this chapter also discusses on how madrasas played key role in creation of Pakistan out of British colonial India in 1947.

vi) Chapter Six

This chapter discusses strategic culture from the perspective of jihad and madrasas. Given the importance of jihad and madrasas as variable key tools in shaping Muslim societies' cultural, political and security structure, this study analyses role of jihad and madrasas as variable in relation to way in which they can be used to explain strategic cultures and defence policies of Islamic Republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this context, this part also focuses on the role of religious seminaries, particularly madrasas providing religious justification for state strategies and security policies in domestic and external affairs. Following to this, this chapter also discusses strategic behaviour in the context of defence policies, particularly from the perspectives of historical experiences, geopolitics and the international alliances of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be argued that the national strategic culture of states like Afghanistan

and Pakistan remained variable under regional (geopolitics) and international factors such as the Cold War. In the context of Pakistan, taking into account the geostrategic location of country, sandwiched between the two hostile states of Afghanistan and India respectively, the focus in this chapter will be placed on the way in which jihad has been used as important strategy by Pakistani strategist towards both Afghanistan and India. In the same way this section analyses madrasas as important tool that played crucial roles in religiously justifying political loaded strategies and defence policies of state and non-state actors in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Lastly, this chapter will analyse changing nature of strategic culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly from a perspective to see that how changing characters of political, strategic, and economic environments in the region have impacted strategic preference of both states.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

Jihad, and Madrasa Determining Factors of Strategic Cultures in Islamic World

Likewise to hitherto divinely revealed Abrahamic religions (having common origin, descendent of the Prophet Abraham, *Ibrahim*) such as Judaism and Christianity, Islam was disclosed to Muhammad son of Abdullah in Mecca in 610 AD³⁶ as a last divinely revealed religion to guide fallacious peoples of Arabian Peninsula to righteous path.

The divinely religions revealed when humankind had gone astray, misled and had lived in aberration. Likewise its precursors such as Judaism and Christianity, the religion of Islam was revealed as a guide for people “*hudan lin nas*”.³⁷ In Quran it is stated that ‘And We certainly sent into every nation a messenger, [saying], ‘Worship Allah and avoid Taghut [cross limits or boundaries].’ And among them were those whom Allah guided, and among them were those upon whom error was [deservedly] decreed. So proceed through the earth and observe how was the end of the deniers.’³⁸ As time went by, Islam has become ‘highly detailed legal system that started regulating a broad aspect of human life including human behaviour in both private and public spheres.’³⁹

³⁶ When Muhammad was in his 40s the holy book of Quran through the medium of Gabriel revealed to him by God, Allah, to guide people towards the right path for detailed information see Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 11.

³⁷ See chapter two, Al-Baqara, The Cow, ayah (verse) 185, Quran (2:185). According to Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, the first verses of Quran revealed were guidance based on three principle subjects; one, to teach and prepare the Prophet of his duty; second to teach *nafs-ul amr* (truth in itself, the existence of God. See Sayyid Abul Ala, Maududi, *Tafheem-ul-Quran* (Lahore: Idara Tarjuman Pvt. Ltd., 2011), 21.

³⁸ See Quran (16:36).

³⁹ Islam regulates all aspect of human life, such as human behaviour (private and collective), his or her relation with god, social matters (economy, public service, tax on and on) including political and security aspect (state building, international relations, etc.) under a systematic law called Sharia law. See Shmuel, Bar, *The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad: Warrant for Terror* (Oxford: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 1-2.

The fundamental source of Islam is divinely inspired scripture of holy Quran and the Prophet's practice of Islam in the light of Quran so called *Sunnah*. The Prophet Muhammad was the true exegetist and practitioner of Quran.⁴⁰ As noted earlier, although, Islam was revealed as monolithic religion of practice under the omnipotence of one God, the almighty Allah, to his messenger Prophet Muhammad, under the guidance of the one divinely inspired holy book, Quran, after the Prophet and his companions' epoch, the Muslim *ummah*, community, fragmented under different interpretation of fundamental sources of Islam, which led to emergence of diverse schools of thought, *madhahib*, between 8th and 10th centuries.⁴¹ The Muslims have started facing problem on the issue of diversity of interpretation of primary source of Islam (Quran and *Sunnah*) pertinent to Islamic military discourse. This according some scholars like Onder Bakircioglu is achieved in large part through reliance on the outwardly ambivalent attitude of Quran regarding the military facet of jihad when decontextualized.⁴² Bakircioglu further describes that Quran appears to lay down contradicting laws pertinent to the use of force, with some verses condemning aggression, declaring that believers should fight only in self-defence, while others providing unequivocal justification for fighting in pursuit of subduing unbelievers.⁴³ However, according to Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, a renowned Pakistani theologian and Islamic scholar, who provided an excellent background of Islamic military doctrine, and Islamic philosophy in his book *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, emphasised that Quran talks to its readers in a clear and coherent language of Arabic.⁴⁴ In the

⁴⁰ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 39.

⁴¹ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 9.

⁴² Bakircioglu discussing the context and compatibility of Islamic doctrine of war with international law emphasises that in Quran texts, particularly those related to doctrine of war does not have a clear cut definition. For further detail see Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 66.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 20.

context of clarity and coherency, Quran states that the language it talks is “In a clear Arabic language”.⁴⁵ Viewed from this perspective, it can be said that it is not what Bakircioglu stated as ambiguity of Quranic texts that provided ambivalence attitude; rather it bestows opinions for its readers to interpret when decontextualised. Thus, it is the readers by constructing equally convincing but contradictory interpretation of the primary sources of Islam such as Qutb, Ibn Warraq, Laden, and Zawahiri; promote their own discernments of jihad in line with socio-political and ideological stances. Thus, the ambiguity is created by diverse interpretations of fundamental sources in respect to Islamic military discourse.

The contemporary analysis of jihad has failed to discriminate what Ramadan calls the difference between eternal principles and models when interpreting the primary sources of Islam.⁴⁶ Viewed from this perspective, a question raises how to address controversial diversity of epistemological understanding as well as the moral and legal legitimacy of jihad by different political activists, religious and non-religious scholars in the contemporary world. Ramadan who finds *islah*, *tajdid* (reform) as panacea for the contemporary misconceived, self-portrayed and ill-judged Islamic law including Islamic military discourse, and jurisprudence stated that

[I]nterpretation of individual texts can only be carried out in the light of knowledge of the general message, of its various levels of enunciation, of categories of science (ulum) methodology, and of the rules (qawa'id) applied to scriptural texts, grammar (nahw), semantics (ma'na), and morphology (sarf)...It ...amounts to stating -most dangerously- that such immediate, free, and non-specialized access to scriptural texts ensures the emergence of more 'open' more 'progressive' and necessarily more

⁴⁵ See Quran (26:195).

⁴⁶ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Ethics and Liberation*, 19.

*‘modern’ reading of Quran and Sunnah: the violent and extremist actions committed in recent years in the name of Islam, in general in the name of superficial readings of certain Quranic verses, ought to convince us that this is far from certain.*⁴⁷

When referred to Islamic history, ‘revelation was being elaborated through time and circumstances in which the Messenger was its first interpreter and its first practitioner.’⁴⁸ As time went by, Islam expanded and Muslims have started experiencing different cultural, social, and political milieus (experiencing different cultures such as non-Arabic, Persian, South Asian, Turkic, African). The expansion of Islam encompassing different cultures, environments and embracing new developments, which were not analogous to time and environment in which the Prophet taught its follower the practice of Islam has raised disputes and arguments amongst Muslim scholars on how to adapt with new socio-cultural developments and environments from an Islamic perspective and more importantly how to protect quintessence of Islam (Quran and *Sunnah*) from non-Islamic substances. As a result, the first and second generations of Muslims (the Prophet’s companions followed by companion’s companion, at-tabi’un) interpreted Quran in light of the Prophet’s interpretations.⁴⁹ As time expanded, diverse interpretation emerged which jeopardised the originality and quintessence of fundamental source of Islam.⁵⁰ This phenomenon made Muslim scholars such as Noman bin Thabit (well known as Abu-Hanifa), Abu Abdullah Muhammad Ibn Idris Al-Shafi (well-known as imam *Shafi’i*), Ahmed Bin Muhammad Bin Hanbal Abu Abdullah Al – Shaybani (better known as imam *Hanbal*), and Abu Abdullah Malik bin Anas (better known as imam *Malik*) to protect primary

⁴⁷Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 23-24 also see page 19.

⁴⁸Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 39.

⁴⁹Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 39-40.

⁵⁰Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islam Ethics and Liberation*, 40.

source of Islam by applying inductive and deductive methods of analysis.⁵¹ In this context of fears and protecting fundamental sources of Islam, different *madhahib* between 8th to 10th centuries such as Hanafi, (led by imam, leader, Abu-Hanifa), Shafi'I (led by imam Shafi'i), Hanbali (led by imam Hanbal) and Maliki (led by imam Malik) had formed. On the other hand, this development has divided Islam, religiously and politically into different sects.

Since Islam emerged as a universal religion that addressed humankind regardless of any geographic constraints, ethnicity, culture, colour, and tribe, it had experienced series of problems dealing with non-Islamic nations throughout its history. Likewise precursor divinely revealed religions such as Judaism and Christianity, universal approach of Islam in the form of establishing world order under the divinely legislation has never gone peacefully. In this context, Majid Khadduri stated that the Islamic military discourse, jihad, remained as one of the 'very basis of Islam's relationships with [non-Islamic] nations.'⁵² Khadduri's conclusion of *Siyar* based on Islamic jihad is highly contentious. The *Siyar* is Islamic international law that does not merely based upon warlike measures.⁵³ Indeed, it embraces all aspects of Muslims' relationship – economic, social, cultural, political and personal – with non-Muslim world. The *Siyar* embraces all aspects of interactions between Islamic and non-Islamic world – this also includes non-Muslim minorities within Islamic world – such as 'laws of warfare – covering all stages of hostilities, down to truce and peace treaties – rights and responsibilities of minority groups, environmental issues, diplomacy, asylum,

⁵¹ For detailed analysis on the emergence of different Islamic schools of thought and the ways in which they followed different methodological analysis see Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 41-58.

⁵² See Majid, Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*, (United States: The John Hopkins Press, 1966), xi.

⁵³ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 51.

jurisdictional matters, and law of treaties.’⁵⁴ Here we do not intend to analyse, explore or debate on *Siyar* in Islamic law, rather what is important in the context of Islam’s relation with non-Islamic world is the way in which Islamic doctrine of jihad has evolved as an Islamic military doctrine to expand Islamic territories. Indeed, Islam through jihad between 7th to 11th centuries expanded very fast conquering vast geographies across the continents (North Africa, Middle East, Central and South Asia).

In the context of Islamic politics, Bakircioglu stated that “Islam does not distinguish between spiritual and political affairs...rather it establishes a seamless unity between religious and political spheres, and, likewise between matters of sacred and profane nature.”⁵⁵ Viewing from this perspective, Bakircioglu assimilated the Islamic law of warfare with the Christian law of wars – as defined by St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas’ just war doctrine, *jus ad bellum* and *jus en Bello* – stating that

*[Islam] never provides licence to employ indiscriminate or disproportionate violence, even when the cause has been legitimate, rather, it demands that lethal force be used as final measure when peaceful alternatives has failed to thwart the threat posed or to execute legitimate religious cause – with the least possible military damage.*⁵⁶

Although as stated above jihad has occupied a prominent place within the Islamic military discourse since the establishment of Islamic state in early 7th century, it has become a fashionable subject amongst non-Muslim scholars, particularly Westerns, to scrutinise it from the security and religio-political perspectives, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. In the context of scholars, strategists, and political activists from across the globe have understood and interpreted jihad as well as its moral and legal legitimacy to promote their own reading of jihad in line with their

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 44.

⁵⁶ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 61.

socio-political and ideological stances. For example for a radical Muslim commentator like Sayyid Qutb, jihad is perennial duty of each Muslim until '[t]he earth belongs to God and should be purified for God, and it cannot be purified unless the banner, 'No deity except God', is unfurled across the earth.'⁵⁷ Likewise Khadduri, Qutb's understanding of *siyar* is based on Islamic warlike measures, jihad.⁵⁸ He had refuted all social, political and economic relation with non-Islamic world by stating that a Muslim 'should cut off his relationship of loyalty from the jahiliyah [,Western,] society, which has forsaken, and from jahiliyah leadership, whether it be in the guise of priest, magicians, or astrologers, or in the form of political, social or economic leadership.'⁵⁹ However, the relationship between Islamic and non-Islamic world both in public and state levels had existed even in a state of war during the Prophet and his companion's era.⁶⁰ Some of the well known Muslim scholars who are better known as reformists in Islamic world like Traiq Ramadan finds Qutb's like analysis and interpretations of Islamic law, jurisprudence and *Siyar* including Islamic military law, as one of the main flaws of criticism in itself that lacks categorisation of science, history, terminology and critically questioning different schools of fundamental Islamic science.⁶¹ Contrary to Qutb's like arguments – jihad must be conducted against jahiliyah until world is purified for god – Ramadan, giving the example multiculturalism in Islam from the medieval Islam in Andalusia (Spain) to Islam under the Ottoman Empire, Suleyman the Magnificent (died 1566), pointed out that Islam have coexisted with different religions throughout history.⁶² Of course, there have been critical debates and disagreements amongst scholars on the way in which the minorities (non-Muslim) had

⁵⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestone*, (India: Islamic Book Service, 2001), 26.

⁵⁸ Qutb, *Milestone*, 20-48.

⁵⁹ Qutb, *Milestone*, 48.

⁶⁰ Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*, 17

⁶¹ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 5.

⁶² Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 268

coexisted in Islamic world under Islamic empires such as Ottoman. Irrespective of multiculturalism in Islamic world, the phenomenon of multiculturalism in its very nature does not guarantee equal rights between majority and minorities.⁶³

In the context of critiques to reform Islamic law and jurisprudence, Ramadan divided the critics against reform in Islam into three groups, first those who advocate ‘reforming Islam ...means...changing Islam, [second those who] see in ‘reform’ some thing foreign, an approach imported from Christian tradition to cause Islam to undergo the same evolution as Christianity...make it lose its substance and its soul [and third those who understand Islam as] universal and timeless.’⁶⁴ Ramadan referring to the Prophet’s saying that after him every hundred years God will send someone to renew the religion of Islam, emphasise that it is necessary for Muslims to adopt *tajdid* ,reform, in order to ‘be able to rediscover the essence, ethical substance and superior aims of Islam’s message to implement them faithfully and adequately in sociocultural context that are by essence changing, in constant mutation.’⁶⁵ However, people who follow Qutb’s vision of Islam in which he had declared that Muslim must reject the “proposal of the ‘reconstructing of Islamic law’ for a society which is neither willing to submit to the law of God nor expresses any weariness with laws emanating from sources of other than God’,⁶⁶ Muslim must conduct jihad unless ‘[t]he earth belongs to God and should be purified for God, and it cannot be purified for him unless the banner, ‘No deity except God’, is unfurled across the earth’.⁶⁷ However, those who argue Islam needs to be revived, regenerated, which in Arabic letter referred as *tajdid*, such as Ramadan stated “the meaning of concept ‘*islah*’[refom] that appears several time in the Quran and in ...Prophetic tradition...conveys the idea of improving,

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*.11.

⁶⁵ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islam Ethic and Liberation*, 13.

⁶⁶ Qutb, *Milestone*,43.

⁶⁷ Qutb, *Milestone*,26.

purifying, reconciling...[and] reforming.’⁶⁸ The debates on the interpretation, understanding and implementations of Islam, particularly military discourse, in the light of Quran and *Sunnah* has remained as one of the protected argument amongst Muslim scholars since 8th century.

What matters here is not to analyse scholarly debates on interpretation of Jihad as well as it is legal legitimacy, but rather, what is important to discuss is how diverse interpretations, understandings, and legal justifications of jihad through higher Islamic institutions such as madrasas and mosques have served strategic, economic and political interests of different state and non-state actors within Islamic world throughout history. The heart of the matter lies the question how jihad has been so influential theme in both public and state spheres throughout Islamic history. In this context, when one assesses how Islam depicts Muslim’s live, it can be easily observed that the whole range of Muslim actions, the private and public spheres are regulated under Islamic jurisprudence. To summarise this, Muslim actions are categorised under certain religious canons such as *fardh*, god’s commandment – for example performing five times prayers, paying *zakat*, 2.5 per cent tax, and fasting – the mandate is obligatory, not rebuttable; *Sunnah*, practice of Islam in the way as the Prophet guided under the light of Quran and its religious mandate is similar to *fardh*; *Mustahab*, recommended actions such as charities, but not mandatory; *Makruh*, objectionable the statute is not mandatory and *Haram*, unlawful, the statute is obligatory.⁶⁹ Ramadan divides Muslim actions into two categories; first, *al-aqida and al-ibadaat*, creed and worship, which are subjected to ultimate omnipotence god, and second the *al-muamalat*, social affairs, which is open to human intelligence, creativity, science, rationality, politics and cultures unless not contradictory to immutable principles of

⁶⁸ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 13.

⁶⁹ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islam Ethic and Liberation*, 71-72

Islam, Qurand and *Sunnah*.⁷⁰ According to Ghamidi, Islam is based on two fundamental principles, *al-Hikma*, metaphysical and ethical bases of worship, that constitute faith and ethics that are subjected to testimony and submission to ultimate authority and revealed text, and the second principle is *al-kitab*, practicing rituals within certain limits.⁷¹ Ghamidi categorises jihad under *al-kitab* as collective capacity not individual duty, which not only necessitates authorised body, but also demands certain regulations and responsibilities.⁷² Be that as it may, the way in which some political activists or radical religious commentators portray contemporary jihad, it can be said that in an effort to convince mass Muslim population jihad inline with strategic and political interests are choreographed as immutable ordain of god. Viewed in this light and to summarise, radical commentators, political activists and terrorist leaders in the contemporary world have regarded jihad mandatory, *fardh*, in other words fundamental bone of the *al-aqida and al-ibadat*. In this context, Bakircioglu described that ‘Muslim rulers drew on religious justification for politically and/or economically motivated wars, largely because this eased the conscience of Muslim warriors, assuring them that the cause for which they fought was righteous.’⁷³

As touched upon earlier, the literal meaning of jihad is ‘striving’ or ‘struggling’. And when philosophically analysed it is divided into internal, “to struggle against evil temptation within” and external, “struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam”.⁷⁴ According to Mirza Iqbal Ashraf, a Pakistani philosopher, the concept of Jihad can be explained like a struggle for existence by peaceful means and by fighting

⁷⁰ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islam Ethic and Liberation*, 264-265.

⁷¹ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 69.

⁷² Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 542.

⁷³ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 46.

⁷⁴ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 67-70.

when the natural right of existence is endangered.⁷⁵ For some like Qutb and Ibn Warraq jihad is “the holy war, whose ultimate aim is to conquer the entire world and submit it to one true faith, to the law of Allah”.⁷⁶ Given the importance of jihad in the contemporary era as highly contentious subject within and between Islamic and non-Islamic world, one must refer to Quranic text to understand what the primary source of Islam takes about jihad to be and how it explains the norms and principles of Islamic military discourse. In this context, there is a general assumption amongst Muslim scholars that the first verse in Quran that afforded permission of jihad is revealed in chapter 22, *Al-Haj* (The Pilgrimage), which states ‘Permission to fight has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged, And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory, [They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right – only because they say, “Our Lord is Allah”’.⁷⁷ The reason why Quran authorises use of force in Islam is to end violence in its all forms. ‘And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned’.⁷⁸ Ghamidi’s commentaries of these verses suggest that if Allah has not permitted conduct of jihad against violence – in all its forms – human led atrocities would have convicted the most extreme of the violence as such that they would have destroyed even the places that are considered as centres of peace like churches, synagogues and mosques.⁷⁹ Within this context Ghamidi further adds that

⁷⁵ Ashraf, *Current Conflicts: Is Islam the Problem*, 17.

⁷⁶ Writers such as Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Warraq has become source of reference for most of the Western scholars to whoever wants to criticise religion of Islam as well for those who equate Islam with terrorism regardless. In other words it can be said that this kind ill-informed and inadequate awareness of Islamic history, semantic, exegesis, jurisprudence and law can lead to dangerous consequences such as expansion of the notion of Islamophobia in the Western world. See Ibn, Warraq, ‘Foreword: The Genesis of a Myth,’ in *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims*, ed. Robert Spencer (United States: Prometheus Book, 2005), 14.

⁷⁷ Quran (22:39-40)

⁷⁸ Quran (22:40)

⁷⁹ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 577.

Quran commences jihad in two ways; first, jihad to root out oppression and aggression against humanity with ultimate objective of establishing peace, security, and justice and second, after the Prophet of Islam accomplished his duty to teach *nafs-ul amr*, truth in itself – the existence of God, and righteous way, the Islamic public order, and human welfare what Ghamidi calls it as *itmam-e hujjat* – Allah appointed only the Prophet to conduct jihad against unbelievers and pagans.⁸⁰ Adding to his exegesis, Ghamidi emphasises that Islamic just war doctrine is not an individual duty of Muslims; rather it is the legitimate leadership – in modern epoch that would be elected leadership by Muslim community – and/or the Islamic community's collective responsibility to take decision as to whether is it proportional to achieve ultimate aim of sustaining peace, security and justice, by conducting jihad or not. Further, jihad stipulates principles of just conduct in – ethics of conduct of war, discriminative in terms of providing immunity to non-combatants.⁸¹

Given the fact that although the first converts in Mecca – they are state in Quran as *Saabiqun al Awwalun*, the pioneers whose 'faith and moral character were of exemplary degree'⁸² – were victims of all forms serious violence,⁸³ the permission to use force as self-defence or as just war doctrine was not afforded unless Muslims were able to form an Islamic community/state in Medina.⁸⁴ Notably, jihad after *itmam-e hujjat* – accomplishing teaching of *nafs-ul amr*, including Islamic way of life under the guidance of Quran and the way in which the Prophet of Islam had practiced Islam–, in the context of preaching Islam, was the task assigned by God to his messenger, no one other than the Prophet Muhammad has the authority to conduct jihad against any non-

⁸⁰ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 577-578

⁸¹ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 578

⁸² Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 544

⁸³ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 47.

⁸⁴ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 579

Muslim nation under the advocacies of spreading Islam.⁸⁵ Ghamdi's exegesis contradicts Bakircioglu's remarks on jihad in which he emphasises jihad as legitimate tool to expand Islamic public spheres besides being a defensive tool.⁸⁶ This kind of analysis and interpretations are appealing in the contemporary Islamic world where some groups of Muslims such as *Tablighi Jamaat*, Society of Islamic Preach or preach of faith, finds jihad – in this context rather by peaceful means of verbal strife, preach – as personal duty to spread Islam across the globe. Such trend is also employed through military means by non-state Islamic terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, ISIL, Lashkar-I Taiba and Harakat ul-Mujahidin around the world.

However, for Khadduri jihad's juridical and theological meaning is Muslim conduct of warfare against unbelievers unless the world is purified for god.⁸⁷ Khadduri bases his definition of jihad on verses from chapter 61, The Ranks, of Quran, in which it states,

*O, you who have believed, shall I guide you to a gainful trade that will save you from a painful punishment? Believe in Allah and His Messenger and strive in the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is better for you if you have knowledge. He will forgive your sins and will place you in Garden beneath which the streams flow and pleasant dwellings in garden of perpetual residence. That is the great attainment.*⁸⁸

However, Abul A'la Maududi, commentaries of the chapter 61, 'The Rank,' suggest that it was revealed during the battle of Uhud – the battle of Uhud was an attempt by pagans of Mecca to avenge the first battle, Badr, in which Muslims defeated them.⁸⁹ These verses warn Muslims of conspires and instruct them to uphold discipline during

⁸⁵ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 58

⁸⁶ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 68.

⁸⁷ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 55.

⁸⁸ Ibid, also see Quran (61:10-13).

⁸⁹ Maududi, *Tafheem-ul-Quran*, 452-453.

military discourses. When referred to the background of the revelation, the verses were revealed in reflection to a situation in which some men came to the Prophet Muhammad promising that they will join the battle of Uhud, but later they ran away from the battlefield. This had disorganised and jumbled the military ranks and discipline endangering lives of the rest in the camps of the war. To clarify this further, the verses from 10 to 13 in the chapter 61 warning about conspiracy and plots against Muslims, promise that only those will be rewarded – their sins will be forgiven, and compensated with eternal life in paradise – who truthfully and open-heartedly make jihad with their wealth and lives on the way of god.⁹⁰ Notably, the title of the chapter, ‘The Rank,’ comes from the context in which it was revealed – discipline in ranks of military. Hence, when context of the above states verses is examined, it can be said that the stated verses do not define jihad or its principles and legitimacy as described by Khadduri, but rather, these verses confer rewards to true believers and warns about conspires in relation to a particular context. What matters here, as noted above, is not to discern righteous definition and perception of jihad or contrary, but rather to highlight that everyone comes to study jihad with a specific belief, political background, and having different socio-cultural experience, which affect their understanding of jihad inline with their ideological positions. To clarify this further, each definition proclaims righteous definition and legitimacy by formulating legal rulings, *fatwa*, that the cause they fight for is religiously justified and mandatory as immutable Islamic duty. It is important to note that such warlike Islamic legal rulings have not merely been against unbeliever. But rather it has been a variable force that spontaneously and indiscriminately taking place in various fronts within Islamic and against non-Islamic world.

⁹⁰ Maududi, *Tafheem-ul-Quran*, 452-453.

Notably, when referred to political history of Islam, significantly in relation to the way in which jihad was evolved as military doctrine within Islamic world, – for example the *kharijiyah*⁹¹ led jihad – it can be said that jihad from its earliest time has remained an important tool to serve strategic and political interests of Muslim leaders throughout history⁹². Given the presence of diverse discernments and assessments on jihad by different Muslim and non-Muslim scholars such as Majid Khadduri, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, Barry Rubin, Mirza Iqbal Ashraf, John Esposito, and Tariq Ramadan on jihad, the interpretation of jihad through Quran and *Sunnah* can be divided into two schools of thought, the literalist and contextualists. The literalists by adopting literal approach towards the fundamental sources of Islam want to revive historical model, centuries old social and political structure of Islamic caliphate and proclaim that Islam is timeless and beyond history. It is worth noting that the literalists such as Qutb, his followers, and contemporary *salafis* denounce interpretations and practice of fundamental sources of Islam in the light of reform, innovation, and change.⁹³ Such, literalist assessments and interpretations are appealing in both Islamic and non-Islamic world. The scholars who constitute the second school are those such as Ghamidi and Ramadan who by referring to a broad based contextual analysis of fundamental sources of Islam, Quran and *Sunnah*, advocate that reform and revive of modalities are essential feature of Islam in order to compete the constantly changing nature of social, economic, technological and political milieus in the contemporary world. It is important to note that the contextualists do not intend to change the immutable

⁹¹ One of the earliest rebellion against the Islamic authority or leadership happened during the 3rd caliphate, Uthman bin Affan, which divided Muslim *ummah* into two warring political entities, the *kharijiyah* those who first supported Ali ibn Abi Talib as successor Muslim caliph, but later denied and fought against him. This was one of the first major jihads of its kind in Islamic history that happened within Islamic world. For detailed analysis see Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 17.

⁹² See Barry, Rubin, 'An Introduction to Assessing Contemporary Islamism,' in *Guide to Islamist Movements* Vol.1, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2010), xiv.

⁹³ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 19.

commandment of Islam, Quran, and *Sunnah*. Notably, what makes them different from literalist school is the way in which they adopt broad based analysis – scientific/religious using rational, *aqli* or *maqul*, and transmitted *naqli* or *manqul* sources of knowledge – when they approach to fundamental sources of Islam.

As to the central issue of jihad as variable force to serve strategic interests of different actors in Islamic world, one tends to scrutinise that what plays key role in propagating jihad and who provides legal validation of jihad. In this context, madrasas, religious seminaries, and mosques have remained as important means through which scholars, *ulema*, *mullahs* and political activists preach and provide legal ruling, *fatwa*, to conduct jihad as religious duty. Although madrasas' role have been overlooked or otherwise minimised from the political perspectives, madrasas and mosques are key to construct ideas – individual or community – and they are de facto authorities in provision religious rulings in Islamic world. Ramadan, describes that mosques, 'have impact on Muslim's collective psychology and they radiate attitudes and behaviours in daily life.'⁹⁴ Given the importance of mosques as centres where Muslims from different social, cultural and political backgrounds gather five times a day to perform ritual prayers as well as students gather to gain Islamic knowledge, – in general every mosque besides being praying centres are home to madrasas – they have been playing important role in shaping socio-cultural and political structures of Islamic countries across the globe. Thus, given the importance of madrasas as high authorities in provision of Islamic legal ruling, some of them have remained as an important substance of strategic discourses in Islamic world.

⁹⁴ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 221.

Viewing from the Islamic epistemological perspective, knowledge in Islam is considered as worship.⁹⁵ In this context, it can be said that education is used to ‘promote a particular ideological position or social or political perspective for good or ill’.⁹⁶ Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, describe role of education as not “merely a technical process of information dissemination and skills development [, according to them rather it plays important role] in shaping social and political agendas, including identity formation and nation building”.⁹⁷ Not only religious education that shapes societies, in fact education irrespective of religious or modern is an important factor that transforms human societies. According to Jack Mezirow’s theory of ‘Transformative Learning’ education plays key role in transformation of a society.⁹⁸

As noted earlier, since the 9/11 terrorists attacks in the US, there are ample amount of literatures available in the larger context of discussing and debating the role of jihad and madrasas in shaping contemporary non-state warfare and Islamic terrorism. In this context some scholars such as Neyazi stated that ‘[r]eligious education, whether in the madrasas, the pathshala or a theological seminary, is carried out within the narrow and unquestioned confines of faith which is hardly likely to encourage critical imagination.’⁹⁹ ‘[E]ducation ... purposely or inadvertently

⁹⁵ See Robert W. Hefner, “Introduction: The Culture, Politics, and Future of Muslim Education,” in *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, ‘*Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*’, eds. Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (UK: Princeton University Press, 2007), 4.

⁹⁶ See Rebecca, Winthrop and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” *Centre for Universal Education at Brookings*, June 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2010/6/pakistan-education-winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf, (accessed 21 June 12, 2015), 31.

⁹⁷ Withorp and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan”, 6.

⁹⁸ See Jack, Mezirow, “Transformative Learning as Discourse,” *Journal of Transformative Education* 1, no. 1 (2003), 58.

⁹⁹ See Taberezh Ahmed Neyazi, “Madrasa Education,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 38 (September 2002), 3967.

manipulated to influence conflict dynamics-usually to detrimental effect.’¹⁰⁰ Considering the convictions that the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the US were planned and master minded in Afghanistan and Pakistan, madrasas in these regions attracted greater amount Western and non-Western attentions. Analysing possibilities of madrasas’ relation with the non-state terrorist groups in Pakistan, Winthrop and Graff, concluded that ‘Deobandi madrasas [,in this context those Deobandi madrasas that are located in Pakistan,] have well-established links with groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan [,banned as militant group by Pakistan¹⁰¹],’¹⁰² From the perspective of the Taliban led religiously motivated suicidal attacks, Winthrop and Graff argue that [s]uicide bombers in Afghanistan and the tribal areas ... were recruited by the Taliban in local madrasas’.¹⁰³ Further, exploring political aspect of madrasas they described that madrasa “in Pakistan has been used as a tool by successive regimes in pursuing narrow political ends”.¹⁰⁴

In order to grasp a comprehensive knowledge on the role madrasas in Islamic world, it is important to know epistemological and ontological perspective of Islamic educations as well as changing role of madrasas throughout Islamic history. Consequently, when attention is given to the glossary definition of the term ‘madrasa’, it is understood that madrasa refers to an education centre or simply school.¹⁰⁵ The

¹⁰⁰ Withorp and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan”, 29.

¹⁰¹ “Pakistan bans 25 militant organizations” *dawn.com*, published August 6, 2009, <http://www.dawn.com/news/963704/pakistan-bans-25-militant-organisations> (accessed October 1, 2015).

¹⁰² Withorp and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” 18.

¹⁰³ Withorp and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan”, 19.

¹⁰⁴ Withorp and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” 29.

¹⁰⁵ For detailed historical analysis of madrasa see Jonathan P. Berkey, “Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the Problem of Muslim Identity,” in *‘Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, eds. Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (UK: Princeton University Press, 2007), 40.

very existence and the nature of Islam are built upon a scriptural source that is the holy book of Quran. Some like Ramadan describes that the holy book of Quran as centre of Islamic knowledge, through which humans learn about the universe surrounding them as well as the accurate and detailed order of the nature.¹⁰⁶ Within this context Quran states; ‘In the creation of the Heavens and the Earth, and the alternation of the night and day, there are indeed signs for all those endowed with insight.’¹⁰⁷ Assessing the nature of Quranic texts, Ramadan highlighted that ‘the texts of Quran are comprised of ‘signs’, as the surrounding [c]reation is a universe of signs that must be grasped, understood and interpreted.’¹⁰⁸ In his clarification Ramadan further adds that Quran talks of two spectrums of knowledge, the Book of Universe, *al-kitab al-manshur*, that talks about rational and physical existence of nature, ontology, which theologically are signs that imparts metaphysical and moral bases of worship that constitute faith and that are subjected to testimony and submission to ultimate authority through the written book, *al-kitab al-mastur*.¹⁰⁹ Throughout history, *ulema* interpreted Quranic texts in the light of faith that its intent was to promote well being for human being, *mubah or halal* and protect from harm and evil, *haram*.¹¹⁰

In this context, notably, transmission of knowledge has remained central in Islam.¹¹¹ In other words the very existence of knowledge, epistemology in Islam is ‘remained intrinsically tied with Islamic practice of education.’¹¹² Nonetheless, the way in which knowledge was transmitted from a generation to another has changed

¹⁰⁶ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 88.

¹⁰⁷ Quran (3:190).

¹⁰⁸ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 88.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 89-90.

¹¹¹ Hefner *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 5.

¹¹² Diallo, “Introduction: The interface between Islamic and western pedagogies and epistemologies: Features and divergences”, 175.

over time.¹¹³ The term *madrasa* in medieval usage referred to mainly religious school of law, whereas, in modern usage, it refers to colleges or higher institutions where subjects of Islamic science are taught.¹¹⁴ However, in the contemporary era there are different perceptions of the term *madrasa* between Arab and non-Arab world. For example, *madrasa* in Arab world refers to both general as well as religious schools whereas in non-Arabic Islamic world the term refers mainly to religious education that may contain some scientific curriculum.¹¹⁵

Historically the earliest established centres of education in Hijaz – the Western part of today's Saudi Arabia – in the first century of Islamic epoch were known as *Kuttab* where young Muslims were generally thought to memorise and recite the Quran.¹¹⁶ There is disarray amongst the scholars in line with the first built higher Islamic religious institution in Islamic world. For some such as Mortel, the first higher Islamic academic institutions, *madrasas*, imparting subjects such as Islamic law, jurisprudence, semantic and letters were established in *Khurasan* (today's Eastern Iran).¹¹⁷ But for scholars such as Febe Armanios and Christopher M. Blanchard *madrasa Nizamiyah* was the first *madrasa* in Islamic history, built in Baghdad in the 11th century.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, irrespective of chronological order of *madrasas*, when historically analysed, it can be said that conventionally *madrasas* were centres that have imparted both religious and non-religious subjects such as, Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, semantic, science and letter. Consequently, *madrasas* were important

¹¹³ Hefner, *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 5.

¹¹⁴ See Peri, J. Bearman and others, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Glossary & Index of Terms*, Vol. I-IX (Netherlands: Brill, 2000), 231-232.

¹¹⁵ Hefner *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 5.

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Mortel, "Madrasas in Mecca during the Medieval Period: A Descriptive Based on Literary Sources," 236.

¹¹⁸ See Febe, Armanios, "Islamic Religious School, Madrasas: Background," *Report for Congress*, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/26014.pdf>, (accessed June 21, 2015), 2. Also see Christopher M. Blanchard, "Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background," *CRS Report for Congress*, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf>, (accessed July 16, 2013), 2.

institutions that shaped Islamic societies and their political structures by producing leading scholars including scientists, jurists, and political scientists.¹¹⁹ As time went by, madrasas evolved into a complex educational institution where religious and non-religious subjects were taught. Notably, the way in which madrasas imparted Islamic religious and scientific knowledge were mainly based upon informal system of pedagogies such as *halqa*, in circle.¹²⁰ The *halqa* system of pedagogy was built in a way that *ulema* imparted lessons to students who sat in circles around them. The first *halqas* ‘were organised in homes, mosques, or shops under the auspices of a master, Islamic scholar.’¹²¹

Notably, important aspect of madrasas throughout Islamic history was not only as centres of knowledge but also legal institution that were used as tool to influence politics in Islamic world as such that ‘Kings, viziers, and civilian elites patronised madrasas to demonstrate their own high standing and to ensure that the message coming from the scholarly community remained friendly.’¹²² In the same way, madrasas were important means to strategic and political discourses by political actors in order repel any possible danger that posed threat to their political authority. For example, ‘[t]he eleventh-century Seljuq vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, founded his network of madrasas to strengthen Sunni orthodoxy against newly ascendant Shi’ism.’¹²³

The turning point in the context of role of madrasas in Islamic world was the Western remarkable edge in the fields of educations, industrialisation, which moved the centres of knowledge, politics, and international affairs from Islamic World to Western world. This according to Esposito ‘reversed the relationship of the Islamic

¹¹⁹ Hefner *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 6.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Hefner *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 8.

¹²³ Ibid.

world to the West – from...expanding offensive movement to a defensive posture'.¹²⁴ Under the colonial rule madrasas' role in Islamic societies had drastically transformed. Madrasas and mosques that conventionally played important role in social and political arenas as well as controlled the commanding heights in public and political spheres have abruptly lost their political position and status in Islamic societies. In other words, the political power had shifted from religious institutions such as madrasas and mosques, to modern (Western) statehood. The imposed secularisation under the colonial rule that considered Islam as uncivilised rule made madrasas antagonist against the colonial imperialism. At the same time, prevalence of Western pedagogies worried the religious circles about the protection of fundamental sources of Islam, Quran and *Sunnah*, from foreign substance – the Western scientific knowledge. Such development made Muslim religious scholars, *ulema*, to preserve and retain autonomy over madrasas and mosques. Sikand described that some Muslim scholars in British Colonial India strongly opposed to adopt Western methods of pedagogy based on two important understanding; first, *ulema* consider Islam 'ultimate truth, [and they believed that madrasas have had produced renowned scholars throughout history, thus any reform is] regarded as sign of weak faith and ...straying from the path that the elders of the past have trod; [second, they see reform, adopting Western system of pedagogy,] as interference in ...their own territory.'¹²⁵ Alam finds the cause of madrasa autonomy in Western colonial policy towards Islamic education system. He explains that the colonial judgement of religious school as personal or private resisted government control over madrasas.¹²⁶ This kind of phenomenon served interests of *ulema* in the

¹²⁴ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 43.

¹²⁵ See Yoginder Sikand, "Voice for Reform in the Indian Madrasa," in *The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*, eds. Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 33-34.

¹²⁶ In response to analysis that argue contemporary madrasas in Islamic world as centres for radical extremism, Arshad Alam, has provided a comprehensive, brief historical evaluation on the role of

way in which ‘they were able to engage in the hegemonic representation of the masses.’¹²⁷ This phenomenon led madrasas to establish autonomy in relation to the way in which they independently used desired methods, concepts, curriculum, and style of pedagogy under preferred school of thought. Thus, they ‘jealously guarded their autonomy vis-à-vis the states.’¹²⁸ As a result, madrasas representing different schools of thought and imparting religious educations based upon various methods, concepts and curriculum have expanded in Islamic states. For example, Sikand highlighted that there are about 7,000 Deobandi madrasas in India where each madrasa is “autonomous in administrative matters...[and] every madrasa is,... free to formulate its own syllabus”.¹²⁹ According to Sikand, in most of these madrasas Muslim scholars do not deem reform needed in curriculum and system pedagogy, instead they see the fault ‘in the declining standards of piety and dedication [in] the increasing materialism.’¹³⁰ To this end, one must also examine how Western modern knowledge has impacted madrasas in the Islamic world outside the orbit of colonial empiricism.

The Islamic powers that remained independent throughout history such as Ottoman Empire has also followed Western modernisation calling it ‘secret wisdom.’¹³¹ Same as Turks, Iranians also found education as one of the important reasons of underdevelopment. Accordingly, they have attempted to westernise their educational systems¹³² Nevertheless, the Iranian attempt to modernise its educational system was not peaceful. In fact, the government of Iran confronted with series of

madrasa, particularly in India. For further details see Arshad, Alam, “Understanding Madrasas,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no.22 ((May-June, 2003),2124.

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ See Farish, A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, “Introduction: Behind the Walls: Re-appraising the Role and Importance of Madrasas in the World Today,” in *The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*, eds. Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 17.

¹²⁹ Yoginder Sikand, *The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*,58.

¹³⁰ Yoginder Sikand, *The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*,33.

¹³¹ Hefner *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*,14.

¹³² Ibid.

religiously motivated violence that were led by *ulema* who had remained persistent to preserve their monopoly on education considering the reform as foreign intrusion to fundamental sources of Islam.¹³³

In order to afford empirical analysis, the best course to adopt here is to see how and what kind of changes had Indian madrasas gone through experiencing British colonialism. Not surprisingly, the first political movements against British Empire had led by madrasas under *ulema* who advocated jihad against the colonial rule calling them infidels.¹³⁴ However, the British raj stamped out *ulema* led revolts, which forced them to seek refuge in modern madrasas – those that adopted Western system of pedagogy – in 1857.¹³⁵ The most important development in the history of madrasa was the establishment of Darul Uloom Deobandi in 1867 in the town of Deoband,¹³⁶ Uttar Pradesh, India under the British raj.¹³⁷ This madrasa was going to play very important role in academics and socio-political milieus in the region.¹³⁸

Throughout British colonial epoch in South Asia, madrasas had preserved their de facto importance in political arena. Within this context, in early 20th century, madrasas once again had started religiously motivated anti-British movements in response to an incident wherein the British officers destroyed a part of a mosque in Kanpur.¹³⁹ This incident had sparked grandiose Islamic religious rebellions against the British raj throughout Indian subcontinent. The Indian *ulema* propagandised the incident as ‘Islam in danger’ and conferred the partly destruction of mosque as

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ Farish, A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, ‘*The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*’, 14-15.

¹³⁵ Farish, A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, ‘*The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*’, 15.

¹³⁶ Ibid

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Muhammad Qasim, Zaman, “Tradition and Authority in Deobandi Madrasa of South Asia,” in *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, eds. Robert W. Hefner Muhammad Qasim Zaman (UK: Princeton University Press, 2007), 63.

¹³⁹ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 90-91.

religious validation to advocate jihad against British colonial rule.¹⁴⁰ Consequently, the ‘slogans, such as Islam in danger’ and the traditional battle cry of ‘Allahu Akbar’ led by madrasas and mosques had played an important role in bringing mass Muslim peasants and artisans into a political movements that divided Indian subcontinent into two different states, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Republic of India.¹⁴¹ The end of colonial era meant the emergence Islamic modern, Western, system of states. The notion of modern state in post-colonial era according to Hefner has ‘ended *ulema*’s monopoly on education’.¹⁴² Nevertheless, in countries such as Pakistan, madrasas have retained their de facto importance in state building process as well as in shaping social, and political structure in both private and public spheres.¹⁴³

In this context, to draw a constitution had never been an easy task for Pakistani strategists and policy makers. There has been long pull-and-push between seculars and Islamic religious spheres¹⁴⁴ to draw the first national constitution of the country. However, the main bone of contention between the two groups was not only as to whether construct some of the national constitutional law, particularly in relation to public affairs, in line with Islamic law, but also on the issues such as Islamisation – building Islamic *Riyasat*, reviving pre-colonial Islamic leadership – or building modernised secular Islamic state of Pakistan. In this context, some of the remarkable provisions of the constitution were: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is based on Islamic beliefs, thus, the head of state must be a Muslim – stated in Part IV, Article 32 –; reforming Islamic society under Islamic principles – subscribed in Part XII, Article

¹⁴⁰ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 91.

¹⁴¹ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 96.

¹⁴² Hefner *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 8.

¹⁴³ Madrasas remained important force in political, social and security sectors of Pakistan from very early times of its independence, particularly *ulema* have strong influence on constituency in the country. See Masooda, Bano, “Beyond the Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18, no.1, (2007), 49-50.

¹⁴⁴ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 117-118.

97 –; and ‘no law contrary to Quran and *Sunnah* of the Prophet could be enacted – Article 198.’¹⁴⁵ In addition, it was not only constitution where madrasas retained its influence, but also, since the independence of Pakistan, madrasas and mosques have “been state’s principal tool for internal political mobilisation and for external projection of its efforts and ambitions”.¹⁴⁶ For varieties of purposes, madrasas and mosques were used as strategic tools by Pakistani politburo. The most remarkable use of madrasas and mosques for internal – consolidating and religiously validating regime power – and external strategies and defence policies, particularly toward Afghanistan and India had occurred under the tenure of the President Zia ul-Haq. To clarify this further, General Zia used Islam both at home to legitimise his power¹⁴⁷ as well as to pursued security strategies and defence policies towards Afghanistan and India.¹⁴⁸

When it comes to strategic decision-making as to whether at domestic level – uniting different ethnic groups, pull-and-push between secular and radical religious groups, on and on – or external level – geopolitical problems with both of its main neighbours, Afghanistan and India –, the Pakistan military has dominated strategic decision-making body in both domestic the foreign affairs; particularly it has controlled security strategies and defence policies.¹⁴⁹ Notably, the strategic decisions depending upon each situation have been ‘totally or partly different.’¹⁵⁰ For example, Pakistan’s strategic preference towards India was dominated by identity factor – the perception that the India politburo never accepted concept of Pakistan as a result of it,

¹⁴⁵ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 118.

¹⁴⁶ Ajai, Sahni, “Pakistan,” in *Guide to Islamist Movements* Vol.1 , ed. Barry Rubin (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2010), 347.

¹⁴⁷ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 177.

¹⁴⁸ Winthrop and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” 18-19.

¹⁴⁹ See Feroz Hassan Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan,” *Strategic Insights* 4, no.10, (October 2005), 1-2.

¹⁵⁰ Rizvi, *Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 307.

India has remained hostile in its attitude towards Pakistan.¹⁵¹ Whereas, Pakistan's security strategy and defence policy patterns towards Afghanistan have constantly changed under realistic – the protracted border and ethnic issue – and ideational factors such as Islamic doctrine of jihad under the Cold War politics and afterwards.¹⁵² Notably, although Pakistan inherited its political structure and governing institutions including its military establishment from the British Empire, absence of single cultural identity – Pakistan is comprised of fragmented cultural society, Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi and Baloch – as well as volatile political history, particularly the political tensions between in civilian and military establishment have provided greater room for madrasas and mosques to manoeuvre greater role in integrating fragmented political and social-culture spheres in the country. This is well described by Rizvi, who stated that

*Islam is integral to Pakistan's strategic culture because it contributed to shaping societal dispositions and the orientations of policymakers. Islam is closely associated with the establishment of the state and the constitution designates the state as an 'Islamic Republic,' with an emphasis on the Islamic character of Pakistani identity and a stipulation that no law can be enacted that violated the basic principles and teachings of Islam. Islam figures prominently in political and military discourse.*¹⁵³

Conversely, in Afghanistan conventionally Islam played modest role, particularly in the context of state building process and uniting people of different tribe and ethnicity. In contrast to Deobandi style of pedagogies in Pakistan, Afghan madrasas were traditionally based on the *sufi* or *Tasawwuf* tradition – mystical practice

¹⁵¹ Rizvi, *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 309-311; also see Khan, 'Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan', 2.

¹⁵² Rizvi, *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 307-308.

¹⁵³ Rizvi, *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 319.

of religion – of Islam.¹⁵⁴ Since Afghanistan is comprised of different tribal and ethnic cultures, the way in which madrasas played role in localities, societies across the country remained diverse.¹⁵⁵ Conventionally, tribal traditional culture preceded Islam and vastly practiced in Afghanistan, particularly amongst Pashtuns. This is well described by Roy, who stated that,

*The tribal code is more democratic but more restrictive; it does not attempt to transcend the particularity of the group, but makes appeal to the consensus of the tribal community. As far as political life in Afghanistan is concerned, the tribal code tends to isolate the Pashtun community, while the shari'at, which does not recognise that ethnic groups have ultimate reality, envisages a more universal social order.*¹⁵⁶

In the context of types and roles of madrasas shaping societies and political structure of Afghanistan, Borchgrevink describes that there are two types of madrasas in Afghanistan, first *Dar ul Hifaz*, which instructs memorisation of the Quran and second, madrasas like in Pakistan and India that impart higher religious pedagogy.¹⁵⁷ Notably, contrary to Pakistan, madrasas were the only source of education in Afghanistan until 1920. Throughout Afghanistan's modern history, education has remained one of the most rusted sectors in the country. The King Amanullah was the first leader in the country who introduced a modern Westernised system of education in 1920.¹⁵⁸ According Saif R. Samady, although, the "[c]onstitution promulgated –

¹⁵⁴ See Oliver Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 30 also see Antonio, Giustozzi, "Afghanistan," in *Guide to Islamist Movements*, Vol.1, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), 181.

¹⁵⁵ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 34-35.

¹⁵⁶ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 36.

¹⁵⁷ See Kaja, Borchgrevink, "Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: implications for the reform of religious education," PRIO paper, September 2010, http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/PRIO%20Paper_%20Borchgrevink_%20Beyond%20Borders%20Diversity%20and%20Transnational%20Links%20in%20Afghan%20Religious%20Education_September%202010.pdf (accessed June 15 2015), 16.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

prescribed in Article 20 and 22 – in 1931 made primary education compulsory for all Afghans.¹⁵⁹ ‘By 1940 with an estimated population of ten million people there were 60,000 pupils in 324 schools with 1,990 teachers throughout Afghanistan...[after ten years in 1950 the number of students barely reached to] 95,3000’.¹⁶⁰ This phenomenon led madrasas and mosques to enjoy monopoly in provision of education to mass population, particularly in rural areas, which according to Samady, comprised 80% of the population in the country.¹⁶¹ What matters here is not merely to emphasise madrasas as sole centre for provision of education in Afghanistan, but also to highlight as to whether the quality of the education they have imparted were standardised and genuine or not. Notably, the quality of education provided in these madrasas was very low. The *mullahs* or *mawlawis* in madrasas in general were not part of any establishment such as Ministry of Education, or any non-government organisation; rather local leaders or the community appointed them based upon their personal piety or they have inherited the post being descendant of a *mullah* family.¹⁶² As a result of such phenomenon most of the Afghan madrasas and mosques were controlled by the without knowledgeable but trustworthy religious leaders.¹⁶³ Such phenomenon served strategic interests of state to an extent that Afghan rulers have discoursed their self appointed statutes through madrasas and mosques as religiously legitimate at home as well as mobilised mass populous to fight against external threats under the auspices of jihad. For example jihad against the British Empire was partly successive strategy that kept Afghanistan to an extent independent on its internal affairs during British colonial

¹⁵⁹ See Saif R., Samady, ‘Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century’, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Education Sector*, November 2001 <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001246/124627E.pdf>, 10-29

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Samady, ‘Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century’, 14.

¹⁶² Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 32.

¹⁶³ See Kaja, Borchgrevink, ‘Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: implications for the reform of religious education’, December 2012, <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11125-012-9258-2#page-1> (accessed June 29, 2015), 79.

rule. One of the contentious issues between Afghanistan and British India was the disputed border so-called Durand Line, which divided Pashtun ethnic group into two part, Afghan Pashtun and British Indian Pashtuns in 1893.¹⁶⁴ Although the Durand Line issue has been a geopolitical matter, the Afghan politburo have portrayed it as Afghanistan's domestic problem in relation to way in which they considered to reintegrate Pashtuns based on their common ethnicity, language, and culture.¹⁶⁵

The turning point in the context of politicisation of madrasas and mosques, particularly as stratagem occurred when the Cold War embraced Afghanistan and Pakistan in early 1970s. Under the Cold War politics, religious seminaries, madrasas, and mosques in Afghanistan and Pakistan had played potential role as tools to pursue strategic and political interests of not only two contending blocs of east and west, but also regional states and radical non-state Islamic religious actors.¹⁶⁶ This phenomenon has transformed the traditional cultures as well as *sufi* Islamic tenets in country into a radicalised warring contours. Importantly, the tribal areas where Islam and cultural beliefs were traditionally separated as two distinct spheres had merged into a radicalised religio-cultural dogma. According Nabi Misdaq this was the incorporation of religious codes of practice with cultural codes, which formed new codes of religio-cultural laws.¹⁶⁷ To clarify this further, for example fundamental base of religiously inspired new cultural codes has become, *yawalay*, monotheism or belief in one God; *paighamabary*, prophethood or belief in the Prophet Muhammad, and *qiamat/akherat* or the day of judgement", which are, at the same time, the fundamental beliefs of

¹⁶⁴ See Kevin Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011* (Australia: Rosenberg Publishing Pty Ltd. 2011),18.

¹⁶⁵ See Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd 2004),112.

¹⁶⁶ See Ahmed, Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* (London: Pan Books, 2001), 130.

¹⁶⁷ See Nabi, Misdaq, *Afghanistan, Political frailty and external interference* (New York: Published by Routledge, 2006) 30-31

Islam.¹⁶⁸ Such trends – remodelling cultural identities and religious tenets – continued for decades in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Importantly, in the post-Cold War era madrasas and mosques have expanded and become not only substances of strategic discourses for various state and non-state actors, but also independently started targeting various state and non-state groups under the Takfir doctrine. For example, madrasas and mosques such as Lal Masjid, Red Mosque, independently challenged the government of Pakistan as un-Islamic and provoked jihad against the state.¹⁶⁹

One should begin by clearly analysing the fundamentals and root causes of such madrasas in the region. Most of the analysis and accounts suggest that it was the General Zia-ul Haq's – then the president of Pakistan – policy of Cold War jihad that not only raised the number of madrasa from nine hundred in 1971 to eight thousand registered and about twenty-five thousand unregistered private madrasas in 1988 in Pakistan,¹⁷⁰ but also politicised, radicalised militarised the religious circles in the region. Notably, these madrasas and mosques were not built as centres to promote education, but rather the important task was to allocate mass young recruits to fight for the cause of the Cold War under the rhetoric of jihad as ultimate Islamic duty. 'Neither teachers nor students [in these madrasa] had any formal grounding in maths, science, history or geography. Many of these warriors did not even know the history of their own country or the story of the jihad against the Soviets'.¹⁷¹ Viewing from a strategic perspective, Coll, stated that General 'Zia embraced jihad as a strategy...[he considered] the legions of Islamic fighters on the Afghan frontier...as a secret tactical

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ For detailed analysis on Red Mosque, see Qandeel Siddique, "The Red Mosque Operation and Its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban", *Norwegian Defence Research Establishment*, (October 2008), <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/08-01915.pdf>, 13.

¹⁷⁰ Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, 89.

¹⁷¹ Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, 32.

weapon'.¹⁷² What matters here is to examine as to whether states consider moral and ethical norms of diplomacy when pursuing a strategic interest and construct defence policy patterns or not. In this regard, Kane and Lonsdale stated that

*[s]trategy is driven by policy. Any actions must be judged on how they affect achievement of the policy objective. Thus,... it is entirely possible that a military operation that is regarded as necessary and fulfils the requirement of proportionality, discrimination and double effect...could still be cancelled if attainment of the policy objective is hindered by anticipated moral outrage.*¹⁷³

Seen from this perspective, the policy objective of a state refers to strategic decision-making body – political elite, military, strategists, policy makers – in the way in which they prefer one objective than other. Significantly, in this context “strategic culture is an important concept to understand the disposition, response, and decisions of the security policymakers”.¹⁷⁴ Notably, when examined what variable plays greater role in mobilising certain political and strategic interests in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the fact that Islam depict both state and public spheres, jihad, madrasas and mosques retain their de facto importance as substances that can be used to discourse desired strategic interests.

¹⁷² See Steve, Coll, *GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001* (United States of America: Penguin Group, 2004), 61.

¹⁷³ See Thomas M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, *Understanding Contemporary Strategy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 63.

¹⁷⁴ Rizvi, *South Aisa in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 308.

Chapter Three

Political History of Jihad and Madrasa in Islamic World

To analyse contemporary role of jihad and madrasas in Islamic societies, one must adopt the historicist approach to see the historical changes and demonstrate their potential role in shaping societies and political structures throughout Islamic history. Additionally, what is attempted here is to emphasise importance of jihad and madrasa history and their potential role in politics, wars and violence within Islamic and against non-Islamic world. Before affording in-depth analysis on jihad and madrasas, we should begin looking at very nature of Islam and clearly define about what we take 'Islam' to be.

According to *A Glossary of Islam* written by Sourdél and Sourdél-Thomine, the term Islam literally means "submission to God – also 'religious practice', required for believer along with 'interior acceptance (*iman*) and 'living virtually' (*ihsan*)"¹⁷⁵. Describing principles and fundamentals of Islam, Ghamidi, stated that religion is god's guidance, which he first confessed in the nature of humankind and then he sent all necessary details through his messengers to guide humankind to righteous path and in this context the Prophet Muhammad was the last messenger of god to whom Islam was revealed.¹⁷⁶ The Prophet 'Muhammad (570-632 C.E.) is viewed [by Muslims] as the last in a long line of messengers – the Prophet Adam, Abraham, Moses and Jesus – sent by God (Allah), first to the Jews and Christians and finally to Arabs.'¹⁷⁷ In chapter 16, *Al-Nahl*, The Bee, Quran states 'And We revealed to you, [O Muhammad], to follow the religion of Abraham, inclining towards the truth; and he was not a

¹⁷⁵ Dominique Sourdél and Janine Sourdél-Thomine, trans. Caroline Higgitt, *A Glossary of Islam*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 78.

¹⁷⁶ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 17.

¹⁷⁷ See John L. Esposito, "Islam in Asia: An introduction", in *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press), 11.

polytheist.¹⁷⁸ Islam came as a religion of peace, to teach righteous path – equality, peace, harmony, and living virtually – to humankind in the lands of Arabs, Hijaz, the western part of today's Saudi Arabia, particularly the regions that include the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, at the time when rich suppressed poor, inequality, lawlessness and tribal conflicts prevailed in Arabian Peninsula in way that one or two rich tribes dominated politics, religion, and society. Abd al-Latif describes the time prior Islam in Arab Peninsula as “religious, political, social and economic turmoil”.¹⁷⁹

3.1. The Advent of Islam

The divinely inspired scripture of Quran was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in early seventh century¹⁸⁰ in 610AD in Mecca, Hijaz. The Prophet guided Arabs in Hijaz in the light of Quranic texts, which were gradually revealed in twenty-three years in accordance to the social, political, economic and cultural prerequisites of the Arabs in Hijaz in its days.

The Prophet's mission was universal. Like his predecessors, he warned people of wrong doings with punishments and promised rewards¹⁸¹ to those who had decried and abandoned erroneous cultural myths by accepting Islam. According to Maududi, the first revealed verses of Quran were in line with guidance based on three principle subjects; first, to teach and prepare the Prophet of his duty; second, to teach *nafs-ul amr*, truth in itself, the existence of God,¹⁸² and third to demonstrate the true path by demonstrating righteous behaviour based on humanitarian welfare.¹⁸³ Consequently, it

¹⁷⁸ Quran (16:123).

¹⁷⁹ Bahjat Kamil Abd al-Latif, provides an intensive brief history of Arabian Peninsula before revelation of Islam. See Bahjat Kamil, Abd al-Latif, *The Prophet Muhammad and Universal Message of Islam*, in *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*, Vol.3 ed. Idris El Hareir and El Hadji Ravane M'baye (France: UNESCO, 2011),33.

¹⁸⁰ Esposito, *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, 11.

¹⁸¹ Abd al-Latif, *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*,35.

¹⁸² See Fazlur, Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), 160.

¹⁸³ Maududi, *Tafheem-ul-Quran*, 21.

can be said that the early verses were mainly to disseminate the presence of one god, *tawhid*, and teaching Islamic ethics of humanity and well-being. When referred to the structure and commentaries, exegesis and analysis of the early Quranic texts, it can be said that the verses that were revealed in early years are shorter in length and generally talk about previous Prophets, universe, and *tawhid*, believe in one god, monotheism. Since the Prophet was going to transform the local tradition and cultures, primarily revealed verses were relevant to the matter that were culturally, political, economical and socially important to Arabs in Mecca in those days. It should be pointed out that worshipping self-made idols and poetry were the two most important values that constituted the fundamental aspect of Arabs' culture in Arabian Peninsula prior Islam. In this context Quran states that

*And you worship other than Allah that which neither harms them nor benefits them, and they say, " These are our intercessors with Allah" say, "Do you inform Allah of something He does not know in the heavens or on the earth?" Exalted is He and high above what they associate with Him.*¹⁸⁴

In the chapter seven, *Al-A 'RAF*, The Height, Quran states,

*Those who follow the Messenger, the unlettered prophet, whom they find written in what they have of the Torah and the Gospel, who enjoins upon them what is right and forbids them what is wrong and makes lawful for them the good things and prohibits for them the evil and relieves them of their burden and the shackles which were upon them. So they who believe in him, honoured him, supported him and followed the light which was sent down with him- it is those who will be the successful.*¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Quran (10:18)

¹⁸⁵ Quran (7:157)

It must be added, throughout history of humankind, whenever new ideologies and religions emerged decrying previous practices, they were subject to denial, tortures, and harassments. There are numerous incident historically happened in which the Prophets such Noah, Moses, and Jesus were denounced and tortured for decrying traditional practices by revealing divinely sent new religions. In this context the Prophet Muhammad was not an exception. He had suffered serious persecutions and harassments after disclosing that he was selected amongst Quraysh (one of the prominent tribes of Arabs in Mecca) as last messenger of Allah to guide mankind on the righteous path. The Prophet's preach of Islam on the first step was not explicit and thus it was secrete. The Prophet on first step by sermonising god's message evangelised those who were very close to him. The first group of people who converted to Islam were those who were close to the Prophet Muhammad such as his wife, Khadija, his close friend, Abu Bakr, his nephew, Ali ibn Mutallib, and his adopted son Zaid bin Haritha. After a short while in the second injunction god ordered the Prophet to blatantly and explicitly call people to Islam, "O you who covers himself. Arise and warn. And your Lord glorify."¹⁸⁶ When the Prophet started explicitly disseminating god's message and calling people to Islam, the majority of Meccans, mainly Quraysh, vigorously opposed the call. Since the Prophet was decrying decades old traditions (cultural practices, tribal dignities, and political, social and economic superiority of one tribe over others), the antagonism towards the Prophet and his companions, *sahaba*, had emerged in various from such as verbal denounce, humiliation including physical tortures.¹⁸⁷

The Prophet's explicit preach were soon to become pervasive crossing regions beyond Mecca and consequently, the number of new converts to Islam increased

¹⁸⁶ Quran (74:1-3)

¹⁸⁷ Abd al-Latif, *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*, 41.

rapidly. After thirteen years of preaching Islam under strident circumstance the Prophet met a delegation from Yathrib (pre-Islam name of Medina city in Saudi Arabia) who invited the Prophet and his followers to migrate to Yathrib. Finally in 623 the Prophet Muhammad along with his companions migrated, *hijra*, to Yathrib.¹⁸⁸

After the Prophet's *hijra*, migration, to the city of Medina, it had become political hub of Islam. To clarify this further, Muslim from all around Hijaz had gathered to form an Islamic administrative authority under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. It should be pointed out that the verses revealed post *hijra*, migration, particularly after the establishment of Islamic *Riyasat*, political representative/state, dealt with the socio-cultural and political affairs such as devotion to Allah (*shahadat tawhid*, faith in one god, *salat*, five times prayer, *zakat*, 2.5% taxation, *sawm*, fasting in the holy month of Ramadan – 9th month in Islamic calendar – *haj*, pilgrimage of holy Mecca), social affairs (marriage, divorce), ethics, Islamic manner, politics and importantly the Islamic doctrine of war, *qital*, or jihad. Comprising of both short pre-*hijra* and long descriptive long post-*hijra* verses that revealed in regard to social, cultural, political and economic affairs that the Prophet and his companions experienced throughout their time, the holy book of Quran was completed in 23 year (610-633 AD).¹⁸⁹

3.2. The Fundamental Sources of Islam: Quran and *Sunnah*

This assessment has repeatedly mentioned in the previous chapters that the holy book of Quran is the fundamental source of Islam. Equally it has also touched upon its contents and what language Quran is written in. What also matters here is to know about the physical structure of Quran. The holy bool of Quran has one hundred

¹⁸⁸ Maududi, *Tafheem-ul-Quran*, 24.

¹⁸⁹ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 17.

fourteen chapters, six thousand two hundred thirty-three *ayat*, (verses).¹⁹⁰ The divinely inspired book of Quran, like its preceders such as Torah and Bible, talks about humanity, universal welfare, and peace. Al-Latif described that Quran contains the term ‘worlds’ seventy-three times, ‘human being’ (*al-insan*) sixty-five times and the word ‘people’ two hundred forty-two times.¹⁹¹ The Quran also uses the term Muslim (*Muslimin, Muslimun*) in various contexts referring to both Muslims who believed in the Prophet Muhammad and the Prophets who revealed divinely regions before him such as the Prophet Abraham, David, Solomon, Moses, and Jesus. In this context Quran states, ‘Allah named you ‘Muslims’ before [in former scriptures] and in this [revelation] that the Messenger may be a witness over you and you may be witness over the people.’¹⁹² The Quran also refers people of Moses and Jesus as Muslims, ‘And Moses said “O my people, if you have believed in Allah, then rely upon him, if you should be Muslim.”’¹⁹³ Further, in chapter five Quran states, ‘And [remember] when I inspired to the disciple, Believe in Me and in My messenger Jesus. “They said, “We have believed, so bear witness that indeed we are Muslims [in submission to Allah].”’¹⁹⁴ Seen in this light, it can be said that Quran defines Muslim as a person who believe and submits him or herself to god irrespective of racial difference such as Arab, *bani-Israel*, son of Israel, Persian and people any other tribe and ethnicity.

The way, in which the Prophet of Islam followed certain rules, regulations in the light of Quran were indeed the revived and reformed version of Abrahamic religion.¹⁹⁵ ‘Then We revealed to you to follow the religion of Abraham, who was truly

¹⁹⁰ See Gabriel Sawma, *The Quran Misinterpreted, Mistranslated, and Misread: The Aramiac Language of Quran* (United States: Adibooks, 2006), 98.

¹⁹¹ Abd al-Latif, *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*, 34.

¹⁹² Quran (22:78)

¹⁹³ Quran (10:84).

¹⁹⁴ Quran (5:111)

¹⁹⁵ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 18.

devoted and was not among the polytheist.’¹⁹⁶ The stated verse according to Ghamidi is the statement that shows *Sunnah*, practice by the Prophet in the light of Quran, is not merely personal habits, or cultural habits of the Prophet Muhammad, rather it has consensus with the Quran.¹⁹⁷ The *Sunnah*, Prophet’s practice of Islam, is fundamental element of Islam that imparts how conduct rituals such as *salat*, the prayer, *Zakat* (2.5 % tax) including *Sadaqa*, voluntary charity, *Eid-ul Fitr*, celebrating end of *Ramadan*, fasting month, practice of social affairs such marriage, divorce, and dietary practices, prohibition on the consumption of pork, alcoholic beverage, blood, meat of death animals.¹⁹⁸ However, in span of time and space several narratives (*hadith*) has emerged advocating the status of Prophetic *Sunnah*. According to Bakircioglu, one of the main reasons that led emergence falls Prophetic narratives was ‘unlike Quran, which was immediately recorded after the death of the Prophet, the Prophetic traditions were only recorded in second and third centuries of Islam.’¹⁹⁹ However, viewing *Sunnah* from the perspective of its authority in Islam, Ghamidi describes that as far as authenticity of the Prophetic narratives is concerned ‘there is no difference between *Sunnah* and Quran.’²⁰⁰ He further adds that

*[j]ust as the Quran has been received by the ummah [Muslim community] through the consensus of the Prophet’s companions and through their perpetual recitation, the Sunnah has been received by it through their consensus and through their perpetual practice and stands validated like the Quran in every period of the time through the consensus of the ummah.*²⁰¹

¹⁹⁶ Quran (16:123)

¹⁹⁷ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 17-18.

¹⁹⁸ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 18-19.

¹⁹⁹ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 24.

²⁰⁰ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 19.

²⁰¹ Ibid

Both the Quran and Prophet's practice of Islam according to Esposito "reflects the comprehensiveness of Islam."²⁰² According to Ghamidi, Islam is formed of the Quran and *Sunnah*, 'nothing besides these two is Islam or can be regarded as its part.'²⁰³

Since Quran was revealed in the period of almost 23 years (610-633) meeting economic, social, cultural and political challenges that the Prophet and his followers faced during their time, the Quranic verses cannot be referred simply and only by their literal meanings. Each verse revealed was in accordance to a particular situation and circumstances that Muslim faced to build their inner faith, in regard to issues that emerged between Muslims as well as with pagans, Jews and Christian during the time span of 23 years. To elaborate this further, in order to understand Quranic texts, one must grasp adequate knowledge of pre-Islamic Arab culture, society, and politics²⁰⁴ beside competent knowledge of classic Arabic language in which Quran is written. Thus, what matters here is not merely importance of the Arabic language that requires competency and expertise – mastery in semantic and grammar of classic Arabic language – but also to acquire adequate knowledge of pre-Islamic social, cultural and political structures in Arabian Peninsula in relation to which each Quranic verse was revealed. In this context, Ramadan states that Quranic texts refer to general principles, to essential and immutable rules, thus, the practical implementation of which has to be thought out.²⁰⁵

As touched upon earlier, the holy book of Quran is revealed in classic Arabic language.²⁰⁶ The "classical Arabic" is not the language in which renowned Arab litterateurs and poets composed their poems like al-Hariri (516 AH, acronym for After

²⁰² Esposito, *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, 12.

²⁰³ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 19.

²⁰⁴ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 24-25.

²⁰⁵ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethnic and Liberation*, 24.

²⁰⁶ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 19.

Hijrah, migration) and al-Mutanabbi (354 AH) or they wrote exegesis on the Quran.²⁰⁷ ‘The difference in vocabulary, idiom, style and construction of the [Quranic] classic Arabic and the one spoken, and written today is the same as the difference, for example, between the Urdu and [old academic Persian or the difference between contemporary spoken English and English of Shakespeare].’²⁰⁸ Ghamidi emphasises that those who want to interpret, refer, or do commentaries on Quran must be competent scholar of this language.²⁰⁹ In the context of poetic structure of Quran, one bends to why the Almighty Allah had to reveal Quran in poetic form. Given the importance of poetry as fundamental aspect of pre-Islamic Arabian culture,²¹⁰ it can be said that Quran was revealed in regard to cultural, social, and political circumstances of Arabian Peninsula.

Returning back to the main issue of this assessment, jihad, within the context of Quranic texts, one of the verses that has been commonly referred by scholars and political activists in both Islamic and non-Islamic world such as Lincoln, Bakircioglu, Ibn Warraq, Sayyed Qutb, and Khaddur is the verse that states ‘And keep fighting against them, until persecution does not remain and [in this land] Allah’s religion reigns supreme.’²¹¹ The general commentary and perception amongst these scholars suggest that the world outside Islam is *Dar-ul Harb*, Realm of War, ‘in which jihad means hostile military campaign to spread Islam.’²¹² Nevertheless, for scholars such as Ghamidi and Ramadan the context of the stated verse is indispensable in order to grasp comprehensive knowledge about what the injunction talks about. The above stated verse was revealed at the time when ‘*Baytullah* [house of God, *kabah*, Mecca] was

²⁰⁷ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 20.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ See Arie Loya, “The Detribalization of Arabic Poetry,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 2 (April 1974), 202.

²¹¹ Quran (2:193).

²¹² Lincoln, *Holly Terror: Thinking about Religion after September 11*, 33.

regarded as the new *qiblah* [direction to perform prayer], – formerly Muslim prayed in the direction of Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem – Muslim became anxious to offer *hajj* [pilgrimage], since Mecca was controlled by pagans and they were hostile towards Muslims²¹³ – Muslim feared that they will be attacked and killed while performing *hajj*, since *hajj* is peaceful ritual performance in which conflict, violence is strictly forbidden. Adding in his commentaries, Ghamidi further describes that the word “fight” in the verse was confined within Mecca, where the holy *Kabah*, direction of prayer and pilgrimage site.²¹⁴ Thus, the supremacy of Islam was considered within the context of Mecca not entire world. Importantly, when referred to the prior and later verses of the above stated verse it become further clear that the context of the message is entirely different than what some writers such as Qutb had intended to portray. For example, the preceding verse states that ‘But do not initiate war with them near the Holy Kabah, unless they attack you there. But if they attack you, put them to the sword [without any hesitation]. Such disbelievers deserve this very punishment. However, if they desist [from this disbelief], Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.’ And the later verse states that “But if they mend their ways, then [you should know that] an offensive is only allowed against the evil-doers”.²¹⁵ When the above stated verse decontextualized it may afford Sayyid Qutb’s perception jihad, which he stated in his book, *Milestone*, as “[t]he earth belongs to God and should be purified for God, and it cannot be purified for him unless the banner, ‘No deity except God’, is unfurled across the earth”.²¹⁶ Nevertheless, the context of the verse in which it was revealed is completely different when scrutinises the background and reason in which it was revealed. In this perspective, it can be said that the type of jihad that is stated in the above-mentioned

²¹³ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 543.

²¹⁴ Ibid

²¹⁵ Quran (2:191-194).

²¹⁶ Qutb, *Milestone*, 26.

verses – chapter 2 verses 190-194 – is a defensive act of war not to wage war against non-believers to spread Islam across globe. To this end, one must also afford a considerable attention to the time and circumstance under in which god has permitted use of force in Islam. Importantly, the permission of use of force was given at the time when the Prophet could successfully establish Islamic society what Esposito calls as the first Islamic community/state in Medina.²¹⁷ Thus, viewed in this light, it can be said that jihad was not permitted at the time when Muslim suffered extreme humiliation, harassments such as forcibly expulsion from homes just for the cause of being accept the Prophet Muhammad's Islam, unless they could successfully build a political community.

Given the importance of Islamic doctrine of war as an integral part of the religion of Islam as argued by some scholars such as Esposito²¹⁸ and Bakircioglu²¹⁹, rejecting simple analysis and literal approach, this research advocates the need of historicist analysis of Islamic doctrine of war, particularly with regards to recourse and conduct of jihad stated by Quran and its commentators such as Ghamidi, Maududi, and Ramadan, and Ashraf as last resort to sustain peace and at the same its compatibility with the contemporary Islamic warfare. This will be dealt in details in the next part.

²¹⁷ Esposito, *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, 11. Also see Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 541-544.

²¹⁸ Esposito, argues that to be a Muslim is to be a member of religio-political community that is guided by Quran and *Sunnah*. See Esposito, *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, 12-14.

²¹⁹ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 44.

3.3 Jihad: Islamic Just War Doctrine, Defence Force, or Military Discourse to Spread Islam

*Permission to take up arms is hereby granted to those who are attacked because they have been oppressed and God indeed has power to help them – those who have been unjustly driven from their homes, only because they said: “Our Lord is Allah.”*²²⁰

The above stated *ayah*, verse, was the first injunction revealed by Allah that gave permission to wage war against oppressors, particularly Qurays in Mecca who forced the Prophet and his companions to migrate to Medina. What is considered important here is to know why Muslims were given permission to conduct jihad against oppressors only after migration to Medina. Further what is depicting as main catalyst to wage war in the stated verses, the *hijra*, forcibly expulsion to leave home, or the aggression against Muslims in Mecca? Ghamidi, in this context provides an excellent exegesis of the verses (22:39-40) that why Islam permits use of force. In his commentaries of these verses (22:39-40) Ghamidi stated that unless there is an extreme situation such as crime against humanity, deliberate extreme torture, persecution, oppression, particularly being victim such atrocities for only having different ideology, no one is prepared to leave his or her home. Further, the words ‘because they have been oppressed’ ‘refer to this very aspect, and it is because of the ruthless and unfounded oppression that the Quran allowed Muslim to resort the use of force against aggression.’²²¹ In response to why almighty Allah did not permit use of force in early years of Islam when Muslims suffered extreme harassments, agony and humiliation under the Quraysh oppressions, Ghamidi states that jihad was not an individual duty, it

²²⁰ Quran (22:39-40)

²²¹ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 542.

necessitated collective Muslim community, because the consequences of war no matter in what scale they are concerns community, people at war as well as innocent civilian including women and children. Thus, conduct of war must be calculated in the context of proportionality, with an ultimate purpose of sustaining peace and justice, as well as special attention must be given to the way in which force is conducted in, ethics of war. Thus, Islamic use of force unlike in the way in which some radical commentators and extremists such as Qutb and Osama bin Laden who had stated jihad as an individual duty²²² stipulates authorisation of a 'collective system', Islamic state under certain principles and responsibilities. However, this does not at all mean that the contemporary modern Islamic states have the authority to conduct jihad. Notably, what matters here is to analysis the community or collective system in Islamic world, which means collective decision-making body that embraces all Muslims societies' opinion and consensus. Given the example of contemporary Islamic states (mostly undemocratic, authoritarian, and/or semi democratic alleged by series of corruptions charges such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan), it can be said that jihad is not permissible to be used as ways to wage war by any of the contemporary Islamic states, let alone the non-state terrorist organisations to justify religious warfare, jihad within Islamic and/or against non-Islamic world. In this context, Ghamidi explains that '[n]o person or group has the right to take a step on its own [to conduct jihad] on behalf of the Muslims.'²²³ To clarify this further, Ghamidi emphasises that the word 'permission is granted' stated in the verses (22:39-40), refers to justification and permission of use of force only at the time when Muslims could successfully build Islamic state.²²⁴ However, contemporary arguments – led by some

²²² See Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 79.

²²³ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 542.

²²⁴ Ibid

radical commentators, such as Qutb, and non-state terrorists organisations like al-Qaeda and ISIL – reject the Islamic states’ authority and justify legal ruling of jihad, by referring to historical incident that happened during the peacetime when Muslim of Medina and Meccans lived relatively peacefully under the *Hudaibiyah* treaty (a deal signed between the Prophet of Islam and Meccan Quraysh to allow Muslims to conduct pilgrimage in Mecca), a Muslim named Abu Basir (who lived outside Medina) conducted jihad against pagans (Quraysh) regardless of *Hudaibiya* peace treaty.²²⁵ In response to such arguments Ghamidi, by referring to Quranic verses in which it states

*Indeed, those who have believed and emigrated and fought with their wealth and lives in the cause of Allah and those who gave shelter and aided – they are allies of one another. But those who believed and did not emigrate – for you there is no guardianship of them until they emigrate. And if they seek help of you for the religion, then you must help, except against people between yourself and whom is a treaty,*²²⁶

explains that ‘the Prophet and the Muslim in Medina were not responsible for the actions and deeds of people who had not migrated to Medina.’²²⁷ Further, the Prophet had condemned Abu Basir of his actions.²²⁸ Seen in this light, it can be said that jihad is not an individual and/or group of people’s duty. In the same way jihad must not be carried out unless a legal authority that represents Islamic societies democratically justifies it. It is also important to note here that when jihad is used in the context other than defensive act; particularly under just war doctrine it must meet proportionality with an ultimate purpose of sustaining peace and justice. When referred to Quran, the following verses provide a detailed recourse of use of force in Islam,

²²⁵ *ibid*

²²⁶ Quran (8:72).

²²⁷ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 542.

²²⁸ *Ibid*

And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight against you and do not transgress bounds [in this fighting]. Indeed, God does not like the transgressors. And kill them wherever you find them and drive them out [of the place] from which they drove you out and [remember] persecution is worse than carnage. But do not initiate war with them near the Holy Kabah unless they attack you there. But if they attack you, put them to the sword [without any hesitation]. Such disbelievers deserve this very punishment. However, if they desist [from this disbelief], Allah is Forgiving and Merciful. And keep fighting against them, until persecution does not remain and [in this land] Allah's religion reigns supreme. But if they mend their ways, then [you should know that] and offensive is only allowed against the evildoers. A sacred month for a sacred month; [similarly] other sacred things too are subject to retaliation. So if any one transgresses against you, you should also pay him back in the same coin. And have fear of Allah and keep in mind that Allah is with those who remain within the bounds set by Him.²²⁹

According to Ghamidi, after giving permission to use force in Quran (chapter Al Hajj, verses 39-40), the details of enactment and implementation of jihad was given in the above stated verses of Quran and all other verses that mention jihad are indeed to 'elucidate and emphasise what is stated in above mentioned verses.'²³⁰ These verses describe Islamic just war doctrine in the way in which to continue war until persecution inflicted by Quraysh is eliminated from the holy land of Arabia and Islam prevails in the region.²³¹ This indeed was a big responsibility given to Islamic state

²²⁹ Quran (2:190-194).

²³⁰ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 543.

²³¹ *ibid*

considering the ability and capability of Muslim states to conduct such war.²³² Ghamidi adds in his explanation that this was the first phase of jihad in which Muslims were known as *As-Saabiqun al-Awwalun*, the pioneers whose ‘faith and moral character were of exemplary degree’ and they were explained by Quran as 1:10 to enemy ratio²³³(almighty Allah promised to help them because their numbers were very few comparing to unbelievers, and thus the ratio here means power of one Muslim was considered to equate to the power of ten pagans). And later in major Islamic wars against unbelievers such as battle of Badr, Uhud and Tabuk, the Muslim soldiers were “required to present their services as a combatant.”²³⁴

To this end, it is worth mentioning about the order and mandatory of ordain of jihad. When referred to Quran it seems like jihad is not a compulsory duty. Also there are several *Hadith* references showing that the Prophet had not afforded permission to some Muslims to take part in the Islamic battles in several occasions. For example, ‘Narrated by Abdullah bin Amr, A man came to the Prophet asking his permission to take part in jihad, the Prophet asked him “Are your parents alive?” he replied yes, the Prophet asked him to serve his parent.’²³⁵ In other place the Prophet asked a man whose wife was going to perform pilgrimage to accompany his wife and not to participate in jihad.²³⁶ In the same way Quran does not consider not joining Islamic military discourse as sin or wrongdoing. In regard to this Quran states,

Not equal are those of the believers who sit at home without any genuine excuse and those who strive hard and fight in the cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives. Allah has given preference by a degree to those who

²³² Ibid

²³³ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 544.

²³⁴ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 545.

²³⁵ See Summarised Sahih Al-Bukhari, trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, (Riyadh: Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 1994), 611.

²³⁶ Summarised Sahih Al-Bukhari, 612.

*strive hard and fight with their wealth and their lives above those who sit [at home]. [Truly], for each, Allah has made good promise and [truly] Allah has preferred those who strive hard and fight above those who sit [at home] by a huge reward.*²³⁷

However, Quran strictly condemns conspiracies and those Muslims who first joined jihad and later turn their back and runaway. For such people Quran promises abode in hell. In this context Quran states,

*And [you should know that] whoever turns back to them [disbelievers, enemies of Islam,] on such a day [the day of battle,] – unless it be a stratagem of war, or to retreat to a part of his army, - he indeed has drawn upon himself wrath for Allah. And his abode is Hell, and worst indeed is that destination.*²³⁸

According to Ghamidi, these verses indicate that even though jihad is considered as last resort at the time when there is aggression and oppression against humanity, ‘jihad never becomes obligatory unless the military might of Muslims is up to certain level.’²³⁹ Further, jihad cannot be under taken under the interests other than for the sake of Allah, which is indeed to sustain justice and peace.²⁴⁰

Seen from the above stated perspectives, it can be said that the Islamic conduct of jihad is a sophisticated doctrine of use of force, which require in-depth analysis of reason, cause, right intentions, proportionality, ethics of conduct of war separately under each case. It is important to note here that the Islamic jihad has evolved and took different shape after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The political disagreements that mounted after the third caliph of Islam amongst Muslim leaders led

²³⁷ Quran (4:95).

²³⁸ Quran(8:15-16).

²³⁹ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 546.

²⁴⁰ Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 547 and 550

to new series of warfare within Islamic world. Each political leader assured his followers that the way in which they are fighting are righteous. One of the earliest jihad occurred between the Umayyah tribe (the third caliph Uthman bin Affan's clan belonging to Quraysh tribe) and Banu Hashim (the Prophet Muhammad and the fourth caliph's clan belonging Quraysh tribe). According to Tahera Qutbuddin, when political spheres of Islam increased encompassing northern Africa and the Middle East, the political disagreements occurred on the bases of inadequate distribution of political power amongst Muslims of different tribes and culture.²⁴¹

Under a political conflict in a plot by a group of rebels (from Egypt and Medina) the third caliph of Islam, Uthman bin Affan, was martyred in 656 AD.²⁴² After the demise of the third caliph, some in Hijaz elected Ali ibn Talib as fourth caliph of Islam. However, the governor of Sham (today's Syria) Amir Muawiyah (from Umayyah clan) did not accept caliphate of Ali ibn Abi Talib, on the ground that those who committed slain of the third caliph must be brought into justice before electing the fourth caliph of Islam. The political disagreement between Ali and Muawiyah has led to series of wars such as battle of Camel in Iraq.²⁴³ After conducting a number of jihads, Ali ibn Abi Talib and Amir Muawiyah, had agreed to resolute the conflict between them peacefully by means of diplomacy.²⁴⁴ However, a third group of people emerged decrying arbitration made by both political leaders and disobeyed both the fourth caliph, Ali and Muawiyah by proclaiming God's sovereignty and his will as supreme not humans.²⁴⁵ This group of people – their numbers were considered about 4000 in numbers – were known as *Kharijits*, literally means those who are expelled, or

²⁴¹ See B. Tahera, Qutbuddin, "Ali ibn Abi Talib' in *Arabic Literary Culture, 500-925*" ed. Michael Cooperson and Shawkat M. Toorawa (United States:Gale, 2005),69

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ Qutbuddin, *Arabic Literary Culture, 500-925*, 70.

²⁴⁴ Ibid

²⁴⁵ Qutbuddin, *Arabic Literary Culture, 500-925*, 72.

outsiders.²⁴⁶ What is attempted here is to highlight the emergence of new legal rule under a doctrine in which fight against fellow Muslims were considered religiously legitimate. This was the first so-called *Takfir* doctrine, excommunicating fellow Muslim, under which *Kharijites* had started new series of jihad against the fourth caliph of Islam as well as the governor of Sham, Syria. Under the new doctrine of jihad, in a plot by a khariji named Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam, the fourth caliph of Islam, Ali ibn Abi Talib, was martyred while praying in the Kufa mosque, (Iraq) in 661 AD.²⁴⁷

The above stated events brings to an understanding that jihad has never been merely a military discourse against oppression, aggression, or as a defensive force, rather it has been multi dimensional force that served political and strategic interests of different Muslim leaders within Islamic world since dawn of Islam in 7th century. Thus, it can be said that jihad was not merely conducted against the non-Islamic world, *Dar ul-Harb*, realm of war, as defined by some scholars such as Esposito and Khadduri, but rather jihad has been important strategic tool within Islamic world.

It is timely to mention here that the Prophet had not been in continuous warfare with unbelievers in the Arabian Peninsula. There were series of peace treatise that happened between the Prophet, pagans, Jews, and Christians. For example, it is narrated by Abu Humaid As-Saidi, he said that '[w]e accompanied the Prophet in *Ghazwa* [battle,] of Tabuk and the king of Aila presented a white mule and a cloak as a gift to the Prophet. And the Prophet wrote him a peace treaty allowing him to keep authority over his country.'²⁴⁸ Consequently, it is highly controversial to subscribe a term as *Dar ul-Harb* to non-Islamic territories as generally prescribed by some scholars such as Khadduri, Bakircioglu or Esposito. In the same way, importantly, it should be also noted that it would be naïve and simplest approach if one considers the notion of

²⁴⁶ Ibid

²⁴⁷ Ibid

²⁴⁸ Summarised Sahih Al-Bukhari, 635.

Islamic expansionism as stated by Bakircioglu, important part of Islamic military discourse.²⁴⁹ Rather, it is important to distinguish the political aspect of Islamic wars during the Prophet and after him. When assessing and defining jihad from historical perspective, what matter is not only fundamental source of Islam (Quran and *Sunnah*), but also it is important to afford in-depth analysis of the Muslim political leader and religious scholars who have justified jihad under certain political and strategic circumstance. Given the fact the religiously renowned Islamic powers such as Ummiyad and Abbasid had conducted series of jihads against each other, the comprehension about the righteous and erroneous jihad within Islamic world is extremely difficult if not impossible. In this regard Barry Rubin, describes that ‘religious law nominally in command but with the law set by the state, nobles, and customs more important role.’²⁵⁰ In Islamic world, particularly after the third caliph of Islam, this was the case. For example, Abbasids employed jihad in furtherance of military discourse inline with their cultural, political, and strategic interests. In the same way, the Ummiyad mobilised jihad based on their strategic and political interests. This trend followed by other Islamic power that emerged as Islam expanded such as Fatimid, Ottoman, Samanid, Timurid, and many others within Islamic world. None of these jihad under taken for the sake of Allah to sustain justice and peace or as self-defence. Rather, jihad had become important policy domain for diverse Islamic powers under different strategic interests in various epochs within the Islamic world. In other words, jihad has become important tool to shape strategic cultures of different Islamic powers throughout Islamic history.

Returning back to the issue of madrasas and mosques as important institutions in justifying jihad and providing legal rulings for Muslim leaders, after the Prophet and

²⁴⁹ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 187.

²⁵⁰ Rubin, *Guide to Islamist Movements*, xv.

his companion's era, the critical issue amongst the *ulemas* of different madrasas and mosques were to construct ideal path of Islamic law and jurisprudence, so called Sharia. In the search of righteous path, different schools of jurisprudence emerged in first centuries of Islamic history.²⁵¹ This was the time when Islamic religious schools, *madrasas*, dominated Islamic societies, cultures, and politics.

3.4 Madrasa: A Political and Strategic Actor in Islamic World

First thing first, it should be noted that Muslims discern the very existence of universe, knowledge, humanity, war, society, science, ethics, culture, law and so on through the lens of divinely inspired scripture of Quran and *Sunna*. For Muslims, Islam is absolute truth and ultimate path that regulates all aspects of their life. Different from its sister religions, Christianity and Judaism, Islam obliges its believers to perform daily duties. For example, praying five times a day, attending funerals, fasting in the holy month of Ramadan (9th month in Islamic calendar) and paying Islamic tax, *Zakat*. This necessitates every Muslim to acquire sufficient knowledge to perform these religious rituals. Thus, it is compulsory for each Muslim to attend Islamic religious schools in order to learn basic principles of Islam. Notably, it would be misleading to interpret the Islamic knowledge merely as religious education. Importantly, Islamic education encompasses both scientific and religious pedagogies. Conventionally, madrasas have been centres of education for both scientific and religious pedagogies. The taught curriculum, applied methods, and concept in madrasas have evolved under Muslim of different traditions and epistemologies and later have remained dominantly under inspiration of Western epistemology that continues until today.

²⁵¹ Esposito, *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, 12.

In fact, Islam is the religion of knowledge, in which knowledge is considered as worship.²⁵² During the Prophet's era, Muslims referred to him whenever they had faced any problem pertinent to their social, political, religious, and dietary circumstances (both at personal and/or public levels). The Prophet was absolute and ultimate teacher and instructor through him *ummah*, Muslim community, was guided in the righteous path of Islam.²⁵³ However, this was not going to last for ever. Notably, after the Prophet and his closest companion's era (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali), the Islamic world has started facing some of the serious dissent in relation to following and practicing righteous way of Islam based on fundamental sources of Islam, Quran and *Sunnah*. In this context, role of Islamic religious schools have remained crucial. The earliest Islamic education centres established in Arabian Peninsula were known as *Kuttab*s.²⁵⁴ The *Kuttab*s were institution that instructed young Muslims to memorise and recite the holy book of Quran.²⁵⁵ However, the institutions imparting higher Islamic education, madrasas, had emerged outside the Arabian Peninsula such as Khurasan in 10th century (today's Iran), Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo in 1170s.²⁵⁶ Regardless of chronological establishments of madrasas or the place where they had established, this assessment considers importance of emergence of different schools of thoughts within these madrasas, which by advocating distinct paths of Islamic law, jurisprudence over time fragmented Islamic world into a number of competitive sects. Although, Islamic epistemology and ontology are based on the fundamental sources of Islam (Quran and *Sunnah*), the way in which Islam expanded encompassing people of different ethnicity and culture has importantly impacted the interpretation of Islamic law and jurisprudence. Seen in this light, it can be said that one of the main reasons

²⁵² Henfer, *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 4.

²⁵³ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 39.

²⁵⁴ Henfer, *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, 5.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

that led Islamic scholars to adopt different methods, concepts were in relation to way in which they belonged to different cultures, environments, ethnicities as well as each scholar and/or group of scholars had followed different custom and tradition and had different political and social backgrounds. Consequently, different ways, concepts, and mythologies have been adopted to meet constantly changing environments in Islamic world. In this context, the pioneers were Numan Ibn Thabit (well known as Abu Hanifa) centred in Iraq and Abu Abdullah Malik bin Anas centred in Hijaz.²⁵⁷ The former adopted what Ramadan calls it the methods of analogical reasoning (*qiyas*), whereas the later remained conservative on the strict interpretation of fundamental sources (Quran, *Sunnah*).²⁵⁸ Later talented students of these schools of thought (Hanafi and Maliki), such as Ahmed Bin Muhammad Bin Hanbal Abu Abdullah Al – Shaybani (well known as imam *Hanbal*), and Abu Abdullah Muhammad Bin Idris al – Shafi’I (better known as imam *Shafi’i*) established new schools of thought known as *Shafi’i* and *Hanbali* respectively. These schools of thought had influenced Muslims in Hijaz and Iraq, which later developed in the form of schools of jurisprudence, *fuqaha*. This phenomenon has divided Islamic world, particularly in the context of methodologies and concepts, into four different religious and political entities that followed distinct Islamic laws. Notably, these *fuqaha*, in general were known as followers of *Sunnah*, the Prophet’s practice of Islam, which is better known as *Sunni*. Nonetheless, the political disagreement between the fourth caliph of Islam, Ali ibn Abi Talib and Amir Muawiyah led to formation of a new sect called *Shia*. The term *Shia* literally means ‘supporter or helper’²⁵⁹ of the fourth caliph of Islam, Ali ibn Abi Talib. The followers of this movement believes in Ali ibn Abi Talib as successor of the Prophet

²⁵⁷ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 3.

²⁵⁸ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 41-42.

²⁵⁹ See Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islam: Sunnis and Shiites,” *Congressional Research Service*, 28 January 2009, <https://fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf>, (accessed July 27 2015), 1.

Muhammad, not the three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, and Uthman) who preceded him as first, second and third caliphs of Islam.²⁶⁰ Particularly, the divergence and rivalry between *Sunnis* and *Shias* expanded, after the battle of Karbala; in which the son of fourth caliph, Husein was martyred by Yazidi forces belong to *Sunnis*.²⁶¹ Here, it should be pointed out that madrasas and mosques played crucial role during this period justifying military discourses on both sides, *Shia* and *Sunni*, as religiously righteous. Since, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine madrasas as variables that help to shape strategic preference and strategic cultures of Islamic states, in-depth analysis of political disagreements in the context of Islamic leadership within the politburo of Islamic Empires do not meet the purpose of this agreement. Hence, this study will focus on the way in which the Islamic powers used Islamic religious schools, particularly madrasas as tool to pursue strategic and political interests throughout Islamic history.

Historically, there have been strong debates amongst Muslim scholars in relation to the Islamic law and jurisprudence. In this context, some *ulema* adopted inductive methods of approach and other remained adhered to deductive methods of analysis. The Islamic religious institution, madrasas that followed deductive methods of analysis have further divided into some advocating strict interpretations of Quran and *Sunnah*, decrying phenomenon of reform, *ijtihad*, and forcing to revive historical Islamic epochs which according to Ramadan is ‘an irresponsible ‘nostalgia of origin’²⁶² and others followed marginally less strict path modifying some codes of Islamic law within time span and space of that era.²⁶³ On the other hand, madrasas adopting inductive school of thought under various methods, principles, and concepts

²⁶⁰ Ibid, also see Qutbuddin, *Arabic Literary Culture*, 500-925.

²⁶¹ Ibid

²⁶² Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethic and Liberation*, 19.

²⁶³ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 41-48.

of interpretations had further divided into a number of divers madrasas each with different comprehensions and analysis of fundamental sources. For example, madrasas advocating Hanafi jurisprudence, has further divided into distinct madrasas that follow Sufi or Ahl-e Tasawwuf, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Barelvi schools of thought. Sikand, described that there are about seven thousand different Deobandi madrasas in India that each madrasa is ‘autonomous in administrative matters...[and]... free to formulate its own syllabus.’²⁶⁴ In the same way *Shia* sect is also divided into *Twelvers*, *Ismaili* and some other Shiism.²⁶⁵ Since madrasas economically and politically have remained dependent on states and/or societies, in general almost all of madrasas in one way or another have remained important tools for Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan to leverage some sort of strategic and political interests. For example, the Deobandi madrasas played key role in the independent of movement of Pakistan against British Empire, (which will be explored later in Chapter Five). In the same way *Wahabi* or *Salafi* movement through different madrasas under Afghan jihad during the Cold War, supported by Saudi Arabia, has been successive strategy to contain expansion of Iranian led *Shiism* in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Principally, as mentioned above, by accepting Islam, Muslim submit themselves to the divinely law of Quran and *Sunnah*. However, this does not mean that one should have a general perception about Muslims who submit themselves to diverse interpretation of fundamental sources Islam, particularly those that are interpreted by radical commentators and political activists. For example, there is no doubt to say that Allah is the ‘ultimate sovereign whose omnipotence over human affairs stems from His status as the sole creator of the entire universe.’²⁶⁶ Also it is true to state that,

²⁶⁴ Sikand, *The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and Transnational Linkage*. 53.

²⁶⁵ Blanchard, “Islam: Sunnis and Shiites”, 5.

²⁶⁶ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law*, 7.

Islam possesses some important characteristics of a legal system, which seeks to regulate the behaviour of its adherents in accordance with its ideal paradigm what constitutes right and wrong, and demands the believer to follow (by means of thought and deed) its precepts, which are believed to have originated from God's will.²⁶⁷

However, what is important to note here is the way in which the Quranic commandments and the Prophetic creeds are interpreted understood and implemented inline with desired ideological stance as well as political and strategic interests by various Islamic schools of thought. For example, in the context of contemporary decontextualized and literal interpretation of primary sources by some political activists, Ramadan describes,

[f]or on the relationships within human societies, distinguishing between the immutable and the mutable makes it possible to draw a fundamental difference between principles and models. Principles can be immutable, absolute, and eternal, but their implementations in time or in history – historical models – are relative, changing and in constant mutation. Thus, the principles of justice, equality, rights, and human brotherhood that guided the Prophet of Islam indeed remains the references beyond the history, but the model of the city of Medina founded by Muhammad in the seventh century is a historical realisation linked to the realities and requirements of his time. Muslims must, in the course of history, try to remain faithful to those principles and strive to implement as best as they

²⁶⁷ Bakircioglu, *Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International law*, 51

*can according to the requirements of their time, but they cannot merely imitate, reproduce or duplicate a historical model.*²⁶⁸

Importantly, given the fact that ignorance is pervasive across Islamic countries,²⁶⁹ the literal, simplest interpretations of jihad, lacking in-depth analysis, scientific and contextual approach according Ramadan, is ‘appealing’, because the way in which jihad is shown to young Muslim population in the contemporary world is very simplistic and naïve in its form.²⁷⁰ Such rhetoric of jihad are employed in furtherance of military interests of various state and non-state actors through religious justifications provided by certain madrasas in Islamic countries such as Pakistan, and Afghanistan. As repeatedly mentioned in previous parts, madrasas, since earliest time have remained important means for Muslim leaders to pursue political and strategic interests in domestic and foreign policies. For example, madrasas preaching and propagating slogans of Islam in danger played important role in containing Soviet communism during the Cold War in Afghanistan. In fact, the Cold War transformed madrasas’ role from being education centres and having minimal role in politics into highly politicised religious institutions in Afghanistan. Madrasas in the contemporary Afghanistan and Pakistan are utilised as political and strategic tools to pursue various military, non-military, strategic, and political interests by various state and non-state actors in the region. However, this is not to generalise all madrasas as tools for political and strategic interests of different actors in Islamic countries. Indeed, there are numerous madrasas that play vital role in provision of education (at least primary level) in Islamic countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, what concerns this study is the connotation of Islam with the contemporary non-state warfare.

²⁶⁸ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islam Ethics and Liberation*, 19.

²⁶⁹ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islam Ethics and Liberation*, 11.

²⁷⁰ Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethic and Liberation*, 19

Notably, whenever a question or a critique is raised on the Islamic epistemology and ontology or Islamic doctrine of warfare, it is always Islamic religious schools, madrasas/mosques that represent and vanguard as guardians of Islam. Within this context, when some scholars, mainly non-Muslim, convicted madrasas as centres for training terrorists, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, scholars such as Taberez Ahmed Neyazi, has shed light on how some articles arguing such analysis have wrongly portrayed the true picture of madrasas in Islamic world, which indeed teaches tolerance, and human welfare.²⁷¹ These literatures may have been important assessments that provide comprehensive information on the role madrasas throughout Islamic history. But, the important points overlooked in most of such assessments are madrasas being centres of Islamic religious education are constructing worldviews of millions of Muslim young men across Islamic globe, based on desired curriculum, epistemology, analysis and versions of Islam. Thus, madrasas in general playing key role in shaping socio-cultural and political structures of Islamic society, particularly in regions where they hold commanding respect in the society. Seen from this angle, it can be said that madrasas cannot be overlooked as simply centres that impart Islamic religious education in Islamic world.

Some like Ramadan²⁷² and Esposito²⁷³ have concluded absence of Islamic leadership as one of the fundamental challenges of contemporary Islamic world. This assessment by understanding essentiality and necessity of collectivity of Islamic community under shared common interests, – referring to facts that Islamic societies are politically, culturally, ethnically, and most importantly religious divided into contending and conflicting sects within Islamic nations let alone Islamic world – believes that such achievement is far from being practically attainable if not unrealistic.

²⁷¹ Neyazi, “Madrasa Education”, 3967-3978.

²⁷² Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, 261.

²⁷³ See John L. Esposito, “Who Will Speak for Islam?”, *World Policy Journal* 25, no. 3 (Fall 2008), 47-57

Thus, what matters is to promote tolerance in Islamic societies to demonstrate liberality and acceptance of different Islamic schools of thought within one society. The Western societies can be observed as role models where Christians of different religious and secular schools of thought demonstrate tolerance to co-exist within one society or state.

Chapter Four

Religion, Culture and Politics in Afghanistan

4.1 Afghanistan: A Brief Introduction

Afghanistan is a multi ethnic landlocked country. According to United Nations' geographical classification Afghanistan is located in South Asia²⁷⁴. It is bordered to the north from east to west by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, to the southeast by Pakistan and to west by Iran. A narrow corridor of Wakhan packed with high range of Hindu Kush Mountains borders Afghanistan to People's Republic of China to its northeast (see Map 4.1).

Map 4.1: Afghanistan




Source: The University Texas at Austin, 2009²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ [Unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm)

²⁷⁵ See The University Texas at Austin, 2010, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_physio-2009.jpg

The surface area of Afghanistan is 652,864 square km and its estimated population in 2011 was over 32 million people.²⁷⁶ The multi-ethnic population of Afghanistan is comprised of 42 per cent Pashtun, 25 per cent Tajik, 10 per cent Hazara (Dari dialect, similar with Tajiks), 10 per cent Uzbeks, and the rest are other minorities such as Turkmen, Aimaq, Baloch, Nuristani and Kyrgyz²⁷⁷ (see map 3.2).

Map 3.2: Ethno linguistic Groups in Afghanistan



Source: The University Texas at Austin, 1997.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ See UN estimated population of Afghanistan in 2011-
<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Afghanistan#Map>

²⁷⁷ See Kenneth, Katzman, "Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance," *Congressional Research Service*, 12 January 2015 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf> (accessed July 25, 2014), 2-4.

²⁷⁸ See The University Texas at Austin,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnoling_97.jpg.

Afghanistan is governed under a centralised state institution that exercises power through three departments, the Executive (twenty-five Ministries, eleven Departments, five Commissions and a number of Independent Directorates) led by president, the Legislature and Judiciary.²⁷⁹ The Legislature is bicameral consisting of two chambers of *Wolesi Jirga* (House of People) and *Meshrano Jirga* (House of Elders).²⁸⁰ The president of Afghanistan enjoys absolute power appointing almost all of the ministry heads in national and provincial levels including one third of the upper house in the parliament.²⁸¹ The legal framework is based on civil and Islamic (Sharia) law. However, traditional customary law dominated by elderly men is widely practiced in public affairs. Although, the first democratic reform came with a constitution adopted by the King Mohammad Zaher Shah in 1964,²⁸² the feudal patrimonial system of governance left narrow space for the formation of liberal democratic political parties. In the present day Afghanistan, political parties are mostly based on ethnic and religious difference rather than political ideologies.

Through out the history, Afghanistan remained a buffer zone wedged between international powers. With such geopolitical background, it practiced a non-alignment strategy on its foreign relations. However, during cold war era, it enjoyed relatively good relation with Soviet Union. Afghanistan's relations with its neighbouring states other than Pakistan remain moderate. The Afghan-Pak relations persisted unsettled over 2,500 km Afghan-Pak border (Durand Line) dispute.

²⁷⁹ See Aarya Nijat, "Governance in Afghanistan: An introduction," *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit*, (January 2014), <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1402E-GOVERNANCE%20IN%20AFGHANISTAN.pdf>, (accessed July 27), 21.

²⁸⁰ Ibid

²⁸¹ See Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams, "Governance in Afghanistan: Looking ahead to what we leave behind" *Center for American Progress*, (May 2010), <https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/05/pdf/afghangovernance.pdf>, (accessed August 20), 7.

²⁸² Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, 48.

Historically Afghanistan has remained as an important cross route for great empires throughout history. Some of the empires ruled the country for several decades even for centuries. For example 'Achaemenids reign Afghanistan between 522 to 486 BC; Alexander of Mecedon between 330 and 327 BC; Kushans from 135 BC to 241 AD and nomads from CA the Hephtalites from 400 to 600 AD.²⁸³ Islam came to Afghanistan as early as in mid 7th century (642 AD).²⁸⁴ However, it took over two centuries for Arabs Muslims to make Afghan to convert into Islam.²⁸⁵

As time went by, Afghanistan had become home to several Islamic empires, such as Ghaznavids (962-1186), Ghorids (1148-1202) and Timurids (1369-1509) including some Afghan born dynasties like Mir Wais Hotak and Durrani Empire (1747-1772).²⁸⁶ Notably, none of these powers had changed hands peacefully. There had been series of jihad conduct amongst different Islamic powers to control this strategically important geography throughout history. However, what is important to note here is, under the reign of divers Islamic power of different tradition and culture, education, economy and culture flourished in Afghanistan. For example, Timurid and Ghaznavid dynasties established a number of renowned madrasas in major cities of Afghanistan such as Balkh, Herat, and Ghazni. These madrasas had produced renowned theologians, philosophers, poets, and architects such as Hakim Sanai (peot), Abu Rayhan Biruni (mathematician, physicist), Khawja Abdullah Ansari, (theologian) and Maulana Jalaludin Roumi (philosopher, theologian and poet).²⁸⁷ Today, the magnificent historical sights (madrasas, mosques) in major cities of Afghanistan (Heart, Ghazni, and Balkh) show that different Islamic powers have enjoyed glorious times in this land.

²⁸³ See Nancy, Hatch Dupree, *An Historical Guide To Afghanistan*, 2nd ed (Toky: Jagra, 1977), 26-35.

²⁸⁴ Dupree, *An Historical Guide To Afghanistan*, 36-37.

²⁸⁵ Dupree, *An Historical Guide To Afghanistan*, 37.

²⁸⁶ Dupree, *An Historical Guide To Afghanistan*, 38-52.

²⁸⁷ Samady, 'Education and Afghan Society in the Twentieth Century', 25.

Although Islam has played important role uniting Afghans of different ethnicities and tribes whenever Afghanistan was under threat of foreign invasion, the role Islam conventionally had remained modest in state building processes in comparison to its neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan.²⁸⁸ The Afghans conventionally followed *Sufi, Tasawwuf*, mystical and spiritual, practice of Islam.²⁸⁹ In other words, the *Tasawwuf* style of Islam conventionally regulated Afghan's life (all features of life including education, economy, culture, and politics). In comparison to state provided education, madrasa and mosques across the country have remained dominant centres imparting mainly Islamic religious education across the country. It should be pointed out here that besides being education centres, madrasas and mosques in Afghanistan represented centres of social, cultural and political activities.²⁹⁰ However, Afghans do not follow a monolithic religion of practice. Likewise any other Islamic countries, Afghans are fragmented by religious and cultural difference where majority are followers of *Sunni* with some minority who follow *Jafari* school of jurisprudence. Consequently, perception and the way in which religion is practiced have also remained different amongst diverse tribes and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Thus, there are different forms of religious expressions each of which according to Roy has different 'dynamic and symbolism.'²⁹¹ As touched upon previously, it is a general perception that Muslim of different background and ideologies such as secular, religious fundamentalist and reformist perceive Islam in their own dynamics and indulgence. However, what matters in the context of Afghanistan is concoction of Islam with local cultural myths and codes customary law to form religio-cultural codes of conducts. When Afghanistan is examined from the perspective that how Islam

²⁸⁸ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A modern history*, 10.

²⁸⁹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 30.

²⁹⁰ Borchgrevink, 'Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: implications for the reform of religious education', 25.

²⁹¹ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 30.

pervaded culture, it can be said that in south-eastern regions where inhabitants are generally comprised of Pashtun exercising tribal mores, today, both Islamic and tribal customary law are in practiced interchangeably (providing options to conflicting parties to select desired code of justice, Islam or Pashtunwali, Pashtun brotherhood). Misdaq in this context described that under the Cold War jihad the fundamental principles of Islam has become core principle of Pashtun tribal law (Pashtunwali). To clarify this further, three fundamental principles of Islam, believing in one god, almighty Allah, his Prophet, and the day of resurrection, at the same time had become a culture law as ‘*yawalay*, monotheism or belief in one God; *paighamabary*, prophethood or belief in the Prophet Muhammad, and *qiamat/akherat*, believe in the day of judgement.’²⁹² In order to understand how Islam had diverging impacts on tribal and non-tribal regions of Afghanistan it is necessary to shed light on what kind of role does culture play in Afghanistan.

4.2 Afghanistan: From A Cultural Perspective

*In Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush and in today’s Pakistan across the ... White Mountains, angular, dark-eyed men with heavy beards, fierce warriors with a love of individual freedom, their language clearly derives from an older Iranian group but with a heavy influence over the centuries of Indian and touches of ancient Persian, Aramaic, and Greek... These people are now known as Pashtuns.*²⁹³

Pashtun, Pakhtun and Pathan are three different names given to one of the major ethnic group living in today’s Afghanistan. Pakhtun or Pashtun is locally pronounced

²⁹² Misdaq, *Afghanistan, Political frailty and external interference*, 30-31.

²⁹³ See Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban*, (United State of America: Da Capo Press, 2003) 65.

words originally derived from Persian language ‘*Pusht-e-Koh*’ meaning back of the mountain, which later became as Pashtun or Pakhtun²⁹⁴. According to Quddus, Pashtun or Pakhtun is derived from Persian language, whilst Pathan was a name given by British during the colonial era.²⁹⁵ As noted above Pashtuns form one of the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan, however, this does not mean that they are a monolithic ethnic group. In fact, Pashtuns are divided into several bellicose tribal offshoots where each tribe fights for the virtues of honour, land, woman and money.

Tomsen, describes Pashtun tribal structure as one of the largest and sophisticated tribes in the world.²⁹⁶ Some of the major tribes are Afridis, Shinwars, Mohmand, Waziris, Mehsuds, Orakzais, Bangashes, Achakzais, and Khattaks²⁹⁷. These tribes are scattered along the Afghan – Pakistan borders. The Afghan Pashtuns have their siblings on Pakistan side and vice versa. Each of these tribes is divided into sub-tribal offshoots mainly distinguish from each other by their paternal names. ‘The names of Pashtun tribes end with wording that links the tribe to its progenitor, such as *i*, of, *zai*, sons of, or *khel*, clan of.’²⁹⁸ Pashtuns are strongly embedded to their cultural traditions and each tribe exercises different customary law within their tribal cocoons. Describing Pashtun tribal culture Tomsen, stated that

[A Pashtun boy] *is taught the most important Pashtunwali commandment of badal, or retribution... disputes arising from the defence of individual or family honour and family property-women (zon), gold (zar), and land (zamin)- can lead to blood feuds lasting for years or decades.*²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴ See Syed Abdul, Quddus, *The Pathans*, (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1987), 17

²⁹⁵ Ibid

²⁹⁶ See Peter Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan* (United States: PublicAffairs 2011), 53.

²⁹⁷ Quddus, *The Pathans*, 26.

²⁹⁸ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 55.

²⁹⁹ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 54.

Pashtuns conduct tribal customary laws through a council known as *Jirga*. Prior to arrival of Islam *Jirga* was practiced under traditional customary rules. The *jirga*, tribal council, is an important body that deals with public affairs such as inter-tribal conflicts as well as private matters (divorce, marriage disputes). In this context, Katzman describes that even today, in modern Afghanistan where there is state provided judiciary system about 80 % of public cases are dealt by the informal justice system of *jirga*.³⁰⁰ In the context of cultural importance of *jirgas*, Quddus, describes that ‘the force behind the *Jirga* is the age old conventions, traditions and ethnics of the Pashtun society’.³⁰¹ In the same way, the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan have been following *jirga* system of tradition in public and private affairs. Nonetheless, their tribal structures are less sophisticated than their fellow Pashtun compatriots. Notably, as stated in introduction part of this dissertation, each Afghan group is strongly ingrained with cultural virtues, honour, and pride. For example, a Pashtun always remains committed to protect his family, tradition, clan, and culture, Pashtunwali identity against the foreigners. Tomsen describe that a Pashtun persevering his culture ‘grows up somewhat suspicious of non-Pashtun ethnicities, foreigners and government representatives.’³⁰² Notably, personal identity in Pashtun culture does not simply mean a personal identification by name and/or surname. In fact, a Pashtun is known by his father’s name *zai* (son) as well as his *khel* (clan).³⁰³ Thus, what matters every Pashtun is to preserve the pride of his family, clan and tribal identity against any foreign intrusion. In other words Pashtuns are proud of their traditional customs, Pashtunwali identity, such as *badal*, revenge, *dukhmani*, enmity, *melemastia*, hospitality, *nanwatai*, asylum or forgiveness, and *namus*, virtue,

³⁰⁰ See Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” 27.

³⁰¹ Quddus, *The Pathans*, 103.

³⁰² Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 54.

³⁰³ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 55.

honour.³⁰⁴ In the context of non-Pashtun tribe, this phenomenon takes place in the shape of geographic identification such as Kabuli, those who belong to Kabul city, and Panjsheri, people from Panjsher province.³⁰⁵ However, each ethnic group strongly preserved their ethnic and cultural identities against the Pashtun dominated government since the last three centuries.³⁰⁶

4.3 Role of Islam in Afghanistan

Although, role of Islam has remained modest throughout Afghanistan's internal political history, particularly in the context of uniting different tribes and ethnic groups, the religion of Islam was important tool to mobilise political movements and wars under different enter ethnic as well as against foreign intrusion. Although, Amir Abdul Rahman khan, renowned as founder of modern Afghanistan³⁰⁷, was brought in throne by British India in 1880, he proclaimed that he is 'vice-regent of Allah, who got his duties and responsibility to lead Afghanistan from the will of Allah.'³⁰⁸ According to Rasanayagam, the Amir 'claimed that as he was called upon to wage a holy war by unifying and strengthening the country against the infidels... [in doing so] he became the *mujtahid*, interpreter of Sharia law, thus depriving *ulema* [in this context madrasas and mosques] of their authority.'³⁰⁹ At the same time, the Afghan king employed jihad in furtherance of military interests against Muslim minorities such as Tajik, Uzbek, Turkman and Hazaras throughout his reign in Afghanistan (1880-1901).³¹⁰ Utilising jihad as strategic tool, Amir had called upon two major interests; first, jihad as unifying

³⁰⁴ Quddus, *The Pathan*, 67-68.

³⁰⁵ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 49-52.

³⁰⁶ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 23-44.

³⁰⁷ For comprehensive study on political history of Afghanistan see Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 1.

³⁰⁸ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 11-12.

³⁰⁹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 12

³¹⁰ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 11-12.

force against foreign encroachments, second to mobilise war against ethnic minority for Pashtun political supremacy. The Taliban who have led religiously motivated warfare against all minority ethnic groups had followed similar trend between 1996 and 2001.

Conventionally, Islam within Pashtun tribal cocoons, throughout history had modest impact on social norm and tribal customary law of Pashtunwali. For example, whenever a dispute on a private or public matters occurred between Pashtun families, clans or between two tribes (land issue, women, abduction, murder, physical assault and adultery) the disputing parties were given the choice to opt the law in which they want to settle their issues that is whether the Islamic Sharia law or Pashtunwali customary law.³¹¹ In this context, Afghans have a famous saying that ‘Pashtun accept half of the Quran.’³¹²

When Pashtun customary law is analysed, it can be said that the tribal laws are highly distinctive and in the most cases controversial to Islamic Sharia law. For example, in the case of intentional murder the Ahmed Zai tribal law affords the victim’s family to opt one of the two compensations choices; first, to take revenge – killing a person from perpetrators’ family – second, to receive two fair virgin girls from perpetrator’s family in order to be wedded by a member of the victim family.³¹³ It should be noted that the tribal code of justice is not monolithic in its structure; rather each tribe practices a different codes of law. For example, in some tribe the customary law considers half a murder when a victim in physical assault loses an eye and it will

³¹¹ See “The Customary Laws of Afghanistan” *A Report by the International Legal Foundation*, September 2004 http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ilf_customary_law_afghanistan.pdf, (accessed May, 25, 2013), 7.

³¹² Tomsen, *Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflict, and the Failure of the Great Powers*, 46.

³¹³ “The Customary Laws of Afghanistan”, 11.

be considered equal to murder if in case the victim loses both of the eyes.³¹⁴ These kinds of tribal laws entirely contradict with Islamic Sharia law.

The Pashtunwali courts are held in tribal council, *jirga*, which is conducted by tribal men who are renowned for their expertise and knowledge of Pashtun culture. It is important to note that the *jirga* members are not elected nor paid by the people or community.³¹⁵ The Pashtun *jirgas* apply dual system of law, the Sharia, and Pashtunwali customary laws. Nevertheless, the Cold War jihad had transformed the social and cultural aspect of Pashtun lives. The *jirgas* have lost their authority in most places particularly in the regions where Taliban and their affiliates control the commanding heights. To clarify this further, mosques and madrasas have become new centres that represent social, cultural, and political affairs. It should be noted that in other places where the Taliban has less influence, the tribal culture have also remained under some sort of religious control. Seen from this perspective, it can be said that religio-cultural law is the de facto force in the contemporary Afghanistan.

On the other hand, non-Pashtun tribes do not follow such codified cultural laws. Oliver Roy who has an excellent background on Afghanistan studies, in this context describes that,

*Afghans have little knowledge of the intricacies of the Shari'at [Sharia law] and they do not interest him; for him it is sufficient that a concern with justice should characterise the 'Muslim.' On the other hand, the alim [Muslim clergy,] is inclined to see the shari'at in a formalistic, almost casuistic, fashion.*³¹⁶

³¹⁴ "The Customary Laws of Afghanistan", 13.

³¹⁵ "The Customary Laws of Afghanistan", 8.

³¹⁶ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 29.

As noted above Islam have had diverging role in multi tribal and multi ethnic societies of Afghanistan. In tribal areas madrasas and mosques roles are subdued under tribal cultural system and in non-tribal areas religious leaders are panacea for all sorts of problems that villagers face.³¹⁷ Thus, particularly in non-tribal regions, madrasas and mosques are multi task institutions that deal with social, cultural, economic and political affairs of people in communities and villages.

However, when these madrasas analysed from educational perspective, it would be misleading to say that they impart standard education or teach adequate religious knowledge to the population. In fact, most of the madrasas in rural areas – reminding that rural areas constitute majority of the Afghan population – are led by without knowledge, but trustworthy *mullah*³¹⁸ who, as touched upon earlier, are selected to be *imams* or teachers due to their personal piety or being a member of *mullah* family. This phenomenon have left majority of the population to rely on poorly established local mosques and madrasas not only to get education, but also as centres to resolve social, cultural, economic and political issues. Here, it should be also noted that who provide funds to these mosques, madrasas. Since most of these mosques and madrasas, as noted above, do not have any affiliation with the state or any other institution; they rely on local fund (collecting religious tax *zakat* or *ushr*, crop tax, one tenth of the agricultural product). Notably, regional state and non-state sources also provide various type of assistance to these madrasas, particularly to the post-Cold War private madrasas across the country.

The emergence of Cold War in South Asian was turning point in respect to politicisation of madrasas and mosques in Afghanistan. However, Roy states that

³¹⁷ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 29.

³¹⁸ Borchgrevink, 'Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: implications for the reform of religious education', 79.

irrespective of the Cold War politics, Islamic circles in Afghanistan conventional had played important role in domestic politics,³¹⁹ particularly after the constitutional amendment that legitimised formation of political parties in 1964.³²⁰ Oliver may have been true to emphases that the bases of some Islamic political movements were established during late 1960s. It is hard to detach these developments from the Cold War politics, since Afghanistan during the late 1960s was already involved in the Cold War politics – closer ties with Soviet Union to bandwagon its geopolitical disputes with West supported Pakistan. Seen in this light, it can be said that Afghanistan's domestic politics in early 1960s shaped under the influence of the Cold War. Notably, at the same time, religious political activists had already started receiving political and military aids from various external actors, particularly from Pakistan.³²¹ This trend has continued even in post-Cold War era as strategic policies of neighbouring states towards Afghanistan.

According to Gupta the Cold War epoch unleashed and exposed Afghanistan's potential internal political and ethnic issues in international level.³²² Notably, the religious movements have gained momentum at time when Sardar Muhammad Daoud Khan – cousin of the monarch King, Zahir Shah – by ousting his monarch cousin, established the first so called democratic republic Afghanistan.³²³ To shed light upon this further, Daoud's provocative foreign policy towards Pakistan on the issues of Durand Line and Pashtunistan and close ties with the Soviet Union had empowered Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, supported Islamic religious movements against Soviet allied state in Afghanistan. This development led to formation of several Islamic

³¹⁹ See Giustozzi, *Guide to Islamist Movements*, 181.

³²⁰ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 48.

³²¹ See Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould. *Invisible History, Afghanistan's Untold Story*. (United States: City light, 2009), 96-126

³²² See Bhavani Sen Gupta, *Afghanistan Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Publishers Ltd 1986), 3.

³²³ Giustozzi, *Guide to Islamist Movements*, 182.

religious parties such as Hizb-I Islami (Islamic Party), Jamiat-I Islami (Islamic Society), Ittihad-I Islami (Islamic Union), and Harakat-e Islamic (Islamic movement) in the country. Each of these Islamic parties was supported by different external state and non-state actors on the bases of religious and ethnic proximities such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan. Although, in early 1960s the religious political movement in Afghanistan were inspired of the Egyptian radical commentators and political activists such as Sayyid Qutb, later Pakistani Deobandi schools of thought under the Cold War jihad established deep roots in Afghanistan.

It is noteworthy that those who were inspired by the Qutb's vision of Islam such as Mawlawi Yunus Khalis, Burhanudin Rabbani and Gholam Niazi (both Rabbani and Niazi were graduates from Islamic Al Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt). The Afghan religious circle inspired by the Egyptian Islamic political movement, *Ikhwan ul Muslimeen*, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 in Egypt – led by Muslim leaders such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb – wanted to mobilise similar religiously motivated political movement with the help of Pakistani Deobandi madrasas and their political affiliates in Afghanistan.³²⁴ For instance, Qutb's books were translated in Afghan languages by Mawlawi Yunus Khalis – *Islam wa edalat – e edjtemay*, Islam and social justice, and by Rabbani the *Pointers to the Way*.³²⁵ The Afghan religious political activists including religious students from several madrasas – for example Mawlawi Yonous Khalis' madrasas³²⁶ – and mosques had followed Qutb's vision of Islamic knowledge.³²⁷ Notably, this trend has drastically changed when Jamaat-I Islami Pakistan, a religio-political party, centred on Pakistani Deobandi school of thought, established links with Afghan religious circles in

³²⁴ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 100.

³²⁵ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 70.

³²⁶ Rashid, *Taliban, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, 84.

³²⁷ Ibid; also see Coll, *Ghost War; The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001*, 112-113.

Afghanistan³²⁸. As the Cold War politics embraced the region, with the help of Pakistan's military intelligence, Pakistani Deobandi *ulema* spawn roots of new religious movements in the Afghanistan in early 1970s.³²⁹

As early as mid 1960s, religiously motivated political movements have started protesting Afghanistan's friendly policy towards Soviet Union³³⁰. Given the Afghan-Soviet friendly relations, numerous Islamic religious parties such Jamiat Islami, Islamic Community, and Sazman-I Jawanan-I Mosalman, Organisation of Muslim Youth, and Ikhwanis, the Muslim Brothers, had denounced Afghan state's legitimacy.³³¹ What matters here is to know how religiously motivated political movements against the Afghan state were led by madrasas and mosques that drastically moved the country towards total destruction.³³² In this context, Rasul Bakhsh Rais, described that '[r]igidity, puritanism, glorification of martyrdom and jihad',³³³ have shaped pedagogies of madrasas in Afghanistan.

The Cold War jihad had transformed the conventional *sufi*, mystical style of Islam in Afghanistan into dozens of radical schools of thought, such as *Wahabi*, *Salafi*, Deobandi, and Ahl-I Sunnah Wa'l Jamaat in the country. In this context of religious links between Pakistan and Afghanistan Borchgrevink described that 'Afghan students go to Pakistan to study, madrasa graduates return to Afghanistan as teachers, religious leaders, scholars, and judges.'³³⁴ Notably, the flow of diverging radical sects of Islam was not limited to provision of Islamic religious education in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also they have established some kind of links with non-state international

³²⁸ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 100.

³²⁹ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 100-102.

³³⁰ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 101

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 100-102.

³³³ See Rasul Bakhsh, Rais, "Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and Neighbours," *Ethnic Studies Report*, XVII/1 (January 1999), 3.

³³⁴ Borchgrevink, 'Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: implications for the reform of religious education', 75.

Islamic terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, including a number smaller local non-state Islamic radical and extremist groups in the region. Politicisation of madrasa and mosques were inline with provision of religious validation to various non-state led jihads in the region.³³⁵ For instance, the Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islami, Pakistan, a political wing of Pakistani Deobandi madrasas have established links with the non-state Islamic organisations such as Lashkar-I Taiba and Harakat ul-Mujahidin who are not only active in military operations in Afghanistan and Indian controlled Kashmir, but also they were operating in Balkans, and North Africa 1990s.³³⁶ This trend has continued an occupied dominant place in regional politics since 1980s in the region.

Despite the installation of new government after the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, after a decade and a half Afghanistan has to tackle a series of acute challenges regarding security, economic downturn, corruption and absence of the rule of law. According to United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Afghanistan ranks as one of the least developed countries in the world (169th in the list of over 180 countries worldwide), see Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Human Development Report Afghanistan

Human Development Rank	171
Poverty (multidimensional poverty, intensity of deprivation)	42 % live below poverty line
Share of working poor below US\$2	73.6%
Gender Inequality Index	0.693
Mean Years of Schooling	3.2%

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Afghanistan.³³⁷

³³⁵ Borchgrevink, 'Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: implications for the reform of religious education', 74.

³³⁶ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 520.

³³⁷ See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Afghanistan, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG>.

Such overarching challenges constraint the Afghan state ability to meet challenges in particular those associated with religious extremism and terrorism in the country. Particularly, jihad in Afghanistan has remained as de facto force for various Cold War veterans – such as former Cold War jihadist such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – as well as post-Cold War, the Taliban and new emerging Islamist terrorists such ISIL, to mobilise military discourses inline with various strategic and political interests.

It is also important to note that jihad has not been only variable force for non-state Islamist radical actors, but also it has become important strategy substance for different ethnic groups who remained entangled to secure greater political power in Afghanistan. Given the fact that each Afghan ethnic group had established cordial ties with their sibling in neighbouring countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan during the Afghan jihad (1979–2001), each ethnic group aside being a political party possesses physical military power. To clarify this further, it can be said that jihad is employed in furtherance of ethnic based political and strategic conflict within the state. Notably, in large context the past discussions suggest that absence of strong central authority in a country is precondition for violence. For example, Steven Lobell and Philip Mauceri described that ‘[w]hen the central authority declines, groups become fearful of their survival... each ethnic group look to their own devices [,Islam and jihad in the case of Afghanistan,] for protection against another [,because] safeguards are absent to guarantee their political status or economic and even physical security.’³³⁸ Nevertheless, what concerns this assessment is the way in which jihad and madrasas have been strategic actors and policy domains in Islamic world, particularly in regions where Islam depicts all aspect of Muslims’ lives.

³³⁸ See Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, “Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict,” in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation*, eds. Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 3.

Chapter Five

Religions, Culture, and Politics in Pakistan

5.1 Pakistan: A Brief Introduction

Pakistan is a multi ethnic country located in South Asia. It is bordered to the east by India, to the west by Iran and Afghanistan, to the north by China and to the south by the Arabian Sea (see Map 5.1). The population as of 2010 was estimated between 180 to 200 million.³³⁹ The multi-ethnic society of Pakistan is comprised of 44.2 per cent Punjabi, 15.4 per cent Pashtun, 14.1 per cent Sindi, 10.5 per cent Saraiki, 7.8 per cent of Muhajirs, 3.6 per cent of Baloch and 6 per cent other minorities.³⁴⁰

Map 5.1 : Pakistan



Source: The University Texas at Austin, 2010³⁴¹

³³⁹ For in-depth analysis on Pakistan, see Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 30.

³⁴⁰ See Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Pakistan”, *Library of Congress-Federal Research Division*, (February, 2005), <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Pakistan.pdf>, 8.

³⁴¹ See “The University of Texas Library,” http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_physio-2010.jpg (accessed November 15, 2015).

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a federal democratic state governed under a British inherited system of governance. Under the constitution the power is separated between the Legislative (bicameral parliamentary system), the Executive and Judicial branches. The President of Pakistan is a ceremonial head of state. While, the Prime Minister, directly elected by the people is the head of executive branch and responsible for running the government by appointing cabinet, directors, executives and chairmen including Chief Ministers of provinces, administrative and military appointments in Armed Forces in the country. The Judicial system is an independent department, consists of Supreme Court of Pakistan in the centre and High Courts in federal states.

Due to a series of internal and external factors the state of governance has been changing hands between Pakistan Army and civil institutions. Major political parties are People's Party of Pakistan (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League N (Nawaz), Jamiat Ulema-e Islam, Assembly of Islamic Clergy, and Pakistan Tehrik-e Insaaf, Movement of Justice. On its foreign relation, Pakistan is wedged between two unfriendly states of India and Afghanistan, however it enjoyed relatively good relations with West led by US. Particularly, its alignment stance with west during cold war era and contemporary era of global war on terror pledged Pakistan with great economic and military assistance.

5.2 Pakistan: From A Cultural Perspective

Contrary to its neighbouring states, particularly Afghanistan, culture throughout history of Pakistan has remained subservient to religion of Islam. Although, Pakistan is comprised of diverse cultures such as Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, Balochi and some other smaller cultural groups, their importance in the context of politics, particularly relevant to foreign policy, strategy, and defence have generally remained minimal if not futile.

However, when demographically analysed the country is divided into five federal states based upon five major ethnic groups. Each federal state not only communicates in different languages but also practices distinct cultures and traditions. Nevertheless, cultural dogmas contrary to Afghanistan have not constituted political aspect of Pakistani state, particularly in the context of defence, and foreign strategy cultural remained abortive. Nevertheless, it is not to say that culture has been totally out of political spheres in Pakistani politics, rather what matters here is culture of specific group has never represented state or identity of state likewise Afghanistan where the word Afghan is considered by some if not all to represent only dominant Pashtun tribe.³⁴² To clarify this further, the word “Pakistan” (clean or pure place) does not represent any particular tribe, culture, or ethnic group. In fact the name ‘Pakistan’ was opted by the founding fathers of the modern Pakistan, Quaid-e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Allama Iqbal as home for all ethnic groups in the country. At the same time, it is not to say that people of different cultural background have lived in harmony throughout Pakistan’s history. Indeed, there have been political movements and rebellions by the people of different ethnicity and cultural backgrounds such as Bengalis and Baloch against Pakistani state. To clarify this further, the Bengali independent revolution against Pakistan was based on ethnic and cultural identity. Although, Bengalis were Muslim as rest of Pakistanis, but what made them independent in 1971³⁴³ was their demands for cultural, ethnic identities not jihad. In other words, they haven’t mobilised a religiously motivated independent movement, – jihad was not the mobilising force in Bengali independent movements against Pakistan – rather the motivation behind their independence was their cultural and ethnic identity. Today, the ongoing Baloch independent movement against the government of

³⁴² Quddus, *The Pathans*, 18.


³⁴³ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 60.

Pakistan represent similar movement as of the Bengali independent movements in 1970s. However, some of the Baloch independent movements – for example Jundallah – under the influence of the Afghan jihad, employed Islamic jihad in furtherance of independent movements against both Iran and Pakistani state.

However, when Pakistani Pashtuns are concerned then the words Islam, jihad, and madrasas gains remarkable currency. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to generalise all Pakistani Pashtuns as people with strong religious and cultural faith. What makes Pakistani Pashtuns different from their siblings in Afghanistan is they have preserved prominent place amongst the Pakistani elite – most of the powerful military officer who played key role in Pakistan's political history were Pakistani Pashtun such General Ayub Khan, who had formerly trained and served in British Indian Army. It should be also noted that it was Pakistani Pashtun military officers such as General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan former Pakistan military intelligence chief, and Major General Nasrullah Babar, former Minister of Interior, who played key role in choreographing Afghan jihad during the Cold War.

When Pakistani Pashtuns are subject of concern, one must have comprehensive knowledge about the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) where majority of tribal Pashtuns reside. The FATA Pashtuns are orthodox traditional people who dwell in autonomous bellicose tribal societies, and likewise Afghan Pashtun, traditionally Pashtunwali customary law had depicted all aspects of Pashtun lives in this region (see Map 5.2).

Map 5.2: FATA



Source: The University Texas at Austin, 2008³⁴⁴

Importantly, the FATA Pashtun went through similar transformation likewise their siblings in Afghanistan under the Cold War politics. During the Cold War, most of the Afghan jihad training camps in Pakistan were built in the FATA and the peripheries of the Peshawar city, capital of Federal State of Khaybar Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as North-West Frontier Province) (see Map 5.2). The most important reasons for this was the ethnic proximity Pashtuns in FATA with their sibling across the border in Afghanistan, and mass unlettered tribal populous with strong affinity towards culture as well as tribal bellicose society had become integral to the rhetoric of the Cold War jihad.

The absence of state law, presence of tribal skirmishes amongst the distinct Pashtun tribes as well as the integration of thousand of Muslim radicals from across the globe under the Afghan jihad has transformed FATA from being a neglected and marginalised tribal region to a one of the most dangerous zones in the world. The flow

³⁴⁴ See The University of Texas Library, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-308991615-afghan_pakistan_2008.jpg (accessed November 15, 2015).

of a great deal of radical militants belonging to different radical Islamic organisations and groups, such as Barelvi, Deobandi, Shian, Wahabis and al-Qaeda with their local affiliates like Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and Sipah-i Sahaba, and some other local smaller groups has transformed FATA into a terrorist sanctuaries.³⁴⁵ Consequently, this phenomenon has completely changed the traditional society and culture of FATA. To clarify this further, the Pashtunwali tradition, *jirga*, which conventionally had commanded respect in the society, were overtaken by madrasas and mosques of different schools of thought.³⁴⁶ This phenomenon continues to control commanding heights in the region.

However, scholars of different background have found different causes to the above stated FATA crisis. For example, for Cloughley, decades of social and political marginalisation of FATA by Pakistani state have been some of the main catalysts that lurched FATA into current crisis, centre for Islamic radicalisation and terrorism.³⁴⁷ To clarify this further, he adds that over 200,000 unlettered young men – age range of 18 to 25 – seeking to be employed are ready to be exploited by ill-intentioned *mullahs*.³⁴⁸ These *mullahs* by controlling illiterate tribal leaders under flawed religious sermons regulate public, private as well as administrative affairs in the region.³⁴⁹ Cassidy reflects similar argument by stating that

[e]ducation and knowledge are indeed inimical to the dogma and ignorance that generally characterise the creed that Islamist embrace...The dogma

³⁴⁵ See Shuja Nawaz, “FATA- A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, (January, 2009), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf, (accessed December 15, 2015), 13-14.

³⁴⁶ Nawaz, “FATA- A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan”, 14.

³⁴⁷ For in-depth analysis see Brian Cloughley, “Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” *Pakistan Security Research Unit*, Brief no. 29 (January 2008), <https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/psru/briefings/archive/Brief29finalised.pdf>, (accessed October 25, 2015), 6.

³⁴⁸ Cloughley, “Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas”, 6.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

*that animates the TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan, (Pakistan Taliban Movement)] is not dissimilar to the contorted puritanism that stimulate the Afghan Taliban. The Pakistan insurgents espouse a similar interpretive blend of Deobandi and Wahabi Islamism as the Afghan Taliban. It is a creed of death and destruction, prescribing what to believe about which god and condemning those who do not believe it. It relies on illiteracy, tribal mores, and misogyny to construct its myopic narrative.*³⁵⁰

However, no matter as to whether socio-economic marginalisation or poverty were some of the main catalysts that fostered contemporary religious extremism and terrorism in the regions, madrasas and jihad endure as key factors in destabilising security of not only FATA but also the entire region.

5.3 Role of Islam in Pakistan

Pakistan ka matlab Kia?

La illaha illallah

Kon hamara rahnuma?

Muhammad Rasulullah

(What is the meaning of Pakistan?)

There is no God but God

Who is our guide?

Muhammad the Messenger of God)

³⁵⁰ See Rober M. Cassidy, *War, Will, And Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011* (Virginia: Marine Corps University Press 2012), 89-90.

The creation of Pakistan as independent state for Indian Muslims in 14 August 1947, demonstrates an unprecedented example in relation to the way in which it describe the role of religion in creation of a state as such. To afford a comprehensive background on the role of Islam in Pakistan, one must pay considerable attention to the history of Islam in the Indian subcontinent. Likewise, Afghanistan, it took almost three centuries for Muslims coming from the Middle East and Central Asian to convert a significant number of Indians into Islam.³⁵¹ Majority of the new converts lived in the regions what are now Pakistan and Bangladesh.³⁵² It is important to know that although Muslims have remained minority in the Indian subcontinent, they have played significant role in the political and socio-cultural spheres in Indian subcontinent.

Throughout the reign of Moghal dynasty, – from 13th to 18th century³⁵³ – poetry, art, architecture, and letters flourished in the Indian subcontinent. During this era, Indian subcontinent has become centre of Islamic scientific and religious education that served social, economic, political, and cultural spheres by producing renowned theologians, architects, philosophers, and judges. Since the rulers of Mughal Dynasty were people of letters and poets, they afforded considerable attention towards education and build some of the renowned madrasas of Islamic history such as great mosque of Delhi, Humayun’s Tomb – this tomb was one of the better known madrasas in the Indian subcontinent during the Mughal Dynasty – and Badshahi masjid.³⁵⁴ The astonishing architecture of these mosques and madrasas demonstrate remarkable talents of Muslim scientists in those days.

³⁵¹ See Kemal A. Faruki, “Pakistan Islamic Government and Society”, in *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press), 53.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Richard M. Eaton, “Introduction”, in *India’s Islamic Traditions, 711-1750*, ed. Richard M. Eaton (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2003), 9.

³⁵⁴ Haque, “Contribution of Madrasa in Historical Perspective”, 12.

The British who came to the subcontinent in the late 18 century, did not washout the Muslim elites entirely from the politburo. Thus, some of the Muslim elites become part of administration during the British Colonial rule. Notably, one of the most important madrasas of the contemporary Islamic world, the Dar ul-Ulum Deobandi, was indeed established under the colonial rule in the Saharanpur district of Uttar Pradesh in 1867.³⁵⁵ Importantly, it was also Muslims who triggered the independence movement against the British raj in early 20th century.³⁵⁶ The incident wherein the British destroyed part of a mosque in Kanpur in 1913 was propagated by Muslim *ulema* as 'Islam in danger'³⁵⁷, which mobilised religiously motivated independent movements against the British colonial rule across the Indian subcontinent.

Eventually, the Islamic led independent movements expanded and embraced secular Muslim revolutionists such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was given the title of Qaed e Azam (great leader) after independence of Pakistan, and Muhammad Iqbal, renowned Pakistani poet and philosopher. Here, it is important to note that not all Deobandi Muslim clerics supported the notion of Pakistan. For example, some Islamic unions such as Islamic Society of India (Jamiyyat al-Ulema-I Hind) supported Gandhi's movement of secular multicultural India.³⁵⁸ Nevertheless, significant number of Deobandi *ulema* and madrasas actively supported the notion of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and moved to newly formed Pakistan in 1947.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁵ See Muhammad Qasim, Zaman, *Schooling Islami: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, eds Robert w. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 63.

³⁵⁶ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 90-91.

³⁵⁷ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 91.

³⁵⁸ See Barbara, Metcalf, "Madrasas and Minorities in Secular India," in *Schooling Islami: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, eds Robert w. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (United States: Princeton University Press, 2007), 91-92.

³⁵⁹ Bano, "Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan," 49.

Notably, most of the Pakistani scholars such as Faruki argue that Pakistani politburo had nothing in hand to build their state on the genesis of Pakistan in 1947.³⁶⁰ This kind of judgement may have been true considering the fact that the atmosphere of partition was highly loaded with religious hatred and violence on both sides. One of the main issues about which Pakistan has protested several times was the uneven distribution of British colonial assets between two newly born countries.³⁶¹ Nevertheless, as touched upon earlier, Pakistan inherited some of the skilled bureaucrats and highly professional military generals such as Muhammad Ayub Khan³⁶², Muhammad Zia ul-Haq as well as well-experienced civilian politicians who had participated in several wars as British colonial military officers as well as played key role in the political administration of British raj. It is important to note here that the above named generals had served as the longest Presidents of Pakistan under the military coup d'états.

In addition, it should be also noted that Pakistan had possessed a number of actively running institutions, particularly some of the well-established modern universities and military academy such as University of Punjab, University of Engineering and Technology, King Edwards Medical College, and Islamia College that played vital role in shaping socio-cultural and political structure of the country. Thus, contrary to Afghanistan where education was the most rusted sector in the country,

³⁶⁰ Faruki, *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, 55.

³⁶¹ Since the notion of partition of the Indian subcontinent was based upon an understanding that the Hindus and Muslims belong to separate socio-religious systems that are far from coexistence rather they are antagonist towards each another and prone to violence. Indeed, such proclaims were political slogans of extreme right wing religious lobbies and patriots on both side of the partition. Such slogans, dividing people under religious identity, resulted in mass killings of over a million people on both sides. See Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 24-29.

³⁶² See Muhammad Ayub khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1967),13-14.

people in Pakistan were provided with some of the most modern education system in the region.

After its independence the first issue the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had to face was as to whether Sharia or Western secular law should account the national constitution and govern the nation. This had never been an easy task for Pakistani decision makers and bureaucrats who were comprised of both secular and religious elites. There had been long pull-and-push between both religious and secular bodies in the process of state building. According to Esposito, it took nearly ten years for Pakistani policymakers and elites in constituency to draw the countries first national constitution.³⁶³ After a long debate between religious and secular groups in politburo, the first constitution was drafted that promulgated Pakistan as an Islamic Republic and it is based on Islamic beliefs and accordingly the head of state must be Muslim – inscribed in Part IV of Article 32 – as well as ‘no law contrary to Quran and *Sunnah* of the Prophet could be enacted – inscribed in Article 198 –’ in the country.³⁶⁴ Nevertheless, this has never ended the religio-political debate on both state and public spheres, because the mechanism under which the state functioned was Western model of governance, not Islamic Sharia. Even today, debates on identity dominate public and state spheres as to whether Pakistan by adopting Sharia law should represent a true Islamic state or it should follow secular Western style of governance. It is important to note here that the blasphemy law of Pakistan has remained as one of the contorted debates in state and public spheres.

Throughout political history of Pakistan, there have been a number of attempts by charismatic laic leaders of Pakistan, both from civil and military institutions, to

³⁶³ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 117-118.

³⁶⁴ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 118.

modernise (Westernise) the nation state of Pakistan. These attempts were carried out respectively by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who ruled the country as President of Pakistan between 1958 and 1969, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who remained both as Prime Minister and President of Pakistan between 1971 and 1977, and General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan between 1999 and 2008. Such secularisation attempts had faced adverse reactions across the country, which were mobilised by the religious circles that coerced the political leadership to restore the previous status quo – no law contrary to Quran and *Sunnah* of the Prophet could be enacted in the country. The failed attempts by the Presidents of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf to modernise and Westernise Pakistan have demonstrate some of the best examples of the potential role of Islam in public and state spheres of Pakistan. Here, it should be noted that this does not mean at all that Muslims in Pakistan follow a monolithic religion of practice and Pakistan is based on Sharia law. Indeed, Islam in Pakistan is associated with five schools of thought, which are sectarian in orientation such as Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, Barelvi and Jamaat-i-Islami and *Jafari*.³⁶⁵ Thus, viewed in this light, radical Islamisation does not impose direct and significant threat to the state. On the other hand, the Islamic character of state can only be considered relevant or limited to enactment of blasphemy, dietary, and adultery laws.

It should be also noted that Islam not only was central issue of constituency in Pakistan, but also it played key role in domestic party politics. However, it should be noted that Islamic initiatives by political parties have never been an effort to establish a state based on Sharia law or Islamic nationalism, but rather to achieve party based political interests in electoral campaigns.³⁶⁶ For example, Pakistan's People's Party, a secular political party, advocated their policies on land reforms and nationalism in

³⁶⁵ Winthrop and Corinne Graff, 'Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan', 10.

³⁶⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 125.

religious language of ‘*Musawat-i-Muhammadi*, the Equality of Muhammad, and Islamic *Musawat*, Islamic Equality.’³⁶⁷ The Islamic dispositions of political parties were attempts to win trust of the population.³⁶⁸ It is important to note here that, surprisingly, the Islamic political parties such as Jamaat Islami, Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam, and Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan Mawlana Fazlur Rehman Group have failed to win considerable recognition in the polls.³⁶⁹ The reason for such miserable performance in electoral polls relies on two fundamental factors; ‘first, religious parties are far too conservative to support modernisation, and second, far too diverse to submit themselves to a monolithic version of Islam.’³⁷⁰ The point, therefore, is that Islam in Pakistan plays diverse roles in public and political spheres. Viewed in this light, although, today, Islamic radicalisation and terrorism is fundamental threat to security of Pakistan, unlike Saudi Arabia or Iran, Islam is not a unified mass to demonstrate a monolithic vision or controls state.

To this end, it is important to discuss the way in which Pakistan Military – the strongest and the most respected institution in the country – has perceived, manipulated, and influenced by Islam. Given the fact that military since the independence of Pakistan have occupied dominant place in strategic and policy making spheres, particularly towards Indian hegemony in the region and Afghanistan’s irredentist claims, it has adopted ‘three fold approach to security through Islam as a unifying element, competition with India and friendship with the US under the Cold War Politics.’³⁷¹

However, in general when Islamisation in Pakistan becomes topic of discussion the General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’s tenure (1977 to 1988) becomes inevitable focus

³⁶⁷ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 172-173.

³⁶⁸ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 126.

³⁶⁹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 127

³⁷⁰ Ibid

³⁷¹ Cassidy, *War, Will, And Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011*, 91.

of analysis amongst the scholars. This dissertation also considers this era as an important and turning point in the context of Islamisation of Pakistan Military, but from a different angle to see how Islam served strategic interests of the military as well as how Islamic jihad can be used as variable force to explain strategic culture of Pakistan.

General Zia, who was Chief of Army Staff in 1976 – appointed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan – as well as a renowned military officer for his religious piety in the country. A year later, in a bloodless coup d'état in 1977 General Zia became the 6th President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. During Zia's tenure, one of the remarkable policies was introducing Islamic Sharia law in the country. The Islamic shift had made him hero in religious circle's eye. The 'System of the Prophet' or *Nizam-i Muhammadi* (Islamic Order) were some of the significant Islamic initiatives that influenced Islamic political parties such as Jamaat Islami, who fervently backed Zia's Islamic policies.³⁷² Additionally, the Islamic order implemented by Zia postulated Islamic law of *Zakat* (2.5 % tax) that was levied from the all bank accounts.³⁷³ Further, *diniyat* (Islamic theology) subjects has become important curriculum in general schools and has become mandatory to all level of education.³⁷⁴ General Zia ul-Haq was committed to establish Islamic order in the country. Rizvi quoted Zia's remarks on his commitment to build true Islamic state of Pakistan in which he stated 'I would not hand over power as long as the mission of Islamisation and moral renewal of the country in not completed.'³⁷⁵

³⁷² Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 176.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ See Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, (Great Britain: MACMILLAN Press Ltd., 2000), 166.

Islam has also remained as potential decisive tool in Pakistan's foreign policy imperatives. In this context, Ahmed Rashid stated that what Pakistan faces in the context of 'the militancy of the religious parties, the mushrooming of madrasas and extremist groups, the spread of drug and Kalashnikov culture, and increase of sectarian violence', today, are the outcomes of Zia's Islamisation policy.³⁷⁶ This part is important for the purpose of this assessment. Since next part (chapter six) will discuss about foreign policies and strategic cultures of Pakistan, General Zia's Islamisation policy under the Cold War politics will be discussed in detail in later part.

³⁷⁶ See Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 38.

Chapter Six

Strategic Culture: Influence of Islam on Strategic Decision

‘In strategy we have to deal with human beings – German, Chinese, and so forth – collectively, and we can only interpret incoming information with reference to what we know in our culture of their culture’.³⁷⁷

The strategic cultures relevant to security threats and constructing national security policy patterns vary amongst countries, with different forms of governing institutions and geopolitical locations. People-centric democratic states and state-centric authoritarian countries each exhibit different strategic behaviours towards internal (domestic) and external (international) security threats. For example, the strategic culture of the United States (US) is based on liberalism and democracy, whereas, Japan has followed an “antimilitarist political/military culture” and China has adopted an intertwined realpolitik and Confucian/Mencian strategic culture.³⁷⁸ For the purposes of this dissertation, the term security threats means any direct threat (physical attack by means of military intrusion; conventional) and/or indirect threats (proxy war) that jeopardise state authority, sovereignty and the security of its people. Notably, the term strategic culture has become an important concept in defining the national security policy patterns of states, particularly in regions such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where culture and religion rule societies and where geopolitical issues (geographic

³⁷⁷ See Colin S. Gary, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (Jan. 1999), 60.

³⁷⁸ See Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World, An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, eds. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (United Kingdom: Oxford University 2013), 85.

disputes such as borders; competition for regional hegemony) dominate domestic and regional politics.

This part of dissertation examines the strategic culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan in relation to the way in which it can be used to predict and explain the defence policies of Afghanistan towards Pakistan, and vice versa. However, before utilising strategic culture as a theory to explain the strategic behaviours of Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is important to recall to what we mean by strategic culture in the context of this assessment. As stated earlier, in chapter one, strategic culture in this context refers to the 'collectivity of the beliefs, norms, values and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security issues and environment, and shapes their response to these'.³⁷⁹ In the context of using strategic culture as a tool to define state behaviours, particularly defence policies, it is important to understand what the elements that shape the strategic culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan are. Hence, this assessment focuses on how ideational factors, such as Islamic religious war, jihad, alone can define the strategic behaviours of Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms of the way in which they construct national defence policies towards each other. Likewise, this research accounts for the series of material factors that have played an important role in shaping the strategic culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Lantis and Howlett, there are three sources of strategic culture: physical (geography, climate, resources, technology); political (historical experience, political system, elite, military) and cultural.³⁸⁰ Significantly, strategic culture is not merely the habitual attitude of the members of a national strategic community or the elites who run the state, rather it is arguably complex military and non-military political actions that remain variable under

³⁷⁹ Rizvi, *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 305.

³⁸⁰ Lantis and Howlett, *Strategy in the Contemporary World, An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, 83.

the influence of domestic (culture, religion) and external (geopolitics, international pressure) factors. In the context of this study, the definition of geopolitics is the 'practice of states controlling and competing for territory'.³⁸¹ Therefore, this assessment in this section examines geopolitics (conflict over disputed borders and regions; Durand Line; Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Kashmir), as one of the main factors that have shaped the strategic cultures of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In terms of international pressure, this study assesses the Anglo-Afghan wars, the politics of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror as international factors that have also influenced the strategic behaviours of these two states. What matters here is ascertain whether it was material factors such as controlling over disputed borders, territories, Kashmir and Durand Line, and the Cold War slogans of free trade and democracy mobilised wars and served strategic interests or politicised religious tenets, Islamic jihad, played potential role in serving strategic interest of states in various fronts.

Jack Snyder was one of the first scholars to develop the concept of strategic culture theory in order to explain the differences in strategic behaviour between the US and the Soviet Union in the context of their nuclear strategy under the Cold War politics.³⁸² However, the abrupt demise of the Cold War politics in 1990 opened up a new policy window for strategists, policy makers and scholars of international security studies to examine the newly emerging post-Cold War concepts of international security. The new perspective of security studies, from the critical schools of thought, was a mainly centred on human related subject, such as human rights, human security, culture, religion, ethnicity, class, and gender. Amongst these subjects, for some scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, 'culture' became an important challenge in

³⁸¹ See Flint Colin, *Introduction to Geopolitics*. (Oxon: Routledge 2006),13.

³⁸² See Lantis, Jeffrey S., 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy', *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), 87.

relation to international security. According to Huntington, in the post-Cold War era '[t]he great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural'.³⁸³ Similarly, Lantis, reflected that 'many international relations scholars interpreted the end of the Cold War as a grand strategic opportunity for countries to reflect on their past, present and future'.³⁸⁴

This part of the assessment will be divided into three parts. The first part will briefly examine strategic behaviour in the context of defence policies, from the perspectives of historical experiences, geopolitics and the international alliances of Afghanistan in the way in which Islam and madrasas have remained key to pursue strategic and political interests. It will argue that although the national strategic culture of states like Afghanistan remained variable under regional (geopolitics) and international factors such as the Cold War, the state in order to win the trust of the Muslim population used Islam to legitimise the politically loaded strategic interests. The aim of the second part of this section is to explain the national strategy of Pakistan from the perspectives of historical experiences, geopolitics, and international alliances. Taking into account the geostrategic location of Pakistan, sandwiched between the two hostile states of Afghanistan and India respectively, the focus will be placed on the way in which Islam has impacted on the strategic behaviour of Pakistan and how it has influenced its defence policy. In part three, the contemporary changing strategic cultures of both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be analysed, as variables that can be used to explain the current strategic behaviours and defence policies of both states towards each other. Finally, the durability of the material and non-material factors,

³⁸³ For ideational factors forming post-Cold War threats to international security, particularly in the context Islam culture as a major threat replacing Soviet communism see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3, (Summer 1993),22.

³⁸⁴ Lantis, 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy',88-89.

Islamic jihad, in defining the strategic behaviour of both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be discussed.

6.1 The Strategic Culture of Afghanistan: Historical Experience, Geopolitics, and International Alliance

As noted earlier, for centuries, Afghanistan has been a crossroads for great empires that invaded this region, such as ‘Achaemenids (522-486 B.C.), Alexander of Macedon (330-327 B.C.), Mauryans and Greco-Baktrians (205 B.C.-48 A.D.), Kushans (135 B.C.-241 A.D.)’ and nomads from Central Asia the ‘Hepthalites (400-600 A.D.).’³⁸⁵ This phenomenon resulted in ‘the heterogeneity of Afghanistan’s population with their ethnic links across the international borders’.³⁸⁶ Domestically, Afghanistan is a heterogenic, conflicting tribal society, where each tribe fights for the virtues of honour, land, and tribal dominance. Since the formation of the Afghan Empire in 1747,³⁸⁷ the Pashtuns (the major ethnic group in Afghanistan) have dominated the political history of Afghanistan.³⁸⁸ Nonetheless, the inter-ethnic and inter-tribal wars aimed at controlling central power have continued throughout history. There were a series of inter-ethnic and inter-tribal wars ‘in the periods 1801-26, 1880s to 1890s’ in the history of modern Afghanistan.³⁸⁹ Although, the first centralised modern state of Afghanistan arose with the help of British Colonial India in 1880 under the Amir (ruler) Abdul Rahman Khan,³⁹⁰ the tribal skirmish amongst Pashtun and non-Pashtun Afghan ethnic

³⁸⁵ Dupree, *An Historical Guide To Afghanistan*, 26-35.

³⁸⁶ See Nabi Misdaq, *Afghanistan, Political frailty and external interference* (New York: Routledge 2006), 2.

³⁸⁷ See Amin Tarzi and Robert D. Lamb, “Measuring Perceptions about the Pashtun People,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 3 March 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110316_Lamb_PashtunPerceptions_web.pdf (accessed April 15 2015), 3.

³⁸⁸ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 19.

³⁸⁹ Misdaq, *Afghanistan, Political frailty and external interference*, 11.

³⁹⁰ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 1; Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 17.

groups had never ended. In this context, the role Islam contrary to Pakistan, as religious force uniting different ethnic groups had minimal role in uniting conflicting tribes and ethnics groups in Afghanistan.

Notably, conventionally Afghans (particularly dominating Pashtun tribes) have a strong affiliation with their culture. In particular, traditionally, culture has dominated the political, social, and legal aspects of the lives of each Afghan. Traditionally, Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, refer to the traditional council, known as *jirga*, to resolve their social, economic, and political disputes. According to Quddus, ‘the force behind the *Jirga* is the age old conventions, traditions and ethnics of the Pashtun society.’³⁹¹ Furthermore, as noted above Katzman stated that ‘as many as 80 per cent of cases are decided in the informal justice system’ of *jirgas*.³⁹² In addition, even state level political disputes refer to *loya jirga* (grand *jirga*), which is constituted of elderly Afghans, particularly tribal leaders gathered from different regions of Afghanistan. For example, one grand *jirga* consisted of twenty-five hundred tribal leaders (important to note here is that most of these tribal leaders were veterans of Afghan jihad) gathered in Kabul to decide whether or not the Afghan government should support the deal that allowed US troops to remain in Afghanistan after 2014.³⁹³ Furthermore, these *jirgas* are dominated by tribal culture and religious beliefs, such as ‘hospitality, revenge, escort, refuge, asylum... believe in God and believing in Prophet Mohammad’.³⁹⁴ However, that is not to say that Afghanistan lacks state institutions such as judiciary, executive, and legislature. In fact, in 1964 the *loya jirga* adopted a modern governing system that

³⁹¹ Quddus, *The Pathans*, 103.

³⁹² Katzman, ‘Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance’, 27.

³⁹³ See Dean Nelson and Zubair Babakarkhail, “Hamid Karzai clashes with tribal elders over plans for Afghanistan when US troops withdraw,” *the Telegraph*, 24 Nov. 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10470828/Hamid-Karzai-clashes-with-tribal-elders-over-plans-for-Afghanistan-when-US-troops-withdraw.html>, (accessed April 26, 2015).

³⁹⁴ Misdaq, *Afghanistan, Political frailty and external interference*, 11-31.

allowed the formation of political parties, parliament and an independent judiciary department.³⁹⁵ Nonetheless, with more than ninety per cent of the population being illiterate, the new reform had little or no impact on the ‘everyday lives of predominantly rural and tradition-bound people’.³⁹⁶ To this end, it can be said that Afghanistan’ population is comprised of different groups of people who are not only diverse in ethnicity and culture, but the way in which Islam is perceived and practiced is widely different. The presence such phenomenon is nothing new, however, what matters here is, as to whether practice of culture or practice of religion of Islam or both religio-cultural practices, they all are practiced in extreme ends. Consequently, the existence of strong cultural and religious beliefs influenced the political structure of Afghanistan throughout its history. However, it is not to say that the national political structure of Afghanistan has developed as a result of internal socio-cultural and political movements. In this context external factors play important role. The notion of nationalism is based on We (group of people practicing similar culture or religion) against Them (people who are considered inimical outsiders who threat the very existence of We). In the context of national security, Krause and William described that the individual’s security is defined with his/her citizenship with a state.³⁹⁷ As a result, those who are not citizens of the state are outsiders and considered as threat to security of both citizen and state.³⁹⁸ In this context, wars with British Colonial India strengthened the nationalistic cultural identity of modern Afghanistan. Viewing nationalism from state’s perspective, Peter Hough described that ‘[n]ational in a government’s political rhetoric is always a device to convince society to rally behind

³⁹⁵ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 40.

³⁹⁶ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 41.

³⁹⁷ See Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Strategies*, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (UK: Routledge, 1997), 43.

³⁹⁸ Ibid

the government and garner legitimacy for potential controversial policies.³⁹⁹ The garner legitimacy in the context of Afghanistan was religiously validation of state policies by *ulema* through religious institutions such as madrasas and mosques. Thus, the political culture of Afghanistan has developed under “internal disorder and external invasions” in which Islam and culture occupied dominant space (Dupree, 2002, pp.980-981).⁴⁰⁰

In the context of international pressure, the turning point in shaping the strategic behaviour of Afghanistan was the demarcation of its border with British Colonial India. Following two Anglo-Afghan wars, between 1839-1842 and 1878-1880,⁴⁰¹ in 1893 the British Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, and the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahman Khan, agreed to demarcate the Durand Line that divided Afghanistan from British Colonial India.⁴⁰² Given the importance of the strong ethnic and cultural ties between Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the Durand Line has become one of the main catalysts in shaping the strategic culture of Afghanistan, particularly in the context of the national security policy. According to Dupree, Afghans ‘stand together and assert their pride in being Afghan when outsiders threatens’.⁴⁰³ Indeed, the Durand Line has become the source of protracted conflict between Afghanistan and British Colonial India, which has remained as an unresolved issue since the British withdrawal from the region until the present day. In fact, throughout its history, Afghanistan has never had a strong centralised government. Thus, every new Amir in Kabul has repudiated the agreement made by the former Amir with British India. According to

³⁹⁹ See Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security*. 3 edition, (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), 11.

⁴⁰⁰ See Nancy Hatch Dupree, “Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan,” *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 5 (Oct. 2002), 980-981.

⁴⁰¹ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 11.

⁴⁰² Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 18.

⁴⁰³ Dupree, ‘Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan’, 978.

Saikal, '[p]olitics in Afghanistan was characterised by direct bargaining amongst clans, tribes, regional populations and other elementary solidarity groups'.⁴⁰⁴ The Durand Line was not merely a geopolitical issue for Afghans; rather it was an ethnic, tribal, identity, and cultural problem that strongly influenced its strategic behaviours. Hence, Afghans did not consider Pashtuns living in British controlled India to be citizens of a distinct country, since Afghan Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line have remained ethnically and culturally strongly connected to Afghanistan. Prior to the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan strongly backed the formation of an independent state for Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line. In this context, the Afghan government backed Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servant of God) party, who wanted to establish an autonomous state for Pashtuns in the Indian subcontinent.⁴⁰⁵ It is important to note here that the name 'Khudai Khidmatgar' demonstrated assurance to those religious Pashtun who concerned religious validity of the party's political movement. Furthermore, according to Tarzi and Lamb, the behaviour of Afghanistan towards the creation of Pashtunistan 'provoked a social and cultural awakening among Pashtuns on both sides of the border.'⁴⁰⁶ However, India was going to be split into two nation states: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (a country for Indian Muslims) and the Republic of India. As a result, the Muslim cause led Pashtuns to join the newly created Pakistan in 14th August 1947. However, this decision angered the Afghan elites, and as a consequence, the primary foreign policy patterns of Afghanistan, in the context of its national security strategy towards British India and later towards Pakistan, have been strongly influenced by ethnic and cultural values.

⁴⁰⁴ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 4.

⁴⁰⁵ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 32-3; Tarzi and Lamb, 'Measuring Perceptions about the Pashtun People', 2.

⁴⁰⁶ Tarzi and Lamb, 'Measuring Perceptions about the Pashtun People', 3.

Pakistan was created in the thrall of domestic (social, economic, refugee) and external geopolitical challenges (mainly with India over Kashmir). This phenomenon convinced Afghan decision makers that Pakistan is a weak state. Thus, it was timely for the strategic thinkers in Afghanistan to pressurise Pakistan on issues concerning the Durand Line and Pashtunistan. As a result, Afghan strategic enclaves towards the newly independent Pakistan became highly provocative. Similarly, according to Budihas, the Afghan elites and strategic thinkers ‘doubted that Pakistan would be able to survive as a sovereign nation-state’.⁴⁰⁷ The turning point in terms of the Afghan foreign strategy towards Pakistan, occurred when the Afghan King, Mohammad Zaher Shah, appointed his ethno-nationalist cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, as Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 1953,⁴⁰⁸ since ‘Daoud ...believed the best way to tackle Afghanistan’s problem was to embrace the notion of supremacy and unity of Pashtuns, based on their common ethnicity, language, culture’.⁴⁰⁹ Following the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, the decision making body in Afghanistan acknowledged Pashtunism as concerning national identity issues and, therefore, any harm to Pashtunism was considered to be a threat to the nation. The preferred strategic choice for Daoud was ‘nationalism, neutrality and development...with nationalism including...consolidation of central power over the tribal and regional interest’.⁴¹⁰ Hence, in this context, Afghanistan has secretly continued to support Pashtun independent fighters who fought against the Pakistani forces.⁴¹¹ The perception of

⁴⁰⁷ See Christopher L. Budihas, “What Drives Pakistan’s Interest in Afghanistan,” *The Land Warfare Paper*, April 2011
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Documents/LWP_82_web.pdf,
 (accessed May 24, 2012), 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 156.

⁴⁰⁹ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 112.

⁴¹⁰ See Harly H. Hinrichs, “Certainty as criterion: taxation of foreign investment in Afghanistan,” *National Tax Journal* 15, no.2 (June 1962), 148.

⁴¹¹ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 157.

security for the Afghan elites was any threat to their cultural values, identity, and ethnic unification. Consequently, this kind of concept has shaped the strategic culture of Afghanistan towards Pakistan. At the same time, this phenomenon has created predicaments for Pakistan, since the Pakistani elites considered Daoud to be ‘an advocate of Pashtun irredentism’.⁴¹²

However, the arrival of the Cold War politics in South Asia has completely changed the political milieu of the region. Pakistan has become a strong regional ally for the US, as well as becoming a member of the anti-communist organisation, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).⁴¹³ In late 1959, the US officially backed Pakistan on the issue of Pashtunistan.⁴¹⁴ However, the US-Pakistan alignment increased tensions in Afghanistan. According to Khan, when a state faces a stronger enemy state, it has two “fundamental options: bandwagon with the emerging power or seek to balance the perceived threat”.⁴¹⁵ In regards to alignment, Afghanistan followed a non-alignment policy in the early Cold War era. However, the continuation of the Cold War milieu in South Asia presented Afghanistan with a strategic choice of alignment. Indeed, although Afghan decision makers wanted to build friendly relations with both the US and the Soviet Union, that was not an acceptable option under the Cold War politics. Moreover, alignment was an important principle of Cold War politics; ‘if you’re not with us, you’re against us’.⁴¹⁶ However, between 1953 and 1954 Afghanistan requested arms and economic assistance,⁴¹⁷ but the US rejected the request, saying that ‘instead of asking for arms, Afghanistan should settle the

⁴¹² See Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyards of Empires, America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. NORTON & COMPANY 2009), 9.

⁴¹³ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 157.

⁴¹⁴ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 120.

⁴¹⁵ Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan,” 7.

⁴¹⁶ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 157.

⁴¹⁷ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 122.

Pashtunistan dispute with Pakistan'.⁴¹⁸ Therefore, in response to the American behaviours, the Afghan strategic thinkers decided to purchase economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union instead. Consequently, from 1956 to 1978, 'Afghanistan received \$1240 million in military aid from the [Soviet Union]...and some 3725 Afghan military personnel had been trained in the Soviet Union'.⁴¹⁹ At the same time, the Soviet Union formally backed the Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan.⁴²⁰ As a result, Afghanistan altered from its traditional policy of non-alignment to an alignment policy. Hence, it is important to acknowledge the fact that it is not always 'the culture of the strategic players, individuals and organisations' that shapes the strategic behaviour of a nation state.⁴²¹ More accurately, geopolitics, international pressure, and competition for military power are variable elements that continuously change state behaviours, particularly in the context of a strategic defence policy.

However, joining the bandwagon with a powerful state comes at a cost.⁴²² In this context, Afghanistan paid the price with a Soviet invasion in 1979 and destructing notion of Afghan jihad, which slowly and deeply shattered the country. Following the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan once again lurched into political warfare. The Soviet backed communist party of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) divided into the PDPA Khalq (the people) and the PDPA Parcham (the banner) parties.⁴²³ These two communist parties clashed over the control of central power in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, religious anti-government protests, supported by

⁴¹⁸ Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 90.

⁴¹⁹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 34.

⁴²⁰ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 162.

⁴²¹ Gary, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', 56.

⁴²² Khan, 'Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan', 7.

⁴²³ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 164.

Pakistan and the US, erupted across the country.⁴²⁴ Eventually, Soviet strategists lost the war of ideologies against the West, since the Afghan jihadists and their multinational radical Muslim counterparts fought tooth and nail against the Afghanistan communist forces and Soviet troops tagging them infidels, for jihadists the mantra of death was martyrdom, which indeed is highest religious reward in which god has promised eternal life in *jannah*, paradise. Consequently, because of the decline of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan lost its strong economic and military supporter in the region. Moreover, with no economic and military support from the Soviet Union and other allies, such as India, the economy of Afghanistan sharply declined and the country became isolated within the region. Given the domestic and international political pressures, Afghan strategic thinkers failed to exert a long-term national security strategy to counterbalance the emerging threats to its perceived security.

Furthermore, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 1990s, within two years the country had lurched into a civil war. Decades of religiously loaded protracted wars in Afghanistan destroyed almost all of the civil and security service institutions in the country, including the Afghan Army. Therefore, between 1992 and 2002, Afghanistan became a safe haven for international criminals and Islamic terrorist groups from around the world. However, the installation of a new government following the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US meant that, once again, the issue of the Durand Line was revived as the main catalyst for Afghan strategic thinkers and policy makers in shaping its defence policy pattern towards its traditional enemy, Pakistan. A former President of Afghanistan stated that ‘Afghans and we cannot accept the Durand line... [n]o government in Afghanistan will accept

⁴²⁴ Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A short History of Eighty Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier 1839-2011*, 176-8.

the Durand line'.⁴²⁵ Significantly, the majority of the bureaucrats and elites are ex-Mujahedin that Pakistan supported against the Afghan communist regimes during the Cold War era. Thus, no matter how much strategies are influenced by international pressure, geopolitics, and technological advancement, culture and Islam endures as a key factor in shaping the strategic behaviour of states.

6.2 The Strategic Culture of Pakistan: Historical Experience, Geopolitics, and International Alliance

On 14th August 1947, the British Raj over the Indian subcontinent came to an end. Consequently, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned into the two distinct and hostile states of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India. Pakistan was established under an Islamic identity as a home for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Hence, people from distinct cultures such as Pashtun, Punjabi, Bengali, Sindhi and Baloch gathered together to form the Islamic state of Pakistan. In contrast to Afghanistan, ethnic and tribal culture has not influenced the political structure of Pakistan. However, since the creation of Pakistan as an independent state, Islam has become a foreign and defence policy tool for the Pakistani elites. According to Patnaik, strategists and policy makers in Pakistan used Islam as a tool in domestic (unite distinct ethnic groups under one nation state) and foreign policy matters (portraying India and the communist regime in Afghanistan as enemies of Islam).⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵ After exchange of fire between the Pakistani and Afghan forces in Afghan-Pakistan border that resulted in killing of one Afghan soldier and wounding two Pakistani military forces, the President Karzai in a news conference stated that Pakistan is pressurising Afghan government to accept the Durand Line as an international border, but his country will never recognise Durand Line as an international border between the two countries. See Dunya News report 'Kabul will never recognize Durand line: Karzai', *Dunya News*, 4 May 2013, accessed at <http://dunyaNews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/172241-Kabul-will-never-recognize-Durand-Line-Karzai>, 28 April 2015.

⁴²⁶ See Sudhansu Kumar Patnaik, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (India: Kalpaz 2005), 19.

Pakistan was part of British Colonial India for several decades from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Therefore, Pakistan inherited its foreign policy and military establishment from British India.⁴²⁷ Thus, its strategic culture concerning its relationship with Afghanistan was also inherited from British foreign diplomacy towards Afghanistan. However, Pakistan lacked the political and economic superiority of the British Raj. In contrast, the country was created in the thrall of internal and external conflicts. In the wake of its creation, Pakistan was crippled by a series of border and ethnic disputes with both of its immediate neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Likewise, Pakistan had to tackle a series of domestic challenges, including sectarian violence, ethnic issues, and problematic civil and military relations.⁴²⁸ According to Maley, Pakistan was created as ‘an insecurity state’.⁴²⁹ Given the precarious political, strategic, and complex security environments, the Pakistan military not only became the sole guarantor of security and protection for the sovereignty of the nation, but it also dictated Pakistani foreign affairs and governed the strategic decision-making body.⁴³⁰ To the public eye, the Pakistan army appears to be a respectful and powerful institution that is capable of protecting the people of Pakistan from any internal and external threats.⁴³¹ Thus, Pakistan has developed strategic behaviour and defence policies in response to the perceived security threats from Afghanistan and India.

⁴²⁷ See Hassan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An overview 1947-2004,” *Briefing paper for Pakistani Parliament*, April 2004, accessed at <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/PakistanForeignPolicy-AnOvreview.pdf>, (accessed April 28, 2015), 11.

⁴²⁸ Khan, *Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan*, 2.

⁴²⁹ Maley, *Twentieth-Century Wars, The Afghanistan Wars*, 56.

⁴³⁰ Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An overview 1947-2004’, 12; Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan’, 2.

⁴³¹ Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan’, 3.

Essentially, security concerns regarding India and Afghanistan were the catalyst for Pakistan taking an alignment stance with the US.⁴³² Moreover, the close relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and particularly with India, have created serious dilemmas for Pakistan.⁴³³ According to Mahnken, 'effectiveness in war thus depends not only on what we do, but also on what our opponent does'.⁴³⁴ Pakistan signed a series of economic, military and defence agreements with the US, such as the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in May 1954. Furthermore, Pakistan became a member of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation and CENTO in 1959.⁴³⁵ On the other hand, the Soviet, and later Indian, support on the issue of Pashtunistan propelled the agenda established by Daoud into the international arena. Thus, securing international support meant that Daoud was able to exacerbate the issue of Pashtunistan by intruding into the autonomous tribal areas of the frontier Pashtun regions of Pakistan. Consequently, General Ayub Khan, who was then the President of Pakistan, took counteractive measures against the Pashtunistan policy of Daoud by conducting aerial raids over Afghan soil.⁴³⁶ Moreover, General Khan closed Pakistani borders with Afghanistan and dismissed his diplomatic representatives from Afghanistan.⁴³⁷ This action contrasts with the accepted belief that the 'Pakistan military inherited the British tradition: subservient and answerable to the civilian masters'.⁴³⁸ Significantly, Pakistan has spent almost half of its democratic life under military rule, beginning with the first successful coup d'état by Field Marshal General Mohammad Ayub Khan in 1958, who ruled the country for eleven years. Subsequent successful military takeovers came under General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq in 1978-

⁴³² Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An overview 1947-2004', 12.

⁴³³ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 123.

⁴³⁴ Mahnken, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* 3rd ed, 72.

⁴³⁵ Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An overview 1947-2004', 12.

⁴³⁶ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 34.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Khan, 'Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan', 2.

1988, and Pervez Musharraf in 1999-2008. Thus, throughout history, Pakistani security strategies, particularly defence policies, have been dictated by the military. However, it is important to realise that although the strategic culture of Pakistan has been shaped around non-cultural factors (border disputes with both of its neighbours and alignment with the US), the perception of security for the Pakistani elite has developed in the context of these challenges. Indeed, as defined in the introduction to this paper, strategic culture is the ‘collectivity of the beliefs...values and historical experiences of the ...elite in a polity that influences their ...perception of security’.⁴³⁹ Hence, since the Pakistani elites perceived the Afghan irredentist claims and the Indian repudiation of the concept of Pakistan as security threats to their state sovereignty and existence, the defence policies were developed to reflect such perceptions.⁴⁴⁰ What matters here is, to know what substances served Pakistani defence policy agendas. Since, Islam had played significant role in creating Pakistan by uniting different cultures, the Pakistani strategists followed this trend to legitimise and pursue public support against primarily India and Afghanistan considering these two states enemies of Islam and thus thread to very existence of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

A decisive moment for the Pakistani policy on Afghanistan was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the Afghans lost their sovereignty. Under General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq, then President of Pakistan, and with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the US secrete services, the Pakistan intelligence agency, Inter-Intelligence Agency (ISI), began covert Islamic religious warfare, training Afghan refugees and international radical Islamists from around the world to fight against Soviet and Afghan troops in Afghanistan.⁴⁴¹ The Islamic religious war of

⁴³⁹ Rizvi, *South Aisa in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, 305.

⁴⁴⁰ Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan’,2; Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An overview 1947-2004’,10.

⁴⁴¹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*,54-57; also see Rashid, *Taliban, Oil, and the New*

jihad has become an important aspect of the defence policy for Pakistan. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, non-state terrorist groups such as ‘Lashkar-I Taiba, Harakat ul-Mujahidin’⁴⁴², Haqqani Group and the Afghan Taliban have become important elements in shaping the defence policy of Pakistan. Given the importance of strong religious and cultural faith among Afghans, Pakistani strategists have utilised Pakistani Pashtun generals (General Akhtar Abdul Rahman and General Nasrullah Babur) and religious groups and political parties (Jamaat-e Islami Pakistan) to exert strategic security policies towards Afghanistan. For instance, Pakistan supporting the Taliban (an Afghan radical religious political group predominantly formed of Pashtuns) sought for a ‘strategic depth against India’ in Afghanistan.⁴⁴³ Significantly, throughout the history of Pakistan Islam, as a political and strategic tool, has played an important role in the defence policy. As noted earlier, the strategic culture of Pakistan was formulated under the perception that the Afghan irredentist claims (Durand Line), the Indian repudiation of the concept of Pakistan and Indian hegemony in the region posed major threats to the sovereignty and existence of Pakistan.

6.3 The Changing Strategic Culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan

The influence of Islam and culture on strategic preference of states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan has remained strong throughout history. However, in addition to ideational factors there are series of materialist dynamics such as economy, geography, resource, technology, and demographic reproduction that were traditionally considered as realist factors to influence strategic decision and defence policy patterns of states.

Great Game in Central Asia, 130.

⁴⁴² Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan*, 520.

⁴⁴³ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 142-143.

For Lantis and Howlett, the strategic culture in the context of defence policy changes in two circumstances; first, the external shock (for example US changed its national defence policy after the September 11 terrorist attack) and second, strategic culture changes when there is more than one strategic thought advocating durable interests and security policies of a state.⁴⁴⁴ The historical experiences from the perspective of changing material realities and ideational tenets of states vary in accordance to their geographical circumstances, political structures, and form of governing institutions (democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, communist, Islamic kingdom and so on). Additionally, perception and response to changing nature of materialist realities is contingent on ideational sources of states (tribal, ethnic myth and religion allegiance). For example, in Afghanistan and Pakistan Islam and cultural belief dominates strategies when subjects such as technological advancement, globalisations, particularly information technology are concerned. Another cause for a state to change or prefer particular policy rather than other depends upon political history of state, particularly in relation to the way in which political structure and defence policy pattern are formed throughout history. However, it is not always true to say that states, 'varying in material and ideational resources apply different strategic responses' as Lantis and Howlett suggested.⁴⁴⁵ For example, although Afghanistan and Pakistan share geographic circumstances as well as religious and cultural identities, their strategic preference and the way in which material and ideational sources influence strategic decision making as well as the way in which elite in the polity perceive security threats are vastly different. One of the main reasons for Afghanistan and Pakistan choosing different, rather adverse strategic choices against each other is in relation to the way in which tribal culture and religion was used as tool to exert

⁴⁴⁴ Lantis and Howlett, *Strategy in the Contemporary World, An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, 86-87.

⁴⁴⁵ Lantis and Howlett, *Strategy in the Contemporary World, An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, 81.

security strategies of both states. For example, throughout history, tribal culture and ethnicism played important role structuring political structure, strategy and defence policy patterns in Afghanistan. Since its modern history Afghanistan remained subject to culturally motivated violence, which kept the state always weak to govern its peripheries.⁴⁴⁶ Notable, the religion of Islam played secondary role in internal affairs. Although, constitution provision addresses that Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, the sacred religion of Islam is the religion of Afghanistan and no law shall contravene the tenets and provision of Islam (Article I, II, III), the role of Islam in internal affairs remained modest. In other words, throughout Afghanistan's violent political history, Islam failed to unite diverse ethnic and conflicting tribes of Afghanistan to form a strong central government. Nonetheless, conventionally, Islam played important role in foreign strategy uniting 'Afghans of all social classes in times of national crises'.⁴⁴⁷

The Cold War for Afghanistan was a bitter political experience in which Afghanistan's internal problems were exposed to external geopolitical and ethnic pressures.⁴⁴⁸ After Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, tribal culture and Islam played greater role as strategic tool to exert security interest of different regional and international states. This was the era when states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and US preferred ideational factors, Islam, as important tool to pursue foreign policy strategies under the Cold War politics in Afghanistan. This phenomenon has resulted religion to intertwine with cultural myth. The Pashtun traditional cultural codes, which were once totally separated from religion of Islam, has become amalgamated with religious tenets under the Cold War strategies of different states. As a result, some of the most important Pashtun tribal codes have changed to what earlier stated as 'yawalay, monotheism or belief in one God; paighamabary, prophet hood or belief in

⁴⁴⁶ Misdaq, *Afghanistan, Political frailty and external interference*, 4.

⁴⁴⁷ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 10.

⁴⁴⁸ Gupta, *Afghanistan Politics, Economics and Society*, 3.

prophet Mohammad and *qiamat/akherat* or the day of judgement’, which at the same time are main principles of Islam. Notably, ideational resources such as tribal culture and Islam became quick reaction force and important strategic policy for awakening religiously motivated wars against the Soviet expansion in South Asia. Additionally, the Cold War politics in itself had become a tool to cover hidden agendas and strategic interests of states such as Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi under religiously motivated wars in the region.

On the other hand, as stated above, Pakistan was born under an ideational strategy of Islamic identity. The All India Muslim League party with the help of Islamic religious leaders under ‘slogans of Islam in danger’⁴⁴⁹ pursued a successful strategy against British India that resulted in the formation of independent state for Indian Muslims, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The constitution same as in Afghanistan promulgates that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is based on Islamic beliefs, thus, the head of state must be a Muslim (Part IV, Article 32) and reforming Islamic society under Islamic principles (Part XII, Article 97) as well as ‘no law contrary to Quran and *Sunnah* of the Prophet could be enacted (Article 198).’⁴⁵⁰ However, conversely to Afghanistan, Islam played important role in state-building process in Pakistan. Notably, although Pakistani politburo struggled to limit religious influence on state politics, they feared clashing with *ulema*, ‘who commanded respect within certain constituencies’.⁴⁵¹ Throughout history, Islam played important role defining internal and external security strategies (uniting different ethnic groups under the banners of Islam, pursuing security strategies towards Afghanistan and containing Indian hegemony, supporting religiously motivated wars in Afghanistan and India) in

⁴⁴⁹ For comprehensive study on the role of Islam in modern politics in Islamic states see Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 96.

⁴⁵⁰ Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 118.

⁴⁵¹ Bano, ‘Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan’, 50.

Pakistan.⁴⁵² Thus, for Pakistan, ideational source, Islam, has been playing important role as variable tool to exert security strategies at home and towards rival states in the region.

Additionally, the nature of political structure and historical experience has been some of the main reasons for Afghan and Pakistani strategists to adopt different strategies rather than another. The Afghan political structure and defence policy is built under internal (heterogenic, conflicting tribal society) and externally (sandwiched between international powers, for example in colonial era, between the British Imperial Power and Tsarist Russia and during the Cold War era between the US and Soviet Union) political pressure. Thus, the Afghan strategic behaviour and defence policy patterns and the way in which Afghan decision making body prefers one strategy than other is related to the historical experiences through which Afghanistan built its strategic and defence policy patterns. Conversely, Pakistan inherited its political structure and defence organisation from the British Empire. The British trained highly skilled Pakistani Generals who ran the country soon after its independence such as General Mohammad Ayub Khan who served as a military officer in British Indian army,⁴⁵³ effectively and interchangeably used rational (political alignment with major powers, such US and China) and ideational sources 'Pan-Islamism' to secure its position against Indian hegemony and Afghanistan's irredentist claims.⁴⁵⁴ Consequently, the methods and the way in which strategic decision making body perceives security threats and decides strategic response and draws defence policy

⁴⁵² Coll, *Ghost War; The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001*, 61; Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, "Beyond Madrasas: Assessing The Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan," 18-19; Cassidy, *War, Will, And Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011*, 75.

⁴⁵³ Khan, *Friend Not Masters*, 10-14.

⁴⁵⁴ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 39-50.

patterns have been variable under realist and ideational factors and remained different between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Importantly, given the historical geopolitical disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Cold War politics provided an arena in which states sought security alliance, bandwagoning, military build-ups and political hegemony against each other. This kind of phenomenon subdued ideational factors such as cultural, ethnic myths and religious tenets of states strategy to contend with changing nature of security and political milieu in the region. The strategic preference of state through the lens of realist world is based on what calls it 'relative gain' where one state not only considers its gain, but also its rivals' achievement.⁴⁵⁵ In other words, 'state strife not only to be the most powerful actor in the system, but also to ensure that no other state achieve that lofty position'.⁴⁵⁶ However, given the example of shared strategic and security interests of the Western states, Mearsheimer's proclaims such as relative gain and the nature of state searching for lofty position may not be practically applicable in the contemporary Western globalised world, but it can be appropriate to the world outside the Western orbit. For example, Pakistan's strong alignment with the US under the Cold War politics forced Afghanistan to changes its strategy towards Pakistan. Viewing from a constructivist perspective, Wendt stated that 'world politics is 'socially constructed', which involves two basic claims: that the fundamental structure of international politics are social rather than strictly material...and that these structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour'.⁴⁵⁷ Further, he elaborated that 'social structure has three elements, shared knowledge, material resources and practice;

⁴⁵⁵ For realist approach on international security studies see John J. Mearsheimer, 'The false Promise of international institution', *International Security* 19 no. 3 (Winter 1995), 12.

⁴⁵⁶ Mearsheimer, 'The false Promise of international institution', 9.

⁴⁵⁷ See Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds) *Theories of War and Peace* (England: The MIT Press 2000), 416-417.

social structures are defined...by shared understanding, expectation or knowledge... [while] material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge'.⁴⁵⁸ Viewing from the perspective, Pakistani and US strategists had political consensus and shared understanding that Soviet communism is an immediate threat to the regional and international security.

The President Daoud's ethnocentric ideational strategy, the Pashtunistan policy, towards Pakistan was subjugated under political and security pressure created by Pakistan's alignment with the US - which provided Pakistan with economic and military assistance. After Afghanistan's strategic failure towards Pakistan, the Pashtunistan policy, which according to Rasanayagam, was a 'bitter pill' for, the President Daoud, Afghan government tried to establish a friendly relations with the state of Pakistan.⁴⁵⁹ With an effort, Daoud changed his strategy towards Pakistan by abandoning Pashtunistan policy and showing willingness to accept Durand Line as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan during his visit in Pakistan.⁴⁶⁰ However, Daoud's attempt to draw a new policy patterns towards Pakistan failed before enactment. After Daoud's assassination in a coup d'état in 1978, once again the Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues retained their strategic importance as significant strategic factors for Afghanistan's foreign and security policy towards Pakistan and vice versa. Notably, Wendt may have been true to emphasise importance of ideational factors in the context of social interactions between people under 'shared understanding, expectations and knowledge' in order to create alignment, collective security strategies and friendly political and security relations between states.⁴⁶¹ Again, this may have been appropriate to the Western world where culture myth and religious

⁴⁵⁸ Wendt, '*Theories of War and Peace*', 418-419.

⁴⁵⁹ Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan a Modern History*, 64.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

⁴⁶¹ Wendt, '*Constructing International Politics*', 418-419

tenets do not influence or remain modest factors influencing politics and strategies of states. This is not to say that shared understanding in the context of alignment, collective security is not achievable between the Western democratic states and non-Western undemocratic states. For example, Saudi Arabia is a strong US ally based on shared economic, security and political interests. These kinds of alignments are based on the principles that parties respect the non-interference policy in each other's domestic political structure, cultural values, and religious tenets. Notable, another reason for such alignment is national interests (mainly economic and security) of states sometimes eclipse human-centred democratic policies and strategies. This can be easily observed by examining how France and the US changed their strategies towards Libya (prior and later to humanitarian intervention in Libya), Iran, and Cuba in contemporary era. In this context, it would not be a mistake to say that 'today's alliance might be tomorrow's enemy and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance'.⁴⁶²

After decades of unsettled relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, recently both countries have started shifting their policy towards more co-operative relations, especially given the significant rise in the number of terrorist attacks in both countries. The army chief of Pakistan, General Raheel Sharif, alongside senior military delegates, including the ISI chief, has visited Afghanistan several times.⁴⁶³ Moreover, Pakistan offered to train Afghan cadets and 'provide equipment for an entire infantry brigade'.⁴⁶⁴ However, the Afghan policy shift towards Pakistan rests on finding ways to end the enduring conflict with the Taliban that has shattered the security of the

⁴⁶² Mearsheimer, 'The false Promise of international institution', 11.

⁴⁶³ See Ayaz Gul, "New Signs of Optimism for Afghan-Pakistan Relations," *Voice of America*, 27 Feb. 2015 accessed at <http://www.voanews.com/content/new-signs-of-optimism-for-afghan-pakistan-relations/2661371.html>, (accessed April 29, 2015).

⁴⁶⁴ See Jon Boone, "Ashraf Ghani visit may mark new chapter in Afghan-Pakistan relations," 14, November 2014, *The Guardian*, Nov.2014 accessed at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/14/ashraf-ghani-visit-pakistan-afghanistan>, (April 29, 2015).

country over the last fourteen years. Hence, in an effort to find ways to end the war in Afghanistan, the President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, paid his first state visit to Pakistan in November 2014 followed by visits to China and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁶⁵ In terms of threats to the security of Afghanistan, the Durand Line is not the strategic choice of preference for the new Afghan government. More exactly, the Taliban is perceived to pose the major, primary threat to the security of Afghanistan. According to Poore, “[s]trategic culture ...provides certain ...assumptions and beliefs that are shared by the collective and which will lead to a particular interpretation”.⁴⁶⁶ In an interview to *The Guardian*, former President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, criticised the recent Afghan policy shift towards Pakistan and stated that “if we give up control over our own foreign policy, [Durand Line], then all the wars fought ... against the British one hundred years ago...will be in vain”.⁴⁶⁷

The decision taken by Pakistan to ban the activities of the Haqqani group and to declare that there is not a “good and bad Taliban” has been considered a new strategic move in the region.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, the Pakistani military and the ISI are urging the Taliban towards peace talks with the Afghan government.⁴⁶⁹ However, given the fact that the strategic cultures of both nations are the products of historical experience, particularly the long unsettled disputes over the Durand Line, it will take some time for

⁴⁶⁵ Aoun Sahi and Shashank Bengali, “Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in Pakistan to repair ties,” 14 November 2014, *Los Angeles Times*, Nov.2014 accessed at <http://www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghanistan-pakistan-20141114-story.html>. (accessed April 29, 2015).

⁴⁶⁶ Poore Stuart, “Strategic Culture,” in *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture*, edited by John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore eds. (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2004), 50.

⁴⁶⁷ Boone, *The Guardian*, Nov.2014.

⁴⁶⁸ See Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Pakistan bans Haqqani network after security talks with Kerry,” *Reuters*, 16 Jan. 2015 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-pakistan-militants-haqqani-idUSKBN0KP1DA20150116>, (accessed April 30, 2015).

⁴⁶⁹ See Azam Ahmed and Joseph Godstein, “Pakistanis tries to nudge Taliban along the path to peace talk with Kabul,” *The New York Times*, 18 Feb. 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/world/pakistan-tries-to-steer-taliban-along-path-to-peace-talks-in-afghanistan.html>, (accessed April 29, 2015).

the elites and strategic decision makers in both countries to be convinced of the new perceptions concerning security strategies.

The strategic culture of a state develops under the influence of domestic structures and its foreign relations with regional states and international powers. Furthermore, the strategic culture of a nation state depends on the perceptions of the elite within the polity; since it is affected by the way in which people perceive security challenges and how they prioritise these challenges according to their geographic, economic, political, religious and cultural circumstances. Thus, the strategic culture is a combination of ideational and material variables that change according to the interests of the elites within a polity. For example, to Pakistani strategists and policy makers, supporting the Taliban may have been viewed as a successful strategy against Afghanistan in the 1990s. However, it backfired as a potential threat to Pakistan security developed in the form of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. Likewise, for Afghan strategists, allying with the Soviet Union may have been considered to be a successful strategy to offset its traditional enemy, Pakistan. However, factual developments, such as the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing civil war, demonstrate contradictions. Nevertheless, it is notable that although strategic cultures may be developed on the basis of security threats as perceived by the elites, strategists and policy makers, based upon historical grievances over geopolitical disputes, such as conflicts over borders, competition for political power and hegemony, yet they remain durable. Furthermore, the strategic choices made by states in terms of alignment, modernisation of the military and economic advancement, are variables that have an important role in shaping the strategic culture of the nation state. However, these values are variable and are not persuasive enough to define the strategic culture of a nation state in the long term. For example, given the importance of US-Pakistan

relations, the situation has always been controversial and unsettled. Hence, Pakistan felt seriously 'disappointed' and betrayed by the US-Indian relations (a joint military exercise and nuclear deal) in the 1960s.⁴⁷⁰

The Afghan strategic culture, particularly with regard to its foreign policy towards Pakistan, will remain centred around the issue of the Durand Line. Furthermore, decades of uncertainty and an unsettled relationship have created serious mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, it will take some time for the Afghan elites, bureaucrats and policy makers to recognise the new Afghan policy established by Pakistan, in particular, the notion of the ISI becoming friendly towards Afghanistan? The recently initiated strategy to fight against joint enemies, namely non-state terrorism, cannot yet be considered as a durable policy strategy between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this context, in order to predict the strategic behaviour of Afghanistan towards Pakistan and vice versa, it is important to study the strategic cultures of both states towards each other. Seen from this aspect, it can be said strategic culture theory can be used to explain specific outcomes in the defence policies of states.

⁴⁷⁰ Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An overview 1947-2004', 14.

Conclusion

At the heart of this assessment lies the effort to analyse jihad and madrasas – contrary to conventional approach in which both subjects generally seen from the religious, legal perspectives and/or otherwise as inimical to the Western interests – from strategic and political aspects to see how these variables have served interests of states and non-state actors within Islamic world. Notably, from the very inception of Islam, jihad and madrasas have taken shape in line with changing political, social, cultural, strategic and religious structures of Muslim communities within Islamic world. Consequently, jihad and madrasas have never followed a linear development. Justification to conduct jihad against fellow Muslims under the *Takfir* doctrine (excommunicating fellow Muslim from Islam) right at the dawn of Islam in the 7th century under Kharijites and later emergence of different schools of thought each advocating diverse perceptions and interpretation of fundamental sources of Islam, have demonstrated some of the best examples of changing role of jihad and madrasas pertinent to diverse political, strategic and socio-cultural circumstance in Islamic world.

However, generalisation of jihad and madrasas as strategic actors and policy domains in the contemporary Islamic world would be untenable. It should be noted that jihad and madrasas' roles as strategic actor and policy domain differ in accordance to the political, strategic, social, and cultural structures of states in Islamic world. To clarify this further, the role of jihad and madrasas as strategic actor and policy domain in Islamic countries or Islamic societies in non-Islamic states with relatively peaceful environments such as Malaysia, India, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, or Sultanate of Oman have remained futile or minimal. However, jihad and madrasas play key roles in conflict prone regions such as Afghanistan and Pakistan

where Islam have been playing inevitable roles inline with strategic and political interests of state and non-state actors in the region.

Irrespective of imparting religious or scientific education, in general madrasas are considered as centres of education in Islamic world. There is no doubt that historically madrasas were heart of knowledge and they had occupied dominant space in social, economic, and political arenas by producing highly skilled theologians, scientists, philosophers, poet, judicial officials and politicians in Islamic world. Notably, the commanding rule of Islamic religious institutions in providing legal rulings, *fatwas*, to social, cultural, economic, and political affairs as *halal*, lawful, *mubah*, permissible, *al maruf*, acknowledged as good actions or *haram*, unlawful, has coerced Muslim leaders to respect and protect *ulema* and their madrasas in Islamic world. In response to state provided political and economic protections, *ulema* through Islamic religious institution such as madrasas and mosques have delivered legal rulings and religious justifications to the policies pertinent to requisites of Islamic political authorities. As this assessment repeatedly pointed out that Islamic law is based on fundamental sources, Quran and *Sunnah*. It is therefore not surprising that some of the madrasas and mosques have remained as important political tools through which Muslim leaders provided moral and legal justifications for strategic and politically loaded wars in order to convince Muslim warriors that the way in which they are fighting are religiously righteous. This kind of phenomenon have occupied dominant space and vastly practiced in regions where madrasas and mosques command respect in state and public spheres such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It should be noted here that this on the other hand does not at all mean that Islam denounces modernity or rational, *aqli*, and analogical reasoning, *qiyas*. What matters here is the legal rulings in

Islamic law are based upon Islamic epistemology, which is centred in madrasas and mosques.

Throughout this assessment, it has been repeatedly stressed that in the contemporary world jihad has become a multidimensional, elastic concept that is employed in furtherance of military interests of various state and non-state actors through religious justifications provided by certain madrasas around the Islamic world. Particularly since the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the US, the moral and legal legitimacy of jihad has become one of the main bones of force that is used by various non-state Islamic radical groups to pursue strategic and political interests within Islamic as well as against the Western world. The Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani partners, TTP, alongside the international non-state Islamic terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIL led wars against the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as against each other demonstrate empirical examples in which one can clearly observe how jihad is spontaneously happening in various fronts inline with socio-cultural, political and strategic interests within Islamic world. Further, each of the non-state Islamic group apostates rival schools of thought and denounce their Islamic identity under *Takfir* doctrine. For example *Salafi*, *Wahabi*, and some other Islamic radical schools such as Ahl-I Sunnah Wa'l Jamaat, denounce *Jafari* schools of thought as non-Islamic. In the same way, *Jafari* schools of thought reflect similar religious justifications towards Wahabi, Salafi and Ahl-I Sunnat Wa'l Jamaat schools of thought.

According to a BBC documentary program entitled '*Freedom to Broadcast Hate*', aired on 18 September 2014, some non-state *Shia* Islamic organisations such as *Ahl El Bait*, centred in San Diego, California, USA, and *Khodam Al-Mahdi*, centred in Fulmer, Buckinghamshire, UK preach incendiary sectarian extremism by issuing the decrees of apostate and *takfir* against *Sunnis* through satellite TV channels as well as

mosques and madrasas.⁴⁷¹ Likewise, recognised *Sunni* religious clerics such as Muhammad Zoghbi through mosques and madrasas as well as renowned religious anchors through privately owned TV channels disseminate similar decrees of apostate and *takfir* against *Shias*.⁴⁷² Provision of such Islamic legal rulings, *fatwas*, of sectarian warfare by Muslim clerics through madrasas and mosques shape the contemporary jihad within Islamic world.

The historical records of jihad during the Prophet's era suggest that jihad has evolved mainly as defensive and just war doctrine, 'But do not initiate war with them near the Holy Kabah unless they attack you there. But if they mend their ways, then [you should know that] and offensive is only allowed against the evildoers'.⁴⁷³ However, this does not mean to relay on a narrow analysis of jihad as defensive or just war doctrine, rather what is important – as stressed several times in this dissertation – is to understand the complexity of political and strategic circumstances under which jihads were conducted during the Prophet's era. Thus, literally referring to some passage from Quran and/or calling upon decontextualized historical events, one cannot understand, criticise, and justify jihad. Hence, treating Islamic doctrine of war as timeless immutable duty of Muslim individuals in present day is merely decontextualized political and strategic loaded unjust practice of Islamic war. Such trends are appealing in the contemporary Islamic world, particularly in the regions where unknowledgeable and trustworthy *ulemas* and their madrasas command respect on unlettered Muslim masses.

There have hitherto been numerous contexts in which both Islamic and non-Islamic powers have used jihad as variable tool to leverage geostrategic and political

⁴⁷¹ See Nour-Eddin Zorgui, Freedom to Broadcast Hate, BBC Documentary, Directed by Sam Farnar, September 18, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29257524> (accessed, October 15, 2015).

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ See Quran (2:190-94).

interests. For example, Pakistani strategists, and decision makers preferred Islamic jihad as an important strategic tactic and defence policy against both Afghanistan and India since its independence in 1947. It should be, in this connection, be recalled that the Afghan jihad attracted bulk of Muslims from all around world to pass their baptism under the jihad with Afghans. Although, the strategic rhetoric of the West was based upon free trade and democracy, the strategy they preferred to fight Soviet communism in Afghanistan was built upon religiously motivated war, the Islamic jihad. What matters here is to understand why jihad's military facet is such an appealing force for strategists and policy makers within Islamic and non-Islamic world. As elaborated in this assessment, jihad for Muslims is a gateway to eternal life in *jannah*, paradise, that god promised to those who become martyr on his way. In this context, Muslims loaded with highly radical religious ideologies have remained as important substance for strategic interests of state and non-state actors in Islamic world. Particularly, unlettered masses with strong conviction about Islam hinge on *mullahs*, who are with little knowledge, but controlling commanding heights in societies, promote their own readings of jihad through madrasas and mosques in line with their socio-political and ideological stances in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. This trend has remained as important tool to serve strategic and political interests of state and non-state actors in these regions. The same reflection can be used to define political and strategic interests of non-state Islamic radical organisations and terrorist groups in the contemporary era. Thus, it can be said that jihad and madrasas as important strategic tools can be used to define strategic cultures of Islamic states, particularly those where Islam depicts all aspect of Muslims' lives.

Given the peaceful co-existence of Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Anglican, and many other smaller schools of thought within Christian world, *Sunni*, *Shia*, and

other smaller groups likewise can co-exist peacefully within one society. Indeed, madrasas and mosques of different schools of thought should afford tireless efforts to call for peaceful co-existence and impart tolerance amongst Muslim *ummah* in Islamic world. Nevertheless, this assessment acknowledges attainment of such environment in the contemporary Islamic world will not be an easy task to gain. However, it is important to emphasise that the contemporary religiously motivated war, jihad, necessitates importance of religion centred countermeasure actions in order to refute extreme literalist, decontextualized validation of jihad by ill-informed references to Quranic text and *Sunnah*, particularly in the regions where Islamic depicts all aspects of Muslim lives. Thus, *ulema* and their associates through madrasas, religious seminaries, and mosques, who are considered to be vanguards of Islamic law, jurisprudence and Islamic doctrine of warfare, can play important role in mitigating if not eradicating root causes of contemporary jihad within Islamic and non-Islamic world.

Since education regardless of religious or modern scientific pedagogies plays important role in transforming societies and building individuals' worldviews, it is important to promote madrasas to retain their conventional roles as centres that had contributed in constructing societies by producing civil servants such as judicial officials, scientists, theologians and philosophers. Irrespective of being accused as terrorist training centres or imparting Islamic religious education, madrasas and mosques play key role in shaping cultural, social and political structures of Muslim societies in the contemporary Islamic world. Thus, in large extent the solution to mitigate if not refute the contemporary crisis of jihad comes from madrasas and mosques, particularly in regions where they command high respect in public and states spheres.

Viewed in this light, it must be stressed that madrasas and mosques should not be parted as personal or autonomous centres for religious education. Given the fact that renowned Muslim architects, who built remarkable architectures such as Badshahi Masjid, (the Great Mosque of Delhi), Shah Jahan, Taj Mahal, in India, Sultan Ahmet Mosque, in Turkey and some other astonishing architectures in Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva cities of Uzbekistan, as well as some well known scientists such as Al-Khwarizmi, father of Algebra, and Avicenna, physician, were graduates from madrasa, madrasa throughout Islamic history until the rise of Western imperialism were both centres of religious and scientific education. However, it is not to blame Western imperialism – even though it may contain some elements of truth – for all ills in Muslim world. At the same time, it is also not to suggest reform in madrasa curriculum as have been raised repeatedly in the past discussions, but rather, what is important is to re-integrate madrasas into general education.

There is no doubt that jihad has occupied unprecedented place in the contemporary international politics and security, particularly within the Islamic world. Importantly, when analysing contemporary jihad, one must not merely observe non-state Islamic groups as sole perpetrators of self portrayed jihads, rather one should also effort considerable attention towards Islamic states who share greater roles in the expansion of contemporary strategic and politically loaded jihads in the Islamic world. In other words without some sort of state support the non-state jihadist organisations cannot subsist. Thus, the solution to end the contemporary jihad, which has emerged as an elastic variable force of carnage, cannot be achieved through military discourses against non-state Islamic terrorist groups, rather serious political discourses against and/or between Islamic states in general is essential. This is largely because, generally

states have greater military, political and economic powers and authority than non-state actors.

The Islamic communities not only have failed to construct an exemplary and ideal Islamic state to compete dominant Western statehood, but also they have failed to gain higher objectives of Islam – sustaining justice, peace, equality, human rights, and human brotherhood – within Islamic world. The question thus rises, who has the power to make things move within Islamic world? How to bring significant changes in religious and political spheres within an Islamic state? Given the fact that almost all of the Islamic states are alleged with series of corruption charges, feudalism, authoritarianism, and dictatorship as well as failure of public led movements against such institutions like ‘Arab Spring’, there is a fundamental need for flurry of initiatives, away from the faith that expresses itself in history, to reform Muslim communities in the way in which to revisit Islamic knowledge within the context of modernity, advanced technology and the contemporary intelligence. Otherwise, as far as the present trend persists in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, jihad and madrasas will continue to be employed in furtherance to mobilise strategic and political interests of state and non-state actors and thus, they can be used as variable to explain strategic cultures of such states.

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